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Understanding Care: Introductory 
Remarks
Franziska Krause and Joachim Boldt
“Care” is without doubt among the most important concepts in health-
care. The very word “healthcare” bears witness to this fact, indicating 
what the healthcare system as a whole and the individual actions taking 
place within healthcare are all about—namely, to provide care. The con-
cept of care plays an important role for the professional identity of care-
givers, and it is part of the expectation of care receivers. This can easily be 
forgotten given that in public and academic discourse, issues such as 
costs, prevention, the just distribution of scarce resources and the patient’s 
personal responsibility often figure more prominently than care.
Care is not only a descriptive concept, it also conveys a normative ori-
entation. The term “care” enables one to evaluate different courses of 
action in healthcare. What is more, different courses of action can corre-
spond more or less closely to what one perceives as good care. As there are 
standards and guidelines for and best practices of good care, care provid-
ers can ask themselves whether what they do constitutes good care. The 
question of whether the healthcare system as a whole as well as specific 
F. Krause (*) • J. Boldt 
Department of Medical Ethics and the History of Medicine, University of 
Freiburg, Freiburg, Germany
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regulations and practices within healthcare live up to the ideals of good 
care is always subject to debate.
For example, one may ask whether it is good care in midwifery to allow 
mothers to give birth at home and to offer them support in doing so. 
Many factors must be taken into account in order to come to a conclu-
sion—from the percentage of home and hospital births that involve 
severe incidents, to the experiences of mothers giving birth in both situa-
tions, to the costs of these two alternatives. These factors are related to 
different norms and may point in different directions. In order to find 
ways to proceed, one has to weigh these norms, including the well-being 
of mother and child, the economic and societal sustainability of health-
care provisions, and parents’ preferences.
Socioeconomic stability may interfere with good care in individual 
cases, since, for example, the amount of time care providers can allocate 
to individuals is limited by the number of cases they are expected to man-
age. Determining what constitutes good care is hence usually a matter of 
finding reasonable compromises. In healthcare settings, a typical com-
promise involves finding a balance between optimal care for individuals 
on the one hand and the institutional demands of providing care to many 
care receivers over long periods of time as well as the limits of what can 
legitimately be asked of individual care providers on the other.
Approaches to the ethics of care have shown that care can indeed be 
understood as an overarching normative concept that integrates different 
normative orientations. In the current literature, the unifying role of care 
has been stressed, first and foremost, with regard to personal, dyadic rela-
tions as well as with regard to justice and political theory more generally 
(Conradi 2001; Groenhout 2004; Held 2006; Pettersen 2008; Pulcini 
2013; Sevenhuijsen 1996). These approaches can be applied to health-
care. For example, if there is a conflict between care for the well-being of 
an individual mother and her child and the just allocation of institutional 
resources, the latter orientation can be understood as an attempt to safe-
guard the conditions that enable professional care in individual cases. 
Although protecting the well-being of an individual mother and her child 
is a prime example of caring, securing institutional socioeconomic stabil-
ity can be understood as serving the prior aim of caring as well, since the 
ability to provide professional care in individual cases presupposes 
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institutional stability. Making use of care as an overarching normative 
concept can guide this process of determining the best compromises. 
Institutional demands that cannot be justified on the basis of maintain-
ing the care institution’s socioeconomic stability may be rejected if they 
interfere with good care in individual cases.
 Defining Care
In order to understand care, one may start by attempting to devise a gen-
eral definition of this term. Such a definition of care must necessarily be 
broad if it is to cover as many important aspects of the phenomenon as 
possible. Care in healthcare comprises many elements including the 
physical interactions between care providers and patients, the observation 
of hygiene requirements and the completion of paperwork. Joan Tronto 
and Bernice Fisher have offered an influential definition that classifies as 
care all activities that help to “maintain, continue and repair ‘our’ world 
so that we can live in it as well as possible” (Tronto 1993, p. 40).
This definition can be fruitfully adapted to the healthcare context by 
replacing the term “activity” with “action”, which specifically indicates 
goal-directedness and intentionality. Healthcare activities are triggered by 
patient needs and requests; they follow professional obligations, and are 
shaped by institutional demands. Thus, activities in this field are usually 
goal-directed, which is to say they are actions rather than activities. In the 
same vein, the verbs “maintain, continue, repair” may be changed to 
“maintain, improve, restore”. While the first list describes the relations 
between people and all manner of entities, the second is tailored to 
actions that are directed towards humans and human health. On this 
basis, care in healthcare can be defined as follows:
Care in healthcare is a set of relational actions that take place in an 
institutional context and aim to maintain, improve or restore 
well-being.1
This definition brings to the fore three main aspects and characteristics 
of care that are of specific relevance in the healthcare system:
 Understanding Care: Introductory Remarks 
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Relationality Personal relations are at the heart of care in healthcare, 
where the paradigm of care is the relationship between a person who 
gives care and another who receives care. According to this paradigm, 
relationality is understood as the ongoing verbal and non-verbal com-
municative process between physically present caregivers and care receiv-
ers. This presupposes attitudes like attentiveness and responsivity, which 
can have a decisive impact on care situations. The way patients perceive 
and react to the prospect of an unpleasant procedure can change signifi-
cantly if the caregiver approaches the patient in a caring manner. 
Nonetheless, relationality in healthcare can also be less communicative 
and personal. For instance, in the case of surgery, it may be limited to 
the physician’s physical intervention into a patient’s body. In other 
instances, such as in telemedicine, care may take place without physical 
closeness between the caregiver and care receiver. Sometimes the rela-
tionality of care might even be completely invisible to observers. For 
example, when a physician completes a patient’s files, there is no visible 
direct relation to the patient, although the intentions of this action are 
clearly relational.
Institutionality Care in healthcare is care in an institutionalised and 
professionalised context. In contrast to care in a private context, care 
actions in a healthcare setting are often standardised and subject to 
assessment. This institutional setting can be the source of normative ten-
sions. For example, institutional rules and regulations that are only indi-
rectly connected to the well-being of patients, such as doing paperwork, 
must be implemented in the daily routines of caregivers even though this 
diminishes their ability to directly engage with patients. Along the same 
lines, the rules and regulations concerning bedside caregiving often need 
to be adjusted to the needs of individual patients and their situation. It 
is unreasonable to expect that care can be fully standardised, which is to 
say that to a certain degree, care regulation will always have to leave 
room for individual, context-sensitive decisions. These normative ten-
sions notwithstanding, regulation and standardisation can in many cases 
be regarded as being part of providing care for patients, since they enable, 
for instance, the long-term stability of healthcare systems and the just 
allocation of healthcare resources.
F. Krause and J. Boldt
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Well-being Care in healthcare is directed at those who are ill and at those 
who are at risk of becoming ill. In some cases, caring for a patient may 
simply mean curing that person, that is restoring health. In many other 
cases, such as chronic diseases and situations at the end of life, caring 
involves maintaining and improving the well-being of the patient to the 
extent to which this is still possible. Maintaining well-being in these cases 
is rooted in ongoing relational processes between caregivers and care 
receivers. As part of these processes, the understanding of well-being 
must be continuously adjusted, allowing caregiving to proceed in accor-
dance with the wishes of the care receiver. Thus in principle, respecting 
patient autonomy does not conflict with caring for the patient’s 
well-being.
At the same time, lending an ear to the patient might turn her initial 
denial into a willingness to attempt a new therapy. Care, therefore, 
inevitably involves the possibility of indirectly influencing a patient’s 
will. What is more, there are instances of care where the current will, 
for example, of a dementia patient does not correspond to his overall 
well-being or his former will. In such cases, care might involve practices 
that directly influence the patient’s will. In this context, it can be diffi-
cult to draw clear distinctions between manipulative actions that trans-
gress the boundaries of care and those actions that still fall within the 
limits of care.
 Understanding Care
As the aforementioned aspects of care make clear, a number of tensions 
and ambivalences emerge within the notion of care. Although a general 
definition of the term care can provide a better impression of the range of 
actions that this term covers, it will not help identify and normatively 
categorise these tensions, nor find ways to deal with them. However, the 
fact that it is difficult to come up with a precise definition of care does not 
imply that it is impossible to point out prototypical examples of care 
practices or to delineate a spectrum of more or less typical instances of 
care activities (Mol et al. 2010). To invoke a linguistics textbook example, 
one can name prototypical examples of objects that fall under the term 
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“bird” or “animal” and give less common examples, such as penguins and 
corals, respectively, even if precisely defining these terms proves 
impossible.
In order to gain a better understanding of the meaning of care in 
healthcare in this sense, definitions must be supplemented by descrip-
tions and analyses of concrete care practices. Referring to the tensions 
mentioned above, questions emerge that can only be answered with refer-
ence to concrete cases. For example: Can one’s actions still be understood 
as being part of an ongoing communicative process with the patient? 
When do daily institutional routines support adequate caregiving, and 
when do they hinder giving care? Are one’s actions still in line with what 
the patient wants and needs? This book supplies both reflections on gen-
eral characteristics and definitions of care, and case studies that point to 
and analyse tensions within the notion of care in different healthcare 
settings.
 Framing Care
Part one of this book deals with traditions of care theory, philosophical 
and anthropological approaches to care, and care as an overarching nor-
mative concept. Conradi highlights similarities between the notions and 
intentions of today’s care ethics and those of Jewish social reform move-
ments of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Germany. 
With regard to philosophical approaches, the book focuses on hermeneu-
tic and phenomenological theories. The characteristics of personal rela-
tions, their inherent normativity and interpretations of human interaction 
have always been at the centre of these theories. Freter, in his contribu-
tion, follows the phenomenological tradition and focuses on the notion 
of the “appeal” that a person in need unwittingly directs at a potential 
caregiver, using the story of the Good Samaritan as a paradigmatic exam-
ple. Maio shows how care ethics can be connected to central themes of 
the hermeneutic tradition, as exemplified by Paul Ricoeur. Care is often 
assumed to be an antagonistic concept to respect for autonomy. Referring 
to Ricoeur’s concept of the self, Boldt argues instead that an adequate 
understanding of care necessarily incorporates respect for autonomy and 
F. Krause and J. Boldt
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vice versa. Krause highlights relationality and responsibility as parts of 
care. She turns to the case of commercial surrogacy and shows how care 
ethics and Emmanuel Levinas’ notion of the Other add important and 
often neglected aspects to the ethical evaluation of surrogacy.
 Situated Care
The second part of the book focuses on care in different healthcare set-
tings and analyses cases that do not initially seem to fit within the care 
paradigm. Typically, these situations pose a challenge to any kind of clear 
ethical solutions. For example, as Driessen discusses, caring for persons 
with dementia in residential care homes may comprise elements of “work-
ing on the will” of the care receiver in order to align what the resident 
wants with what the caregiver deems necessary for the person’s well-being. 
Haeusermann also addresses dementia care, describing care practices in 
the first German dementia village and analysing ambivalences between 
regulation and freedom, and the constant oscillation between social 
inclusion and exclusion. On the basis of the current Flemish regulation 
on the use of seclusion cells in psychiatric institutions, Opgenhaffen sug-
gests that while caregivers should not be overwhelmed or blinded by 
regulation, regulation should not prematurely impose a rational-objective 
mode on care. Instead, he spells out how seclusion regulation and care 
could fruitfully co-exist. Skeide describes witnessing as the relational and 
environmentally structured strategy of midwives in Germany and France. 
Being able to witness can be an integrating experience or have an alienat-
ing effect. In either case, Skeide establishes that clinical settings tend to 
delimit witnessing as a midwifery care practice. Pei-Yi Liu’s chapter 
focuses on providing care in the actual homes of diabetes patients. In 
doing so, she traces the ethical dilemmas and challenges healthcare pro-
fessionals face when dealing with a chronic illness in homecare settings. 
She shows that nurses’ care tasks alternate between notions of patient 
autonomy and professional authority—two concepts that at times seem 
unbridgeable. Kohlen contends that the specific care knowledge and care 
perspective of nurses is underrepresented in the clinical institutional 
communication, possibly resulting in harm for patients. On the basis of 
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studies in nursing ethics, she examines the ethical problems faced by 
nurses providing hospital care and their participation in hospital ethics 
committees over the last 30 years. Van der Meide uses the conceptual tool 
of the “three dimensional space”, introduced by the philosopher and soci-
ologist Henri Lefebvre, in order to describe and delineate the humanising 
and dehumanising effects of care in the hospital. She shadowed older 
patients during their stay in the hospital. Their experience of the hospital 
environment leads to feelings of “not fitting in” and “not belonging to”.
All of the contributions in this book highlight the role of care in 
healthcare. They cannot and do not intend to provide an exhaustive over-
view of the field. Nonetheless, we are convinced that they give valuable 
insights into core characteristics as well as tensions and ambivalences of 
the notion of care in healthcare.
Note
1. This definition has been discussed and developed jointly by many con-
tributors of this book in the course of a workshop on care in healthcare 
held in Freiburg in September 2015 (Joachim Boldt, Annelieke Driessen, 
Björn Freter, Tobias Häusermann, Franziska Krause, Pei-Yi Liu, Tim 
Opgenhaffen, Annekatrin Skeide).
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 Jewish Ethics in Germany
In the United States and Europe, the ethics of care has achieved a promi-
nent position among the variety of normative views in circulation.1 A 
major exception is the German-speaking world, which has for the most 
part ignored the topic and the feminist perspectives that often accom-
pany it.2 Indeed, the entire subject area—along with the related concepts 
of benevolence, attention, donation, hospitality, and empathy—has 
hardly played a role in German university philosophy over the centuries, 
up to and including the present day. How to explain the German-speaking 
world’s neglect? I would like to argue that philosophers advocating Jewish 
ethics in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries planted the seeds 
E. Conradi (*) 
Baden-Wuerttemberg Cooperative State University (DHBW),  
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for these ideas but that their work was repressed by the Nazi regime and 
obscured by its long shadow, preventing a modern reception.
In 1935, Martin Buber (1878–1965) published Der Nächste, a collec-
tion of four essays on what it means to relate to other human beings as 
neighbours by the Marburg philosopher and neo-Kantian Hermann 
Cohen (1842–1918). In the introduction, Buber discusses when and 
under what circumstances assistance should be provided to others (1935, 
p. 7). He defends the need for positive duties against the widely held view 
in philosophy that restricts ethical duties to the ancient dictum ‘Do no 
harm’. This position generally holds action to be mandatory only in very 
exceptional cases (Conradi 2016, pp. 54–58). Even a philosopher like 
Arthur Schopenhauer, who saw compassion as the driving force behind 
ethical behaviour, believed that the need must be acute and the emer-
gency dire before action is required (2005, p. 101). For contemporary 
philosophers following Schopenhauer’s lead, the main criteria for per-
forming individual assistance are an expectation of a significant effect, a 
severe emergency, a limited duration of aid, and a minor effort required 
for assistance (Mieth 2012, p. 243). Buber focuses on two other aspects 
of positive duty: whether the recipient is a member of one’s own collec-
tive and whether the recipient is spatially proximate. Buber emphasises 
that the person at the receiving end could be anyone and therefore no 
distinction should be made between neighbour, stranger, friend, acquain-
tance, and enemy. But he believes particular attention should be paid to 
any person who is within the helper’s immediate sphere:
‘Be loving to your fellow as to one who is like you’, is written in the 
Scripture, and shortly thereafter, as if to avoid any misunderstanding at any 
time, through special highlighting: ‘Be loving to a stranger as to one who is 
like you’. Rea, the fellow, is someone I am dealing with, whom I met just 
now, the human being so to speak, for whom I should be ‘concerned’ at 
this moment, whether he is of my own people or a foreigner. I should, liter-
ally translated, ‘love him’: turn towards him tenderly, show him love, prac-
tice love; namely as someone who is ‘like me’: in need of love such as I, in 
need of an act of love of a rea like me—as I know it just from my own soul. 
That this is to be understood in this way arises from the words following 
the second sentence: ‘Because you’ve been strangers in the land of Egypt’—
or, as it says more clearly elsewhere: ‘You know the soul of the stranger, 
 E. Conradi
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because you’ve been strangers in the land of Egypt’. You know this soul and 
its suffering, you know what it needs, and therefore, those to whom it was 
once refused, deny them not! Let us dare, from there, to put the justifica-
tion of the first sentence in words. Be loving to your fellow human being as 
to one who is like you—you know the soul of the co-human [Mitmensch], 
who is in need, so that one is loving to him, because you are people and you 
suffer yourself the plight of man. Such is a message of the ‘Old Testament’ 
(1935, pp. 6–7).
Buber stresses the equal ranking of human beings in one’s proximity. For 
all of them, the same personal support is mandatory, regardless of whether 
they are neighbours, mere acquaintances, or strangers. Buber makes the 
impression that the act of assistance is less important than the act of turn-
ing our attention towards others. What ethical behaviour is truly about is 
the decency, attention, warmth, and kind-heartedness that accompany it. 
We should view others as in “need of love” [liebesbedürftig], we should 
“turn towards them tenderly” [liebend zuwenden], “show them love” [Liebe 
erzeigen], and “practice love to them” [Liebe antun] (1935, p. 6).3
Martin Buber was by no means alone in his focus on what it means to 
relate to other human beings as neighbours. In the long nineteenth cen-
tury, religious philosophers, writers, and rabbinic scholars widely reflected 
on social justice, companionship, consolation, and cooperation. Around 
30 texts written between 1837 and 1913 on this subject matter were 
recently republished under the title Nächstenliebe und Barmherzigkeit 
(Brocke and Paul 2015). Few of these texts were likely to have been writ-
ten as contributions to contemporary philosophical debate. Many came 
in response to vehement attacks against the authors, with some critics 
even questioning their right to citizenship and societal belonging. What 
is more, the authors of these texts geared them towards lay readers in an 
effort to expand their knowledge and perhaps to equip them with argu-
ments against common criticisms. The majority of these treatises were 
dedicated to defending Jewish ethical teachings against popular misrepre-
sentation. They explicitly rebutted legends and obvious simplifications—
such as the claim that the code of conduct Jews followed among themselves 
was different from the one they followed among non-Jews—and rejected 
the mischaracterisation of Jewish ethical teachings as small minded and 
petty. Jobst Paul argues that Jewish ethics ties the institutional social 
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 justice with individual ethical requirements of benevolence and charity 
(Paul 2015, p. 12). “In view of the complexity and depth with which 
these themes are meaningful for and mould Judaism in its ethical core”, 
he observes, “it is completely incomprehensible that precisely this ethical 
core … became the ideological basis for hostility towards Jews” (2015, 
p. 13). But that is exactly what happened in the course of the nineteenth 
century: the process through which the Jewish minority had become 
equal citizens before the law was discredited. Underlying the calls for the 
revocation of Jews’ citizenship and the criticisms of Jewish ethics were 
two interlocking myths. The first, Paul explains, was that “in Judaism, 
only a member of the brethren is considered a fellow human being. … The 
Jewish view is supposed to be selfish and particular, that is, geared towards 
its own interests”. The second was that “only Christianity has brought 
forth a universalist … altruistic ethics of neighbour love, making Judaism 
obsolete” (2015, pp. 13 f.).
Hermann Cohen, in correcting such “misunderstandings” (1935d, 
p. 19), sought to elucidate the idea of Mitmenschlichkeit, or co-humanity, 
in the Jewish tradition (Sieg 1997, p. 252). In 1888, the Royal District 
Court of Marburg asked Cohen to provide an expert opinion on the fol-
lowing proposal: “The law of Moses is only valid from a Jew to another 
Jew; it has no bearing on Goyim, whom you may rob and cheat” (Cohen 
1888, p.  3). Hermann Cohen presented his answer in an essay titled 
“Neighbour Love in the Talmud” (“Die Nächstenliebe im Talmud”) 
(1888, p. 1).
This paper was one of the four texts collected in Buber’s Der Nächste.4 
The editor’s afterword (it is unclear whether it was written by Martin 
Buber or Margarete Susman5) contains a summary of the allegations crit-
ics directed against Jewish ethics in the late nineteenth century:
The main accusation against Judaism was that it was spiritually and practi-
cally surpassed by … Christianity’s unconditional neighbour love. 
Theologians and antisemites are in agreement on this point. Theologians 
like Rudolf Kittel and Franz Delitzsch concluded from it Christianity’s 
morally superiority; antisemites concluded from it Judaism’s inferiority. 
Vulgar antisemitism alleged and still maintains that Judaism’s ethical 
 principles applied only to Jews and urged immoral behaviour towards non- 
Jews. (Cohen 1935a, pp. 82 f.)
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The afterword notes that Cohen’s papers were directed against past 
arguments—the theologian Rudolf Kittel died in 1929—but in deciding 
to republish four of Cohen’s texts in 1935, Buber was addressing his own 
contemporaries. The Protestant theologian Gerhard Kittel (1888–1948)6 
published a brochure in 1933 titled “The Jewish Question” (“Die 
Judenfrage”), in which he invited Christians to endorse a piece of legisla-
tion enacted by National Socialists that permitted government authori-
ties to fire Jewish professors, judges and other public servants at short 
notice (Kittel 1933).7 Kittel asked whether such a radical legislation was 
still justifiable from an ethical, Christian standpoint (1933, p. 7).8 His 
answer—the question was merely rhetorical—is clear: “We have estab-
lished the unconditional demand that the struggle against Judaism must 
be led on the basis of an international and clear Christianity” (1933, 
p. 8).9 Kittel expressly denied “the equal social ranking of Jews and their 
basis civil rights” (1933, p. 20) and unambiguously legitimises the revo-
cation of their citizenship by assigning them the status of “guest” (“Gast”) 
and “stranger” (“Fremdling”) (1933, p. 46).10 In lending credence to his 
point, Kittel observed that over 3000 years ago Jews had lived as strangers 
in Egypt, and hence should continue to do so today. Grotesquely, Kittel 
tried to justify his position by quoting Mosaic law: “‘You shall give the 
poor his wages on the same day, before the sun sets: whether he belongs 
to your people, or whether he’s a stranger who lives in your country and 
behind your gates’ (5. Mos. 24,14; 27,19)” (1933, p. 57).11
Martin Buber immediately replied to these arguments (particularly the 
fallacious interpretation of the stranger’s status in Mosaic law) in his 1933 
“Open Letter to Gerhard Kittel”, which appeared in the journal 
Theologische Blätter (Buber 2011). In the second edition of his brochure 
Kittel published a response to Buber, where despite the usual academic 
modus operandi he elected not to publish Buber’s text alongside his own 
(1934, pp. 87–100). Buber’s 1935 collection of essays by Cohen can be 
understood as a rejection of Kittel’s absurd arguments. In fact, Gerhard 
Kittel did not think up his positions entirely on his own. Other theolo-
gians had already paved the way. For example, Adolf Stoecker (1835–1909) 
published a collection of speeches where he notes that “modern Judaism 
seems to pose a major threat to German national life” (Stoecker 1880, 
p. 5). In 1880, Stoecker signed an “antisemite petition” submitted to the 
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Prussian Prime Minister Otto von Bismarck. Its purpose was to undo the 
legal emancipation of the Jews of 1869, and demanded that the German 
nation rid itself of Jews’ domination, limit their immigration, and exclude 
them from official posts (Conradi 2014, p. 231; Krieger 2003). Cohen 
rebutted arguments like these—specifically addressing those presented by 
the historian Heinrich von Treitschke [1879, p. 574]—in his 1880 “A 
Statement on the Jewish Question” (Cohen 2014). A few years later, 
Cohen published his expert opinion for the Royal District Court of 
Marburg, in which he discussed the treatment of strangers in the Jewish 
ethical tradition (Cohen 1888).
 Helping Those Nearby
Philosophers tend to think that individuals are not obliged to help others if 
the need is small, if the expected effect of the aid only results in an improve-
ment, if the assistance is continuous, or if the assistance is too taxing. 
Sometimes they allow the possibility of obligation if there is some kind of 
proximity to those in need. Onora O’Neill argues that some people are 
obliged to help others when they are socially close to them. Parents have 
‘special’ (in contrast to ‘universal’) obligations towards their children: they 
are “held by some” and are merely “owed to specified others” (O’Neill 1996, 
p. 198). But the fulfilment of ‘special’ obligations is at the discretion of the 
individual, who decides who feels socially close, and whether and to what 
extent to fulfil them (O’Neill 1996, p.  251). Accordingly, this position 
leaves many questions open. One important question is, Whom to help?
For Hermann Cohen, the idea of co-humanity [Mitmenschlichkeit] 
suggests that the person receiving aid must be a fellow human being—
Nächster, someone near. But is a neighbour someone who is spatially near 
or socially near? Cohen’s concept of the “human being as a neighbour” 
(“vom Menschen als dem Nächsten”) gives no indication of pre-existing 
social proximity. Cohen does link co-humanity to a certain spatial 
 closeness, however, and this is how Buber interprets Cohen’s co-humanity 
(1935, pp. 6–7). For Buber, the neighbour is someone “with whom I have 
contact, whom I am just now meeting, the human being who concerns 
me at this moment” (1935, p. 6). Cohen talks about how the concept of 
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the human being as neighbour and fellow human comes to be and rein-
terprets the “love of strangers” as a “creative moment” in this development 
(1888, p. 8). In this respect, there is no doubt for Cohen that the benevo-
lence that accompanies co-humanity is directed at strangers and acquain-
tances in equal measure  (Hollander 2012, p.  106). Whether someone 
counts as a ‘co-human’ [Mitmensch] depends only on whether the person 
is in difficulty and currently within one’s own sphere. “Neighbour love, 
benevolence towards the stranger as defined by nationality and religion”, he 
concludes, “is a commandment of Judaism” (1888, p. 8).
In addition to stranger love, Cohen stresses the basic requirement of social 
equality of human beings and their ‘co-humans’. This kind of equality sig-
nifies parity and respect. In response to a comment by Naphtali Herz 
Wessely on the Third Book of Moses,12 Cohen writes: “He doesn’t say I 
should love the neighbour like myself but renders it as love thy neighbour, 
he is like you. This is the new idea: that people are equal to each other as 
human beings, namely as children made in the image of God. From this 
stems the possibility of the duty of neighbourly love. The duty does not 
stipulate the degree of love—which would raise the suspicion that neigh-
bourly love was self-help. It teaches the equality of people and from this, 
love is derived” (1935b, pp. 17 f.).
As I observed above, Buber does not explicitly characterise neighbourly 
love as a feeling, but he does speak of love. By contrast, Hermann Cohen 
explains the relationship of the human being and the co-human by way of 
disposition [Gesinnung], which he believes leads to action. This disposition 
is not felt; actions unfold [entfalten] from it. After some time, an awareness 
[Bewußtsein] arises that connects people and expresses itself as solidarity:
Neighbour love is a behaviour induced by a disposition towards co- humans, 
not the caution, protection, and defence against harm expected from them. 
All cultivation of a social life entails the unfolding of an ethical disposition. 
And compassion [Mitleid], which awakens people’s  suffering [Leiden], is 
less pain and passion than the dawning of moral awareness on behalf of the 
alliance of people, as a kind of force of nature that connects them. The 
disposition does not remain as an individual secret; rather, it expresses and 
is involved in the association of people (1935c, p. 8).
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From the first sentence of this long passage, it is clear that Cohen 
understands the active support of others as a positive duty, not a negative 
duty limited to the omission of harmful acts. Cohen’s sense of ethics goes 
beyond the individual; it encompasses the awareness that people are con-
nected and gives reasons for solidarity among them.
Leo Baeck is another thinker who considers social equality to be a 
fundamental ethical idea. Like Cohen, Baeck does not believe that com-
passion is a feeling: “In complete fidelity to the sense and the actual con-
tent of the word, he says: ‘Love your neighbour, he is like you’. The whole 
emphasis is located on this ‘like you’. It expresses the unity of all that is 
human, a unity that makes life on Earth meaningful and which means 
much more than the indefinite word love. The social idea of one human-
kind and one human right and not merely a fleeting feeling has formed 
this idea” (2007, p. 11 f.). For Leo Baeck, to treat your fellow human 
being decently and kind-heartedly is not a question of feeling or indi-
vidual decision. It is required of the individual and structures social life 
and interaction.
The German rabbi and writer Ludwig Philippson also argues against 
describing co-humanity as a feeling. He sees the commandment of neigh-
bour love as a social duty to take action. In Die That (“The deed”) 
Philippson writes, “Religion has not just brought God closer to people; it 
has also brought people close to the fellow human being” (1845, p. 250). 
Philippson distinguishes between two types of ethics. He claims the bibli-
cal injunction “Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself ” for Judaism and 
reads it as the active support of fellow human beings. The other type of 
ethics appropriated the concept of neighbour love, mimicked it, and 
“embellished it with many other words, with lots of beautiful words, with 
many lovely sayings; people revelled in the feelings of love, of peace—but 
where was the deed?” (1845, p. 250). Placing the biblical quote in the 
context of rabbinic writings, Philippson contrasts this second type of eth-
ics with Jewish assistance of others [Wohltätigkeit], which he describes as 
“the most beautiful, the most noble side of neighbourly love, wherein the 
word has fully become deed” (1845, p. 250). Philippson sees two branches 
of Jewish Wohltätigkeit. Tzedaka, which is often translated as “charity”, 
refers to the aid we give those in need (1845, p. 250). It is mainly a ques-
tion of financial support and donations in five cases: (1) freeing innocent 
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prisoners; (2) funding weddings that people otherwise could not afford; 
(3) feeding and educating orphans; (4) providing food and lodging for 
travellers who have been displaced, are sick, or have an urgent reason to 
leave their homes; and (5) treating the poor with a kind heart and com-
forting words (1845, p. 251). The second branch of Wohltätigkeit is the 
gemilut chassadim. It consists (1) in the participation in wedding celebra-
tions; (2) in prayer for and visit of the sick; in (3) unpaid volunteer clean-
ing, clothing and burial of the dead; and (4) in the “consolation of the 
bereaved and grieving” (1845, p. 252).
Tzedaka and gemilut chassadim are key ideas in Jewish ethics. Gemilut 
chassadim can perhaps be considered as ‘lending a helping hand’ or as in 
person social engagement (Zeller 1997, p. 117). In the Jewish Encyclopaedia 
of 1928, the entry for gemilut chessed translates it as a “demonstration of 
love” and as an “active participation in the joys and sorrows of the fellow 
human being”. But it also involves assisting others (Elbogen et al. 2008, 
p. 1007). Philippson explains that both tzedaka and gemilut chassadim are 
to be exercised according to the extent of one’s own powers and abilities, 
yet no one is exempt: “And behold, this is the deed! This is deed and real-
ity! This is not only a word and a sweet sensation, but a strong deed. The 
wise say that even the poor person who live on alms should sometimes 
give alms!” (1845, p. 252)
Gemilut chassadim is a central concept in understanding the notion of 
common humanity’s place in Jewish ethics. In Samson Raphael Hirsch’s 
(1808–1888) translation of the treatise Chapters of the Fathers [pirkei avot], 
a part of the Mishnah, it is said that “the world relies on three things: on the 
Torah, on worship, and on deeds of love”. Hirsch’s translation was pub-
lished posthumously in 1895. In his comment on the passage, he writes:
Torah: the knowledge of the divine truth and the divine will for our whole 
inner and outer self and world life; avoda: the duty of obedience to God in 
fulfilling His will with our whole inner and outer self and world life; gemi-
lut chassadim: the selfless deeds of love for the salvation of fellow human 
beings. These three things make up and complete the human world and 
what it encompasses depending on size and type; where they are missing, 
and if they are missing, and to the extent that they are missing, there is a 
gap that cannot be replaced by anything, a part of being is missing. … 
Without gemilut chassadim, humans lack the first part of being similar to 
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God, and instead of bearing a likeness to God in saving and blessing their 
contemporaries, their hearts are frozen in senseless selfishness and hard-
ness, and mankind lacks the bond of brotherhood and love, where the joy 
of life and happiness will thrive. In studying the Torah, human beings do 
justice to themselves; in avoda, to God; in gemilut chassadim, to their co-
humans (1994, pp. 6f.).13
There are other interpretations of this line from the same decade. Isaak 
S. Bamberger (1863–1934) translates gemilut chassadim as ‘‘Wohltätigkeit’’ 
(contributing to wellbeing) and not, like Hirsch, as ‘‘selbstlose 
Liebestätigkeit’’ (selfless action out of love). Below Bamberger explains 
his decision:
The world rests on three things—the world in its entirety as well as each one 
was created for the purpose of performing these three things: the Torah; the 
study of the Torah for one’s own spiritual perfection is a duty for a human 
being unto himself. Divine worship, first in the sacrificial service in the 
Tabernacle and in the holy Temple of Jerusalem, and since the destruction 
of the latter, in prayer. This brings with it obligations toward God. And 
assisting others, through personal bodily assistance (visiting the sick, funer-
als, consoling the bereaved, sharing the joy of bride and groom, making 
peace and the like) and support of the needy and poor, which is suited to 
the duties toward the fellow human being (1981, pp. 2f.).
The forms of personal assistance described here were no mere lip ser-
vice. They were practiced by cooperative associations, known as hevrot in 
Hebrew (Auerbach 1969, p.  19).14 These non-profit groups had been 
active in large numbers and identifiable in every form in Europe since the 
sixteenth century (Farine 1973, p. 17; pp. 19f.; Baader 2001, p. 17).
Benjamin H.  Auerbach, who wrote about the hevrot operating in 
Halberstadt in the nineteenth century, interprets such associations in the 
context of Jewish ethics:
It is a fact that the first characteristic sign of the presence of a pious Jewish 
community is the existence of associations in their midst; they secure 
within the community the three pillars on which, according to the words 
of the wise, the world rests: knowledge of the Torah, religious and human 
personal service, and giving alms (Torah, avoda, and gemilut chassadim); 
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specifically in creating a special association for each branch of assisting oth-
ers. These special associations can be more active within those three very 
large spheres of influence (1866, p. 128).
Auerbach points out that the encouragement of these tasks was not to 
be achieved primarily through financial contributions, but through col-
lectively coordinated voluntary activity in person (Auerbach 1866, p. 128, 
n. 1). Auerbach names the groups active in Halberstadt around 1866. 
Members of one association visited the sick, supported them financially, 
and assisted the dying. There was a “bread distribution society”, a “fire-
wood distribution association” (Auerbach 1969, p. 28) that provided fuel 
to “the local Jewish poor during the four months of winter” (1866, 
pp. 128f.), and an association that supported transients and the “itinerant 
poor” during holidays (1866, p. 128, n. 1). There was a male “burial soci-
ety” (1866, p.  226), founded in 1769 (Farine 1973, p.  30), that dealt 
“with the washing and cleaning of the dead, accompanies them to the 
cemetery, and prepares their tomb” (Auerbach 1866, p. 128). There was 
also a women’s association whose members visited women and girls in 
need, read and discussed books with them, and performed funerals (1866, 
p. 129). Hirsch B. Auerbach (1901–1973) describes a Halberstadt wom-
en’s association whose statutes go back to 1492. It seems that this associa-
tion was devoted primarily to the task of reading, and possibly to making 
clothes for the dead and visiting the sick (1969, p. 21). A soup kitchen was 
added at the beginning of the twentieth century (Auerbach 1969, p. 22).
All these activities are in line with the Jewish belief that people have a 
fundamental ethical obligation to their co-humans. Both in the Palestinian 
and Babylonian Talmuds, these obligations are defined as the exercise of 
mercy, hospitality, supporting the poor, visiting the sick, making peace, 
providing comfort for the grieving, and arranging funerals for the dead 
(Steppe 1997, pp. 81f.). Visiting the sick [bikkur cholim] also comprises 
the supply of food, the cleaning of the sick’s room, the entertainment and 
consolation of the sick, and praying for them (Auerbach 1969, p. 27; 
Steppe 1997, pp. 81f.). Comforting, consoling, assisting, and, if neces-
sary, nursing the sick, whether they are members of one’s own commu-
nity or outsiders, are part of religious duty in Judasim. Associations such 
as the hospital visit society [chevrat bikkur cholim] existed precisely for 
this purpose (Lewy 2008).
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Lina Morgenstern places these associations specifically in the context 
of the German women’s movement. In her book charting the history of 
this movement, she also mentions numerous Jewish women’s associations 
for learning and alleviating distress. Morgenstern was aware of 700 such 
entities (Lordick 2013, p. 11) dedicated to supporting the poor, the sick, 
new mothers, orphans, and needy children (Morgenstern 1893, p. 140 
ff.). Some ten years later, Siddy Wronsky described the establishment of 
the Jewish Women’s League: “Founded in 1904  in Berlin by Berta 
Pappenheim, on the occasion of the meeting of the International Women’s 
congress, it seeks to merge Jewish women’s associations in Germany 
(1928: 10 national and provincial associations, 32 local groups, 450 indi-
vidual associations) with the aim of promoting cultural and social Jewish 
tasks for women and by women, each with an equal voice” (Wronsky 
1929). For more than 30 years, the Jewish Women’s League set itself cul-
tural, social, and feminist objectives (Daemmig 2004). This alliance 
formed out of common beliefs shared by Jewish social reformers such as 
Lina Morgenstern, Bertha Pappenheim (Pappenheim 2015), Alice 
Salomon (Salomon 1901), Sidonie Werner, and Henriette Fürth. Despite 
the differences between them, they all wanted to combine the care of the 
elderly and sick with the creation of vocational training institutions and 
merge child welfare with their educational ideas. Clearly, their social 
commitment in this regard went far beyond any of the positive obliga-
tions defended by philosophers. Indeed, behind their political and schol-
arly pursuits was a belief in the need for Jewish social ethics.
 Political Practice and Ethical Belief
Margarete Susman also stresses the idea of practical engagement in her 
essay “Revolution and Women” [Die Revolution und die Frau], published 
in December 1918 (1992). She wrote her essay in the aftermath of the 
First World War and the subsequent November Revolution. By this time, 
the major goal of the women’s movement had been achieved: political 
suffrage for women was introduced on 12 November 1918. Susman criti-
cises the passivity of most women towards the beginning of the war and 
urges them to become involved in the revolution. This put Margarete 
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Susman in the proximity of radical feminists such as Lida Gustava 
Heymann and Helene Stöcker, who saw the introduction of women’s suf-
frage as an admission of the collapse of male-dominated politics. By con-
trast, the speakers of the ‘Federation of German Women’s Associations’ 
[Bund Deutscher Frauenvereine] issued a declaration in November 1918 
that sought to justify the necessity of the war.
Susman begins her essay by asking why so few women in Germany 
were interested in politics, and discounts disenfranchisement and their 
lack of a public voice as reasons. She notes that suffragettes in England 
fought for their lives and the Germans only made fun of them, just as 
they had once distanced themselves from the “manly women” of the 
French and Russian revolutions. Although they possessed a “voluntary 
nature” arising from “self-sacrifice, silent goodness, pure heroism” 
(Susman 1992, p.  117), they lacked “freedom” in the sense of having 
made a “vital decision for or against what was happening” (Susman 1992, 
p. 118). German women’s lack of political engagement was owing to the 
view that politics were “alien to the female character” (Susman 1992, 
p. 119); entering the political fray was tantamount “to a corruption of the 
purely human” (Susman 1992, p. 121).
But Susman argues that women are capable of being political and, 
given the politics of the time, their involvement was more needed than 
ever before. She proposes a  politically active concept of the human 
opposed to what she criticises as “German inwardness” [deutsche 
Innerlichkeit]. A “ruinous inheritance of the great and inventive German 
metaphysics in uninspired times” (1992, p. 119), “German inwardness” 
is a situation in which individuals have no specific tasks but are occupied 
with general ideas. “Luther’s isolation of individual conscience” was 
disastrous because the majority of Germans, especially women, were 
completely content “to be pure in their own eyes, untainted by personal 
guilt” (Susman 1992, p. 121). But women, Susman argues, applied the 
wrong criteria: “Women demanded from themselves that their actions be 
personal and good, righteous, helpful, and full of love. Any responsibility 
with regard to large life events as a whole was remote; their purpose here 
was that of serving faith. But faith can be moral only as religious behav-
iour; i.e. faith may only take place where our minds are faced with some-
thing basically inaccessible, something ultimate that we cannot fathom. 
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For all other purposes, faith is weakness and guilt” (1992, p. 123). This 
situation was created because of inadequate education, and Susman pins 
the blame on Protestantism, as underlined by her reference to Luther. In 
contrast to such inwardness “of serving faith” (“des dienenden Glaubens”), 
she describes Jewish religiosity as one of action.
In recent years, efforts have been made in Germany to revive aspects of 
the themes discussed above—say, how Buber’s principal of dialogue 
informs professional care (Schwerdt 1998, pp. 261–320) or the relation-
ship between care of others and the writings of Levinas (Krause 2015, 
p. 248). Yet the question remains why topics such as assistance, hospital-
ity, empathy, care, listening, and help were confined to the margins of 
German-language philosophy until well into the 1990s. One cause of this 
relative silence may be actions taken during the National Socialist regime: 
Martin Buber was forced to leave Germany; the Jewish Women’s League 
was dissolved in 1938 (Daemmig 2004); books were removed from 
libraries and publicly burned; writings by rabbis (Brocke and Paul 2015) 
and Jewish social reformers were systematically withdrawn from circula-
tion; propaganda was introduced aimed at undermining solidarity 
between majorities and minorities (Schmidbaur 2002, pp.  129f.). 
Consequently, the German-language thinkers who endorsed ideas of 
mercy, benevolence, hospitality, assistance, and help went mostly over-
looked in the second half of the twentieth century (Conradi 2015b).
About 100 years after Hermann Cohen wrote about what it means to 
relate to co-humans as neighbours, the psychologist Carol Gilligan wrote an 
empirically based study that introduces the idea of care as a specific way of 
viewing the world (1988b, p. 8), a world in which people are related to each 
other through human connection (1982, p.  29). In this, Gilligan shares 
common ground with Herman Cohen, who believes that assisting others 
results from an awareness that is developed over time. She describes her ‘care 
perspective’ as ‘thinking in relationships’, seeing people as members in a net-
work of relations “on whose continuation they all depend” (1982, p. 29–30). 
She interprets communication and care not so much as activities but as 
aspects of a viewpoint (Conradi 2015a). The emphasis on awareness, not 
feelings, distinguishes Gilligan significantly from Schopenhauer and proba-
bly also from Buber. Schopenhauer believes that awareness can prevent us 
only from committing harm; assistance itself is motivated by feeling (2005, 
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p. 89). For attention and concern to be activated, “the distress” must be 
“great and urgent” (2005, p. 101). By contrast, Gilligan believes that action 
is needed when people are neglected and lonely (1988a, p. xviii); distance 
and detachment “constitute grounds for moral concern” (1987, p.  20). 
Buber, for whom despair is something that those who offer help know from 
their own experience, would agree (1935, p. 7). ‘Thinking in relationships’ is 
what allows us to recognise and identify such need in others. This point of 
view enables people to respond to depersonalisation in others by activating, 
cultivating, or repairing existing networks of communication (1987, p. 32).
Gilligan’s ‘thinking in relationships’ goes far beyond what had previ-
ously been defended by the majority of philosophers as an ethical mini-
mum: we must not only refrain from doing harm; we must improve 
others’ situations. In this, she shares much with nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century Jewish philosophy. Gilligan seems to agree with Buber 
that ethical commitment—whether conceptual or practical—applies first 
to those who are currently in one’s own sphere. Yet she also agrees with 
Cohen that aid must not be limited to one’s own social community; it 
ought to be extended to strangers as well. For Gilligan, social proximity 
between persons is constituted by ‘thinking in relationships’ through a 
type of anticipation; and it is established first and foremost through com-
municative engagement.
The ethics of care begins with human interactions—in assisting others 
effectively and in responding to human vulnerability and dependence. It 
starts off with everyday situations in which people assist others who 
require care for the foreseeable future, though their situation is not life- 
threatening. The ethics of care regards care-receivers as partners as well as 
co-subjects by emphasising interactions between human beings.
Notes
1. The discipline in which the ethics of care is discussed depends on coun-
try and language: in the Netherlands it is an object of study mostly in 
nursing science, gender studies, medicine, and theology (Vosman 2016); 
in the United Kingdom and in Sweden, it mainly appears in the social 
sciences; in France and Italy, it has been consigned to philosophy.
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2. Even if the majority of German-speaking philosophers did not absorb 
the ethics of care I would like to highlight the work that had nevertheless 
been published. In Germany, there has been Andrea Maihofer’s work on 
responsibility (Maihofer 1988) and Elisabeth Conradi’s idea of attentive-
ness (Conradi 2001); in Austria, Christa Schnabl developed a socio- 
ethical theory of solicitude (Schnabl 2005, p.  439) and Herlinde 
Pauer-Studer has considered moral theory as it pertains to gender rela-
tions (Pauer- Studer and Nagl-Docekal 1993); in Switzerland, Annemarie 
Pieper has discussed the possibility of a feminist ethics (Pieper 1998) and 
Ina Prätorius has sketched out forms that a feminist ethics might take 
(Praetorius 1995). The care perspective has also appeared in debates 
about the increasing professionalisation in social work and nursing 
(Brückner 2008, 2010; Friese 2010; Schmid 2011). In the field of nurs-
ing, for example, Silvia Käppeli (2004) develops an idea of care from a 
theological point of view. In the area of social work, ethical approaches 
are occasionally taught that focus on the ethics of care (Großmaß 2006; 
Großmaß and Perko 2011, pp. 147–157; Noller 2007).
3. Buber leaves open whether he understands “love” as a deed, a feeling or 
an attitude.
4. Between 1894 and 1914 Cohen devoted three further essays to the ques-
tion of what it means to relate to co-humans as neighbours.
5. The afterword is signed “M.S.” but this might be a typo.
6. Gerhard Kittel was the son of Rudolf Kittel.
7. A significant number of the footnotes in the brochure cite Hitler’s Mein 
Kampf and the political platform of the Nazi party (“Programm der 
NSDAP”).
8. Kittel adds the following clarification: “For Christians, this truly brings 
up a serious question about the argument against the Old Testament and 
even the antisemitic attacks against the Jewish parts of the New Testament 
religion” (pp. 7 f ). This passage, from the first edition of the brochure, 
was amended in the second edition (Kittel 1934): “For Christians, this 
truly brings up a serious question because for them, it is not only about 
humanity but about the problem of love, which is a fundamental require-
ment in Christianity and of which Paul the Apostle said that without it, 
everything else was nothing. On top of this, there is the multiple argu-
ments of antisemites against the Old Testament; antisemitic attacks 




9. In his brochure, Kittel, a professor of protestant theology, muses, “you 
can try to exterminate the Jews (pogroms)” (“man kann die Juden aus-
zurotten versuchen (Progrome)”) (p. 13), but proposes an alternative: 
“You can resolutely and consciously preserve the historical fact of a 
‘strangeness’ between peoples” (“man kann entschlossen und bewußt die 
geschichtliche Gegebenheit einer Fremdlingschaft unter den Völkern 
wahren”) (p. 13).
10. Kittel writes, “The right of the guest must be clearly demarcated against 
that of the citizen” (“das Recht des Gastes muß allerdings in aller 
Deutlichkeit gegen das des Bürgers abgegrenzt sein”) (1933, pp. 39 f ). 
And “the status of the guest” must be “restored” (“entschlossen die 
Wiederherstellung des Gastzustandes herbeizuführen”) (1933, p. 38). “As 
soon as the principle of the right of strangers is absorbed into the (pub-
lic) consciousness, it is absolutely clear and needs no further discussion 
that a guest is not the holder of a public office, and cannot be a civil servant” 
(“Sobald der Grundsatz des Fremdenrechtes ins Bewußtsein übergegan-
gen ist, ist völlig klar und bedarf keinerlei weiterer Erörterung, daß ein 
Gast nicht Inhaber eines öffentlichen Amtes, also nicht Beamter sein kann”) 
(1933, pp. 42 f.). Kittel mentions specific trades: “Once the idea of the 
guest is recognised and affirmed, it becomes obvious that a stranger can 
be neither a teacher of German youth nor a professor” (“Ist der Gedanke des 
Gastes einmal anerkannt und bejaht, so wird ferner selbstverständlich, 
daß ein Fremdling im allgemeinen nicht Lehrer deutscher Jugend sein kann, 
auch nicht Hochschullehrer”) (1933, p. 46).
11. Kittel cites a similar passage in the same text. See Kittel 1933, p. 78, 
n. 21.
12. The comment of Naphtali Herz Wessely (1725–1805) was published in 
1781. Moses Mendelssohn (1729–1786) translated the five books of 
Moses into German. Under the title Sefer netivot ha schalom (“The book 
of the ways of peace”), the translations (using Hebrew letters) were pub-
lished between 1780 and 1783 by George Friedrich Starcke (Boeckler 
2015, p. XIII). Mendelssohn and several others supplied commentary to 
the text.
13. Samson Raphael Hirsch’s commentary was part of the book Israel’s 
Prayers (“Sidur Tefilot Yisra’el”), which on nearly every page includes 
prayers in Hebrew, prayers in German, and commentary on the prayers 
in German (Hirsch 1895).
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14. Hirsch Benjamin Auerbach (1901–1973) was a rabbi in Halberstadt 
from 1933 to 1938 and published on the history of the municipality. 
His great-grandfather Benjamin Hirsch Auerbach (1808–1872) was also 
a rabbi in Halberstadt, from 1863 to 1872, and, like his son, wrote 
about local history.
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In this investigation, I will attempt to pinpoint the connection between 
nursing und care. On the one hand, I wish to understand the extent to 
which nursing represents a genuine normative practice, while on the 
other hand establishing how the normativity of this practice actually 
comes about. My hypothesis is as follows: nursing,1 as I suspect and 
intend to investigate here, is to be understood as accommodated care.
It is not my intention to produce a normative draft determining what 
qualifies as caring or nursing and what does not. In order to verify the 
validity of this hypothesis, I first intend to develop a phenomenology of 
care.
B. Freter (*) 
Independent Scholar, Berlin, Germany
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This phenomenological approach is, as far as I can tell, especially suited 
to an examination of caring and thus of nursing. I must first take seri-
ously the normative practices that I encounter when somebody nurses; I 
must precisely describe what actually happens in this situation. My phe-
nomenological approach aims primarily at a description of the phenome-
non of care. Emphasis is placed first and foremost on the phenomenon, 
which is why the approach is to be characterised as phenomenological. 
Only once I have such a description, only once I have such a phenome-
nology, so to speak, can I begin—in a much later step—to comment on 
these practices from a normative standpoint.
This phenomenological approach will be of key significance for the 
interpretation of care as an existential pattern of my method of dealing 
with reality. This pattern is to be understood in a proto-ethical manner, 
and not, as is often the case in care ethics, as something that is in itself, in 
a normative sense, good.
After the phenomenological beginning, I will attempt to apply the 
phenomenology of care to nursing.
 The General Phenomenology of Care
Care is always initiated by an appeal. Something appeals to us—perhaps 
purely coincidentally. I then allow this appeal to become a matter of my 
concern. In accordance with this concern, I develop a volition: I want that 
which promotes the thriving—even to the smallest extent—of that which 
has appealed to us, that which concerns us, regardless of how I may estab-
lish what that entails. Eventually I take practical action. This connection 
is what I refer to as care.2
Perhaps I hold on to the object of my care in the future and the care 
becomes love (Freter 2016, pp. 351–363), or perhaps, as the case may 
also be, I immediately release the source of the appeal from my care again 
and send it on its way.
In the following section, I will attempt to show how this basic phe-
nomenological structure can indeed be derived from a famous literary 
account, namely the “Gospel According to Luke”, in the so-called Parable 
of the Good Samaritan.
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I will examine this parable as a literary narrative and interpret it with-
out regard to its theological and polemical content. I will concentrate 
solely on the phenomenon of care, which appears in the text, somewhat 
inadvertently, as a by no means exclusively Christian phenomenon, but 
rather as a human phenomenon in general.
Thus it is found in Luke: “[31] And by chance [κατὰ συγκυρίαν; 
Accidit autem]” (Luke 10, 31)—here there is the moment of coinci-
dence—“there came down a certain priest that way: and when he saw 
him” (Luke 10, 31)—“him” refers to a person (“ἄνθρωπός τις” (Luke 
10, 30)) who had been beaten half to death (“ἡμιθανῆ” (Luke 10, 30)) 
by robbers—, so when he “saw [ἰδὼν. viso] him, he passed by on the 
other side [ἀντιπαρῆλθεν. praeterivit]” (Luke 10, 31). The priest saw—
“ἰδὼν”—the person in need, but he did not accept the appeal, for what-
ever reason (Zimmermann 2007, p.  544).3 He avoided the possible 
appeal, he does not want, in the literal Greek translation, to go too close 
(cf. Wolter 2008, p. 396): “ἀντιπαρῆλθεν”, which is made up of ἀντι 
(not)—παρ (near)—ἔρχομαι (go). This is repeated with a Levite: 
“[32]And likewise a Levite, when he was at the place, came and looked on 
him [ἰδὼν. videret] and passed by on the other side [ἀντιπαρῆλθεν. 
praetereo]” (Luke 10, 32).
Now the Samaritan appears:
[33] But a certain Samaritan, as he journeyed, came where he was [ἦλθεν 
κατ’ αὐτὸν. venit secus eum]; and when he saw him [ἰδὼν. videns], he had 
compassion on him [ἐσπλαγχνίσθη. misericordia motus est],
[34] And he went to him [προσελθὼν. approprians]. (Luke 10, 33)
The Samaritan does not pass by, but goes to the helpless man—
“προσελθὼν”—and is “moved within”, σπλαγχνίζομαι, as the original 
Greek puts it. He was touched, in accordance with the etymology of this 
verb, in the “innards”, in the σπλάγχνα (cf. Frisk 1972, pp.  769 ff.; 
Zimmermann 2007, p. 539).
The Samaritan, for whatever reason this was possible for him, allowed 
himself to be appealed to. He makes the injured man his concern and 
can come near (προσέρχομαι) him. To the injured man, to whom he had 
just now been a stranger—just a “ἄνθρωπός τις”—, the Samaritan 
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becomes the closest (πλησίος, proximus (cf. Luke 10, 29 and 10, 36 
ff.)), and the beaten man simultaneously becomes his closest (cf. Wolter 
2008, p. 391).
The Samaritan does not want the injured man to continue to be in the 
state in which he has been: He does not want that which is. The concern 
has been compressed, has been turned into volition, substantiated to a 
volition: to a volition for the sake of the concern. The condition of the 
injured man ought to improve. It ought, therefore, to be different. It ought 
not to be as it is. This seems to us to be of decisive importance. The 
Samaritan takes issue with the situation as he finds it. He sets his will 
against that which is. This appears to be one important source of the 
ought: when I posit my will, as it arises from my being, against that 
which is, when I say: it ought not to be so, but rather how I, for the sake 
of the other person, want it to be. And this will for the sake of another, I 
suspect, is a preliminary form of the ought.
Thus the Samaritan takes practical action, and as the story continues, 
he “bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine, and set him on his 
own beast, and brought him to an inn, and took care of him [καὶ 
ἐπεμελήθη αὐτοῦ. et curam eius egit]” (Luke 10, 34). The care-giver 
then releases the nameless man from his care (Zimmermann and 
Zimmermann 2003, pp.  54–58): “[35]And on the morrow when he 
departed, he took out two pence, and gave them to the host, and said 
unto him, Take care of him [Ἐπιμελήθητι αὐτοῦ. Curam illus habe]; 
and whatsoever thou spendest more, when I come again, I will repay 
thee” (Luke 10, 35). What may have happened after that is not men-
tioned, but it is not important for these purposes.
As I stated, the Samaritan does not want the continued suffering of the 
nameless man. I can form such a will—I now move away from the con-
nection to the parable—because I want to address the concern of the 
person who has appealed to us: I place my will in the service of their 
concern. This will is the central element of the story.
The will is then transformed. This will, which I bring forth in the 
course of my care, encounters me once again—seemingly foreign, seem-
ingly having become independent—as a demand made to myself.
This ought is by no means to be understood universally. With the 
help of this “origin story” of the ought, I indeed intend to establish that 
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the ought, at least in one of its forms, at least when close to its very first 
formation, has unfolded and developed out of my own will: will is 
encountered again as an ought that is addressed to me. This ought, 
however, is primarily valid for me, although I may also wish it to be 
valid for others as well. But the most important point here is that first 
and foremost, I subject myself to an ought that, through the transfor-
mation from “I want” to “it should be”, has acquired a quasi-objective 
character for us.
In the course of the care, through the practical actualisation of my 
being, I have therefore set to work an ought—as short-lived as this ought 
may perhaps be—to which I have subsequently committed myself. In the 
course of the care, therefore, normativity itself, the ought-to-be, has 
become reality: for the sake of the concern, I have brought forth a will, 
into the service of which I have then placed myself. And I have done this 
as if this will were no longer my own. This will has seemingly become a 
will that is addressed to us, meaning: it has become a demand, it has 
become an ought.
I thus understand an ought as a will that is addressed to us. The 
ought—at least in this form—can be grasped as something that was once 
my own volition, a volition that has quasi-extricated itself from us, has 
transcended us, in order then to encounter us once more as this extri-
cated, transcended volition, addressing us with this will (cf. Freter 2016, 
pp. 361–363).4
I have posited with the ought a fact, or to be more precise, an exis-
tential fact (cf. Freter 2016, pp.  52–59). I have created something 
new, something that was not there before, a normative entity. And I 
have subsequently committed myself to this positing—which is 
entirely my own but at the same time entirely foreign. I can thus 
newly define care altogether: caring means to believe that one is sub-
ject to an ought.
At this point I must point out that the person who cares is by no means 
restricted to the notion of altruism. It is not to be assumed that some-
body who cares has only the well-being of the other person in mind. I in 
fact suspect that that which I understand as evil actually arises from pre-
cisely this pattern of care which I have described here, namely when I 
only allow myself to be appealed to by myself and place myself exclusively 
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in the service of caring for myself, that is when I care excessively only for 
myself.5
But let us return to the topic at hand: care, as I wish to pinpoint 
once again, is realised through the quartet of appeal, concern, volition 
and practice. The care-giver wants that to be which promotes the care 
for the sake of the concern, and in following this takes practical 
action.
 Appeal in the Nursing Context
Care is initiated, as I have found, by an appeal, an appeal which may be 
directed purely coincidentally towards us. I also find an appeal at the 
initiation of nursing. However, this appeal has been stripped of any coin-
cidence, and, moreover, at the initiation of nursing, I find the will to 
allow oneself to be appealed to, the will to encounter the person who 
wishes to appeal, indeed who must appeal. Nursing thus begins with the 
nursing care-giver placing him/herself in a position in which he or she 
can and may be found and approached in this role (cf. Martin et al. 2015, 
p. 635).6
Within this fact, I believe, is contained a first fundamental principle of 
nursing. The Principle of the Appeal states: the nursing care-giver wishes 
to communicate his or her approachability—in a certain environment at 
a certain time, and not any longer once these limits of place and time are 
exceeded. The nursing care-giver wishes to be found in precisely this role 
(cf. Eley et al. 2010, pp. 10 ff.; 2012, p. 15537; Price 2009, p. 168; Smith 
and Godfrey 2002; Smith et al. 2013).
I am speaking about what the nursing care-giver “wishes”, not what 
he or she “should” do, for I am not concerned with creating instruc-
tions for those who do not wish to nurse, but rather with attempting 
to understand the (self-produced) ought, the demands to which 
the  person who wishes to nurse—tacitly—subjects him/herself. 
Subjecting him/herself to these demands is what allows the nursing 
care-giver to be recognised as such—even when these demands can 





In the course of my considerations on the appeal in the nursing context, 
I have made two claims. Firstly: nursing is a form of care. As I have shown 
though, the care for the well-being of the patient becomes an obligation 
for the care-giver. This means that secondly: the nursing care-giver acts 
first and foremost normatively (cf. Bishop and Scudder 1991, p. 1810; 
Smith and Godfrey 2002, p. 30211), as he or she works towards realising 
that which ought to be for the sake of the patient, that is: he or she aims to 
create, maintain, improve or restore a patient’s well-being.
Because this is the purpose, that is realising that which ought to be for 
the sake of the patient, ethical problems will necessarily arise while nursing. 
This is due to the fact that the determination of that which ought to be, 
that which ought to be for the sake of the patient, is—as countless social 
debates have shown—something which must be repeatedly determined 
anew. This, however, is the decisive reason to nobilitate nursing as an 
originary normative practice: the nursing care-giver places him/herself—
whether fully aware of this or not—personally as a care-giver (cf. Smith 
and Godfrey 2002) into the highly contentious field of normative fluc-
tuation—both individual and of society as a whole. This service, it seems 
to us, does not yet receive the social acknowledgement it deserves (cf. 
Lachmann 2012, p. 11412; Swanson 1993, p. 354).
I have to accept that nursing means exposing oneself to normative 
uncertainties. Here, as in life in general, there is no ultimate protection 
from the constant threat of the return of normative obscurity: the well- 
being of the patient is indeed a very murky subject. The uncertainty of 
this stipulation, even though it is and must remain an undisputed guide-
line, shows us that it is of paramount importance—from a normative 
perspective, which is all that concerns us here—to provide support to 
care-givers in making decisions, rather than simply handing down 
instruction manuals and rules and so on that—supposedly—list what is 
right and wrong.13
Let us imagine a patient with diabetes mellitus who refuses to curtail 
his consumption of sweets. It is indeed not unequivocally clear, provided 
I do not allow myself to be drawn into some form of reductionism, what 
is to be done in this case. It is not of genuine assistance simply to inform 
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the patient about the course of diabetic illnesses when foodstuffs contain-
ing sugar are consumed—although such knowledge is without a doubt 
necessary for a serious confrontation with the problem. Certainly from 
such a (reductionist) perspective, it is absolutely necessary to remove 
access to the foodstuffs in question; however a care-giver may manage 
this. But, the patient is not simply diabetes mellitus, he is not simply this 
one disease. He is someone who has this disease: he is someone who is also 
much more than this, namely his entire body, and not only this body 
inasmuch as diabetes mellitus can be observed within it. He is someone 
who also has so much more, for example an attitude regarding his own 
illness. My patient could—with good reason—insist upon having a short, 
enjoyable life rather than a long one marked by deprivation
It cannot be clearly decided, if I am to remain within this simple 
dichotomy, whether the shorter or the longer life is objectively preferable. 
Objectivity cannot be achieved here. One can argue with good reason in 
favour of the one option, and with equally good reason in favour of the 
other. In this situation, the care-giver, despite recourse to supervision and 
the necessary specialist knowledge and so on, is nevertheless faced with a 
very personal normative challenge. Furthermore, and this fact must be 
given recognition, he or she must be given leeway for this decision appro-
priate to the vagueness of the issue: the solution is not to prescribe one 
course of action or another, to demand either forced withdrawal or an 
ignoring of the consumption. It must be possible for the care-giver to 
make a decision as to the course of action, to create, maintain, improve 
or restore the patient’s well-being.
I have stated firstly: nursing is a form of care. This means secondly: 
nursing is a form of care. It is one particular form of care, or to be more 
precise: nursing is a particular normative human reaction to the notorious 
frailty of one’s neighbour.
Nursing does not accept the (actuated) reality, as it is, as the best pos-
sible scenario, but rather attempts—healing, soothing, assisting—to 
make the best possible scenario (possibilitas)—I are painfully aware of the 
darkness surrounding this term—become reality (actualitas). This best 
possible scenario, always in terms of the patient’s needs, can materialise in 




Because nursing is concentrated in this way, because nursing is adapted 
in this way to a certain domain—even if that is difficult to define—I can 
speak of nursing as accommodated care. To nurse, I can say, is to care in a 
very specific way, in an accommodated fashion.14
 Concern, Volition and Practice in the Nursing 
Context
If nursing is to be understood as care, it is thus to be presumed that the 
quaternary phenomenology of care—that is not only the appeal, as I have 
attempted to show, but also concern, volition and practice—is similarly 
reflected in nursing.15 I now wish to conclude my investigation with a 
brief look at where the reflections of concern, volition and practice in the 
context of nursing can be found.
Just as the nursing care-giver wishes to be appealed to, he or she 
subsequently wishes every appeal to become his or her concern. The 
care accommodated to become nursing is concerned with that which 
has appealed to it. The Principle of Concern states: the nursing care-
giver wishes to be concerned with that which was allowed to make the 
appeal. An appeal is not only noted, but also made a cause for 
concern.
This cause for concern manifests itself in the direct volition to do some-
thing for the sake of the source of the appeal. The Principle of Volition and 
Practice in Nursing thus states: the nursing care-giver wishes to take prac-
tical action for the sake of the concern.
Notes
1. When, in the following discourse, we speak of nursing, we are referring 
not to the profession of nursing in the narrow sense, but rather to medi-
cal practice in its entirety. A compact overview of widespread nursing 
theories in the narrow sense (Virginia Henderson, Dorothea Orem, 
Nancy Roper, Monika Krohwinkel, Erwin Böhm) can be found in Lauf 
(2013, pp. 61–71).
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2. Joan Tronto has provided a somewhat similar representation from a 
feminist- political perspective (cf. Tronto 1993). There are, however, sev-
eral differences to our approach, particularly the fact that for Tronto, 
compassion with the other person and the understanding of care as a 
collective process play an important role. This is not the case in our 
proto-ethical approach, which is why we will not go into Tronto’s work 
in more detail here. A critical study of the fundamental aspects of 
Tronto’s approach is provided by Edwards (2009, pp.  233–238), an 
overview to different concepts of care (including Tronto’s approach) is 
provided by Kohlen and Kumbruck (2008).
3. Carl Amery undertook the interesting exercise of allowing the “minor 
characters” of the parable (the priest, the Levite, the innkeeper and even 
the leader of the robbers) to express themselves and to explain their 
respective actions (cf. Amery 1973).
4. It seems, as we wish to note only in passing, to be immaterial for the 
significance of the ought whether it was created as an existential factum, 
as we claim here, or whether it encountered me as a facticity.
5. Protest against the tendency of caring ethics to interpret care fundamen-
tally as something essentially good—an idea brought forth primarily by 
Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings—has also arisen within the field of 
nursing studies, cf. for example Allmark (1995); Bradshaw (1996); 
Edwards (2009, pp. 232 ff).
6. “Care is an affectively charged and selective mode of attention that 
action, affection, or concern at something, and in effect, it draws atten-
tion away from other things. In practice, a person who cares is one who 
has already chosen an object to care about. Consider, however, that prior 
to securing a thing to care for, a person must have the capacity or willing-
ness to respond, to be called into action, to be hailed by that object or 
phenomenon. In short, a person who cares must first be willing and 
available to be moved by this other.”
7. “[T]here was notable consistency between students and nurses in 
 reasons for entering nursing affected by neither age nor level of expe-
rience. This finding along with high levels of innate personal traits 
that are conducive to a caring and cooperative nature suggests that 
individuals are drawn to nursing for similar reasons. There was a gen-
eral consensus by participants that ‘all sorts of personalities make a 




8. “Despite individual differences in perspectives of nurses and nursing, 
most studies [analysed in this meta-study] identified that nurses held 
some construction of an ‘ideal’ nurse that usually focused on caring.”
9. The problem of care-givers not being able to meet the necessary demands 
(e.g. due to a high workload) is mentioned repeatedly in empirical inves-
tigations (cf. Price 2009, pp. 16 ff. (on the paradox of caring); Eley et al. 
2010, 2012).
10. “Nursing is a practice with an inherent moral sense.”
11. “Nursing is by nature a moral endeavour.”
12. “Care can be considered simply an ethical task and thus a burden of one 
more thing to do, or it can be considered a commitment to attending to 
and becoming enthusiastically involved in the patient’s needs.”
13. See the contribution by Opgenhaffen in this volume (Chapter “Regulation 
as an Obstacle to Care? A Care-Ethical Evaluation of the Regulation on the 
Use of Seclusion Cells in Psychiatric Care in Flanders (Belgium)”).
14. There can, of course, also be other accommodations of care, but that is 
not of interest to me here.
15. Moreover, if nursing is recognised as care, it seems necessary to support 
and encourage it as care, and consequently to support and encourage the 
realisation of the constitutive moments of that care—appeal, concern, 
volition and practice.
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 Care: Connecting Virtue and Practice
The ethics of care, or care ethics, developed in the field of bioethics, 
primarily in response to the lack of context and the rationalist approach 
of principlism. Care ethics takes an approach which consciously distances 
itself from principlism and the idea that ethical problems can be solved by 
means of abstract principles and instead develops its own concepts. What, 
then, are the specific characteristics of care ethics? The starting point for 
the formulation of an ethics of care was undoubtedly the book In a 
Different Voice (1982) by Carol Gilligan. In this book Gilligan pursues a 
theory of “two views of morality” and defines care as a specifically female 
virtue or disposition. Until now care ethics has thus been seen above all in 
its relation to feminist ethics, raising the issue of the relationship between 
care and so-called female morals. This restrictive definition in terms of an 
“ethics of gender” is not of great help in respect of the medical-ethical 
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implications. It seems more important to reflect instead on the basic char-
acteristics of care ethics, for example on the necessity, underlined by 
Gilligan, of being there for a person in order to realise care, on her empha-
sis on the network of relationships that binds us to others, and on the 
primacy of inner judgement and the personal approach, instead of exter-
nal obligations. Gilligan’s radicalised shift of focus to inner judgement 
and the personal approach provoked direct criticism and brought out 
alternative voices. For example, the political scientist Joan Tronto under-
stands care not primarily as virtue, but rather as practice (Tronto 1993); 
she makes it clear that care cannot be achieved through good intentions 
alone, but can only be considered to have been carried out when these 
good intentions have actually resulted in some kind of effect on the other 
person (Table 1). Tronto thus developed a four-phase model of care:
A model such as this is initially illuminating, because it locates care in 
connection with attitude and action, with outlook and deeds. But such 
lists (which are not entirely free of trivialities) cannot hide the fact that 
they are unable to replace theory or methodical reflection. There is a lot 
to be said for understanding care ethics not so much as a method unto 
itself but as something that brings a specific point of view to situations 
and problems. An example of this deeper reflection can be found in Paul 
Ricœur.
 Care According to Paul Ricœur
In his late work Oneself as Another, Paul Ricœur defines care explicitly as 
a part of humans’ ethical duty. He neatly summarises the content of care 
when he stresses that care is about being “with the other and for them”. 
Table 1 Tronto’s four-phase model with the corresponding ethical elements of an 
ethics of care, modified according to Conradi (2001)
Phases of care Ethical elements
1. Recognition of need (caring about) 1. Attentiveness
2. Willingness to respond to (take care of) a need 2. Responsibility
3. Direct action (care-giving) 3. Competence
4. Reaction to the care process (of the care receiver) 4. Responsiveness
G. Maio
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He thus understands care in one sense as interaction with the other and 
at the same time as referring to them. This double reference brings 
together the two essential aspects of care. Drawing on the Aristotelian 
concept of friendship, Ricœur focuses on the fact that care is grounded in 
reciprocity. He thus categorically rejects Emmanuel Levinas’ one-sided 
appeal to care that extends from the other to us, underlining the reciproc-
ity of the care relationship. Care is not oriented in one direction towards 
the person who receives care. The person providing care also changes as a 
result. By confronting the unfamiliarity of the care receiver, the care pro-
vider expands their own horizons. It is thus care that enables them to find 
their own identity in unfamiliarity. In care, what was previously seen as 
self-evident as well as one’s view of the world and the self—made one- 
sided through routine—are broken down and exposed. According to 
Ricœur, care has a mediating function in that the care provider, in order 
to really show care, must enter “foreign ground”, become distanced from 
themself, in order to be able to broaden their own standpoint and van-
tage point.1 Ricœur thus makes an original connection which goes 
beyond the link between care and finding one’s personal identity to also 
connect care to the valuable asset of self-esteem: our image of ourselves is 
formed above all through dialogue with others. By providing care for the 
other, our own self gains a layer of unfamiliarity, which helps us not only 
to see ourselves more clearly but also to value ourselves more. At the same 
time, for Ricœur, caring is always linked to a recollection of our own 
vulnerability, and this reminder, in which we experience ourselves as 
being “related” to the person in need of help, triggers a process of change 
in the giver. Thus through the simple fact of making their need for help 
known, the care receiver becomes the giver by opening up the care pro-
vider to experiences that would otherwise have been denied to them. The 
awareness of being “related” or “similar” (as Ricœur also says) to the per-
son receiving care, in connection with the fundamental attitude that 
there is a “reversibility” of the roles in the provision of care, leads to an 
effort to compensate for the obvious asymmetry and create equality. For 
Ricœur, care is thus a crucial motivator in the “search for equality in the 
midst of inequality” (Ricœur1992, p.  192). It represents a call for 
increased equality, for the abolition of one-sided thinking, and for the 
facilitation of reciprocity. In pursuing these goals, an inner identification 
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with the other and “the shared admission of fragility” are needed 
(Ricœur1992, p. 192).
For Ricœur, care is thus a reciprocal phenomenon, because it is only 
realised when a response is given—that is through the reference to a 
demand—which in turn depends on active questioning and on a response 
supported by kindness and consideration. Ricœur describes this response 
to the other’s requirement as a fundamental willingness, “by which the 
self makes itself available to others” (Ricœur1992, p. 168). He also defines 
this process of making oneself available and the related openness to the 
particular nature of the other as a disposition to kindness (Ricœur 1992, 
p. 189). This disposition lies at the heart of care. The other can initiate a 
new situation and self-esteem, so long as the care provider is sensitive to 
the demand that they have made. Ricœur calls the acceptance of the asso-
ciated responsibility “striving for the good of the other”.
At one point, Ricœur also expresses this conception of care in connec-
tion with the concept of “benevolent spontaneity”, making it clear that 
care is an interaction which must be supported by a certain fundamental 
disposition: the disposition of goodwill. Ricœur thus links his concep-
tion of care back to motivational contents and emotional factors which 
present themselves in the immediacy of the interaction with the person 
in need of care. Care is hence conceived of as a combination of (1) reflex-
ivity (self-awareness), (2) intentionality (being oriented towards the 
other), (3) affectivity (goodwill), and (4) spontaneity (immediacy).
 Systematics of the Core Elements of an Ethics 
of Care
Now that we have drawn on Paul Ricœur to discuss one of the most well- 
founded conceptions of care, our focus will turn to developing a more 
general understanding of care ethics. We have seen that there certainly are 
differing conceptions, but, all differences aside, a closer look reveals some 





A central feature of care ethics is the anthropology on which it is 
based. This anthropology was originally developed as a counterreac-
tion to a form of ethics that (like the principlism described here) 
focuses on the individual as a sovereign being with the right to self-
defence. Care ethics does not, of course, negate the need to respect 
these rights, but rests upon a different view of humanity. Rather than 
on the sovereignty of each individual, it focuses on their fundamental 
dependence. Practising care ethics means recognising that each indi-
vidual lives within a basic structure of dependence, whether or not 
they are conscious of this dependence (which was also Gilligan’s basic 
idea). Care ethics thus takes as its point of departure an awareness of 
the asymmetry of the situation in which people in need of help or care 
find themselves. Their situation is not so much based on reciprocity 
but on a reflection of a fundamental state of dependence inherent to 
all human beings. And it is also this situation that makes care neces-
sary as a form of action constituting a response to this fundamental 
trait of dependence. What distinguishes care ethics, however, is not 
just that it acknowledges asymmetry and thus dependence. It also 
frees this dependence from its negative connotations: from the per-
spective of care ethics, needing help is not considered an imperfec-
tion, but rather something normal and generally paradigmatic for 
relationships.
In this context, asymmetry does not refer to the cementing of a 
benevolent paternalism. Instead, it concerns the recognition that 
although the situation may be one of inequality, this does not negate 
the postulate of an equal level of respect and of equality between peo-
ple. In other words, an ethics of care acknowledges the different degrees 
of sovereignty that a person may have in their particular situation, but 
without relativising on any level the fundamental equality of all humans 
in their moral rights and relationships of recognition. Its ultimate aim 
(as we saw with Ricœur) is instead, at the same time, to balance out the 
asymmetry of sovereignty by means of the equality of the people 
involved.
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 Being in Relationships
Relationships play a crucial role in care ethics in three regards. Firstly, 
they are based on a concept of anthropology that does not just perceive 
humans as dependent beings but also interprets them as beings oriented 
towards relationships with other humans. Relationships are a fundamen-
tal feature of human existence. Secondly, relationships are seen as playing 
a significant role in the development of ethical problems, particularly 
with regard to a lack of relationships. For care ethics, relationships thus 
become a prism through which to view ethical problems. Finally, rela-
tionships are also a crucial strategy for resolving such conflicts. Against 
this background it is clear why care ethics makes reference to the crucial 
importance of human connectedness in resolving ethical problems. This 
relational approach to ethics also involves an appreciation of other virtues 
that have a stabilising effect on relationships, such as forbearance and 
forgiveness or devotion and trust. Care ethics thus places significantly 
more value on affective connections and prioritises interactive actions for 
resolving ethical conflicts.
However, since promoting relationships as a solution to every problem 
would not be appropriate either, a nuanced approach is required here. It is 
not unusual for the entanglement in relationships itself to cause problems 
for patients, for example when they find themselves in a situation of depen-
dence and need help extracting themselves in order to resolve the problem. 
For the people providing help, this focus on relationships is also always a 
balancing act, since they must guard against becoming too emotionally 
involved and ultimately burning themselves out. This is where we begin to 
see the limits of expecting too much of relationships when it comes to 
providing solutions. Nonetheless, the emphasis on the moral dimension of 
relationships and the appreciation of virtues which make relationships 
more stable are two of the crucial elements at the heart of an ethics of care.
 Being Situation-Oriented
A key issue with regard to care ethics is that of the reason or justification 
for a particular action or reaction. While principlism adopts a deductive 
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approach here, deriving action from abstract principles (and justifying it 
by way of these principles), care ethics takes a fundamentally different 
path. Rather than basing its actions on an abstract rule and moving 
from here to practice, it takes practice itself as the foundation for select-
ing the action required. It thus does not follow a deductive model, but 
instead sees the immediacy and singularity of a particular situation as an 
instruction to decide on the action that seems most appropriate in that 
situation. Thus, while principlism applies rules, care ethics is concerned 
with a fitting response that must be developed based on the situation, 
since the specific nature of a situation cannot be confronted adequately 
simply by applying rules. This shows that, in terms of method alone, 
care ethics is not concerned with the criterion of generalisability or with 
a Kantian idea of universalism; rather, it focuses on understanding the 
particular and incomparable nature of the patient and their situation. 
Generalisability is replaced by singularity and particularity. This is remi-
niscent of hermeneutic ethics insofar as the particular point of view of 
care ethics lies specifically in inquiring into the particular and thus the 
unique nature of the other. It is therefore no coincidence that the her-
meneutist Ricœur of all people advocates an ethics of care, nor that—
drawing on the Aristotelian concept of phronesis—he identifies 
“practical wisdom” as the methodical basis for ethical judgements. 
Ricœur wanted care to be understood as a guarantee that the unique 
nature of the other is protected against being taken over by generalising 
postulates. He sees the fundamental role of care in saving the otherness 
of the other.
In summary, this aspect of situational specificity can be divided into 
three elements:
 (a) emphasis on immediacy and acknowledgement of immediate 
perception
 (b) recognition of the singularity of the situation
 (c) need for a creative resolution to conflict rather than one that is sim-
ply rule-based.
Care ethics thus represents a progressive alternative to simple instru-
mental rationality.
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 Responsiveness
In the light of the above, the distinguishing feature of care ethics is that 
it is defined less by initiative than by responsiveness. It responds or 
reacts to the needs of the person who is dependent on help. Care ethics 
is primarily response-focused. It is the other who calls for care. Thus 
care ethics is linked to the attitude and gestures of “turning to” some-
body and necessitates the capacity to approach the other. This requires 
an attitude of listening, of receptiveness, of understanding, essentially 
of close attention. Here, too, we can see a similarity with hermeneutic 
ethics, although care ethics involves more than just understanding; it 
contains the impulse to change, to realise care (Maio 2015). This 
impulse to realise care can be understood as the impulse to implement 
the response we are urged to give by the urgent situation of the other. 
In this context, Emmanuel Levinas defined care as “being called on” by 
the other.
 Accepting the Indefinable
As care ethics does not aim to be rule-based and instead takes the specific 
situation as its point of departure, the demand made on the result of the 
ethical judgement is also entirely different. Ethics based on deductive 
reasoning demands exactitude and unambiguousness, following the 
motto: Is this permitted or not permitted? Required or not required? 
Right or wrong? Care ethics does not apply these categories, which con-
stitutes another similarity with hermeneutic ethics. Instead, it is 
 characterised by a tolerance for ambiguity; as it takes seriously the specific 
features of each situation, it cannot predict what is right and what is 
wrong. A situation may remain ambivalent until the last moment. But 
care ethics does not see ambivalence as a state that should be abolished by 
any means—paying attention to, allowing and bearing ambivalence are 
part and parcel of the methodical approach of an ethics of care. In other 
words: from the epistemology of particularity comes an acceptance of 
ambiguity. There is no one correct solution, but rather a spectrum of 
solutions; there is no single right answer, but rather what is appropriate 
G. Maio
59
in each case, and there is also no objective solution that is connected with 
a universalistic pretension. Instead, it is a case of the particular and thus 
the always fallible.
 Giving Preference to Emotional Knowledge
The above criteria show that care ethics differs from other forms of 
ethics above all in the way in which problems are perceived. It per-
ceives the ethical problem in different terms, which are not just related 
to the above basic elements, but rest more fundamentally on a wider 
concept of knowledge. For care ethics, knowing the objectifiable and 
formalisable facts does not suffice; care ethics also draws on what 
could be called “implicit knowledge”. The critical role of relation-
ships, the demand for an adequate perception of the situation, and 
the prioritising of creative solutions over deductive inference neces-
sitate implicit forms of knowledge such as experiential knowledge, 
situational knowledge, and relationship knowledge. Valuing these 
forms of knowledge, which go beyond the confines of a formal-logical 
approach, is the essence of care ethics. They are forms of knowledge 
that cannot be learnt by heart but must be practised. According to 
care ethics, competence could be described as skill in dealing with 
ambiguity. The ability to cope with complexity plays a significantly 
more constitutive role here than in other forms of ethics. This perhaps 
also explains why the medical community continues to give little 
importance or support to care ethics. Care ethics represents a coun-
terpoint to operational rationality because it practices a rationality of 
its own, in which feelings, intuition, and sensations are just as impor-
tant as calculations, and in which experience is ascribed an epistemo-
logical value which is overlooked in the structural logic of modern 
medicine.
In this regard, care ethics is more progressive than many forms of prin-
ciplism, because it does away with the prejudice of the irrationality of 
feeling, because it takes the knowledge content of feelings seriously and 
in this respect constitutes an implicit plea to place more value on emo-
tional knowledge. The specific challenge of care ethics, on the other hand, 
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is to take this emotional knowledge seriously in such a way that it is not 
set in opposition to cognitive knowledge. A healthy balance must be 
struck between both forms of knowledge, placing more value on emo-
tional knowledge as a creative factor while cognitive knowledge remains 
present in the same way as a constant check and balance. Care ethics can 
only truly bear fruit when it draws on emotional knowledge to enable 
unique and creative approaches without being absolved of the obligation 
to justify such creative solutions with transparent and comprehensible 
arguments.
 Giving Preference to Space for Growth
Care ethics does not just expand the above-described form of knowl-
edge and insights; its core elements also open up an alternative view of 
how to deal with ethical problems. Where the focus of care ethics lies 
in perceiving the complexity of an ethical problem, and where this 
complexity or ambiguity necessitates a more receptive approach, the 
response to the problem will also be evaluated using entirely different 
criteria than those used when focusing on structural functionality. 
There is a similarity to hermeneutic ethics here in that it is not rapid, 
confident action that counts, but rather a tentative and considerate 
approach. This entails a different definition of good actions, one where 
the guiding values are careful reflection and prudence. It was Carol 
Gilligan herself, the initiator of the care ethics debate, who empha-
sised hesitation and tentative consideration as indicators of care, and, 
as we saw above, Paul Ricœur also talks explicitly of consideration. 
Precisely because care ethics assumes that there are no unambiguous 
solutions, it attributes more value to doubt; the attitude of tentative 
hesitation has no trace here of the negative  connotations that are nec-
essarily attached to it in the constant bustle of large medical institu-
tions. This confers on care ethics nothing short of a subversive power 
in relation to action as well. This subversive power can be extremely 
restorative because it can give rise to the insight that good medicine 
means not simply doing things but also allowing these things space to 
thrive. This praxeology of caution could make it possible to rediscover 
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the value of giving things space to thrive, to mitigate the tendency 
towards actionism, and to introduce a way of thinking that makes a 
clearer distinction between medicine (as care) and industry (as pro-
duction site).
 Limits of Care Ethics
It has become clear that care ethics renounces a universalistic pretension 
and instead turns towards the unique and the particular. It thus consti-
tutes a necessary correction to the prevalent hegemony of the structural- 
functional approach. However, renouncing universalistic pretensions 
inevitably raises the objection that care becomes arbitrary and relative. 
This reproach can only be refuted by making it clear that individual deci-
sions are taken within a predefined framework, which is not invalidated 
by the particularity of a situation but remains in place as a constitutive 
framework.
A second criticism has already been discussed above. The fundamental 
significance that care ethics attributes to relationships and attention also 
has the potential, in some situations, to place excessive demands both on 
the treatment team and on the patient. Sometimes a patient has no desire 
to enter into a relationship, but simply wants to make use of a service. 
This objection can be fundamentally rejected using care ethics itself, since 
an ethics of care, understood correctly, should take its specific starting 
point seriously in such a way that in the case of doubt it recognises that a 
particular situation requires a distanced approach based more on princi-
plism or ethics of ought. This highlights once again the fact that care 
ethics represents a very particular approach to ethical problems which 
cannot and should not be the most appropriate solution to all situations 
and medical-ethical problems. Care ethics is only as good as the way in 
which it is applied. It will only be beneficial when it is applied to prob-
lems for which it is the most suitable method. In contrast, attempts to 
elevate it to the level of a medical-ethical paradigm will inevitably result 
in shortcomings, not in care ethics itself but in the diligence that is 
applied when choosing it as the method to be used in specific contexts 
and situations.
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 Conclusions
Care ethics developed as a reaction to the one-sided thinking of princi-
plism and duty ethics or, as it is sometimes called, ethics of justice. This 
context has induced polarisation which obscures the fact that both care 
ethics and principlism are needed. They are not alternative models; they 
must be allowed to complement one another. In order for medicine to do 
justice to a patient, there must be an awareness of principles and basic 
rights and of the significance of a principle as abstract as that of human 
dignity. That much is indisputable. But on its own it is no guarantee that 
the patient will truly be helped. In order to help the patient in their spe-
cific situation, it is necessary to take a highly individualised approach and 
develop a strategy that will really help that person. Such a strategy cannot 
be reduced to adapting rules or limited to subjective arbitrariness. It 
demands an individual approach to a specific person within a predefined 
framework. The value of care ethics lies its assumption that the depen-
dence of the other demands the personal acceptance of responsibility. 
This acceptance of responsibility (the crucial role of the “response” should 
be borne in mind here) goes beyond ensuring basic rights.
Care ethics, whose core aspects we have highlighted above, thus enriches 
ethics, makes it more stimulating, and brings to it greater substance that 
cannot easily be codified. But the specific richness of this substance can 
only fully develop when it is firmly located within a fixed framework of 
principles which is not in opposition to care ethics but on the contrary is 
what finally enables care ethics to be realised. Paul Ricœur neatly sum-
marises this complementary relationship when he emphasises that the 
power of judgement which is so crucial for care “consists in inventing con-
duct that will best satisfy the exception required by  solicitude, by betraying 
the rule to the smallest extent possible” (Ricœur 1992, p. 269).
Note
1. Axel Honneth takes a similar approach when, referring to the granting of 
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Since the 1960s, the principle of autonomy has increasingly been hailed 
as the cornerstone of medical ethics. Today, it is the prime focus of medi-
cal ethicists when assessing clinical research trials and therapy decisions at 
the bedside. Historically, this development is a reaction to scandalous 
medical research trials on humans in the mid-twentieth century. 
Experiments on humans in concentration camps in Nazi Germany as 
well as harmful and racist trials in the USA up to the 1970s clearly indi-
cated that doctors were willing to disregard the will and well-being of 
individual patients in the name of what they declared to be scientific 
medical progress.
Apparently, the traditional ethos of the medical profession was not suf-
ficient to prevent aberrations of this sort. The obligation not to perform 
any therapeutic or research intervention unless the patient is informed 
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and consents to the procedure was therefore introduced with great 
emphasis as an important, if not the most important, element of the 
medical profession’s set of ethical norms. Although there were select ear-
lier legal and ethical calls to incorporate patient consent into medical 
practice, the medical ethos prior to this development was mainly oriented 
towards not harming patients and, to the extent possible, promoting 
their well-being. Calls to respect the autonomy of patients thus entered 
the scene of medicine as part of an ethical orientation that, it was sup-
posed, had not previously been included in the traditional medical ethos 
of caring for the well-being of patients.
This development has many effects on medical practice today. From an 
ethical standpoint, there is prima facie nothing wrong with strengthening 
the rights of patients in the medical encounter. On the contrary, if the 
traditional medical ethos lacks a focus on patient autonomy, and if medi-
cal ethics can help reinforce and justify the importance of patient auton-
omy, medicine ought to accept this new ethical orientation and 
incorporate it into its ethos. Most famously, the medical ethicists 
Beauchamp and Childress took this new orientation into account when 
setting up their set of biomedical ethical principles (Beauchamp and 
Childress 2013): Physicians ought to respect patient autonomy. In addi-
tion, they ought to minimise harm and maximise well-being, and finally, 
they ought to strive for the just distribution of scarce resources.
In what is to follow, I will argue that despite appearances, thinking of 
autonomy as a separate normative principle in addition to caring for 
well-being suffers from severe ethical drawbacks. What was and still is 
needed is instead a meaningful interpretation of the interdependence of 
autonomy and care, not a new principle besides care.
 A Conventional Limit to Autonomy 
in Medicine
Numerous guidelines, regulations, conventions and laws spell out the 
details of what is implied by respect for autonomy in the medical context. 
The common understanding is that respecting autonomy entails a 
patient’s right to refuse any medical treatment, regardless of whether the 
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treatment appears medically necessary to restore health or, in the most 
extreme case, to save the patient’s life. The right to autonomy is thus seen 
as a right of defence. Any medical intervention is an intervention into the 
patient’s body, and no one ought to be allowed to directly intervene in the 
body of another person unless this person gives consent. At the same 
time, autonomy in the medical context does not mean that patients have 
a right to demand medical interventions that are not “medically indi-
cated”. That is to say, they cannot request interventions that, from a med-
ical point of view, would not help to restore or maintain health, alleviate 
pain or suffering, or that would do more harm than good.
For those who presume that ethical rights ought to be consistently 
organised, this must come as a surprise. If patients are allowed to do harm 
to themselves by rejecting effective treatment, why should they not, in 
principle, have the right to request an intervention that does harm to 
themselves, and only to themselves, provided they are duly informed 
about any harms and benefits? Obviously, autonomy is counterbalanced 
in this case by another normative orientation. This orientation is a rudi-
mentary form of the care perspective: Avoid doing harm to others. 
Although one may have to accept that someone may harm themselves by 
rejecting offers of help, inflicting harm on another person ought to be 
avoided, even if the request comes from the person themselves.
In health care, autonomy and care are thus balanced against each other. 
On the one hand, autonomy constitutes a right of defence against 
unwanted treatment, even if that treatment would lead to better health. 
On the other hand, care ensures that no therapeutically unnecessary 
harm is done to patients, even if they do make a corresponding request, 
and that medical interventions are restricted to restoring or maintaining 
health and to alleviating pain and suffering.
 The Thrust of the Autonomy Principle
The practicability of these rules and regulations notwithstanding, this is 
an ethically puzzling situation. Taking John Stuart Mill’s influential writ-
ings as the root of the current mainstream understanding of the auton-
omy principle, the basic idea of this principle is that individuals ought to 
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be allowed to do whatever they want as long as their actions do not harm 
others: “The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing 
our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive 
others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it” (Mill 1869, p. 13).
Autonomy here consists of the right to act in accordance with one’s 
preferences and interests. This right is to be respected as long as carrying 
out the actions in question does not harm others. Mill assumes that a 
basic ability to distance oneself from overwhelming emotions, to sort 
interests, and to take factual information into account is a prerequisite of 
this right. “Unless he is a child, or delirious, or in some state of excite-
ment or absorption incompatible with the full use of the reflecting fac-
ulty” (Mill 1869, chapter 5, p. 5), the freedom of the individual with 
regard to his or her own good is to be respected.
Now, by itself the autonomy principle does not convey any reason for 
why it is good to have a specific preference or why it is good to help oth-
ers to have a preference apart from the fact that this is the other’s prefer-
ence. The autonomy principle does not provide an answer for someone 
asking themselves whether they should have a certain preference and 
why, nor does it offer guidance to someone who is in a position to pro-
vide support to another person and is wondering whether they should 
regard that person’s preference as worthy of support.
It follows from the autonomy principle that one ought to be allowed 
to reject medical treatment, even if the treatment is medically advisable. 
It further follows that attempting to understand and perhaps alter a 
patient’s preferences is unjustified, since the only justification for the 
preference is the fact that the patient holds this preference. A similar case 
can be made regarding assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia. Taking 
one’s own life primarily concerns oneself. Assuming that this act does not 
compromise the well-being of others, and assuming that one chooses this 
option as the result of a clear-minded process of reasoning on one’s pros-
pects, there is no justification for interfering with or objecting to this 
choice from the point of view of autonomy. What is more, if a person 
who is determined to commit suicide does not have the means or oppor-
tunity to do so, experts who have the required know-how could be justi-
fied in acting on this person’s behalf on the basis of respect for autonomy. 
Asking the patient why he prefers to end his life in order to be able to 
understand and evaluate this preference must be seen as misguided.
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In accordance with this claim, when Mill is concerned with whether 
one person should be allowed to “counsel” another or “instigate” them to 
do something, he is not thinking about whether or not it is good, inde-
pendent of the preferences one happens to have, to act in a certain way. 
He is concerned instead with whether people should be allowed to coun-
sel others who share a preference that may be met with reproach at a 
societal level on how to best act in accordance with that preference. For 
example, should one be allowed to counsel someone who likes gambling 
on how best to gamble? Mill answers this question in the affirmative, 
provided the counsellor does not derive a personal benefit from his advice 
(Mill 1869, chapter 5, p.  8). Accordingly, following Mill, supporting 
someone else’s preference to end their life is justifiable as long as one does 
not do so for personal gain. Still, and this is the important point, ques-
tioning this way of acting from a point of view independent of the prefer-
ence one happens to have must be seen as pointless and, in addition, 
unjustifiable if one thereby aims to alter the preferences of the other 
person.
 Assessing Reasons for Doing What One Wants 
to Do to Oneself
In order to conclude that it is good—not only from the point of view of 
an individual who has a certain preference but from a point of view inde-
pendent of given preferences—to act in a certain way, the desired state of 
affairs must additionally be presumed to be good from some sort of inter- 
individual standpoint. The term “inter-individual” here is meant to indi-
cate that this point of view must refer to reasons that can appeal to more 
than just those who happen to have a specific preference. Utilitarian eth-
ics, for example, clearly rests on the assumption that is always possible to 
supply this kind of inter-individual reason for acting one way rather than 
another.
The ethical debate concerning enhancement is a case in point. 
Enhancement is the use of pharmaceuticals and medical technologies by 
healthy people in order to improve their mental, emotional, or physical 
abilities. How can enhancing oneself be ethically evaluated? Some indi-
viduals may, for example, wish to enhance their ability to stay focussed 
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over long periods of time by using psychiatric drugs; others may not. If 
one assumes that the consequences of the decision to enhance oneself—
or not—are confined to oneself, on the basis of the autonomy principle 
alone, either preference is valid. In terms of justifying and evaluating 
this preference, nothing more can be said. If one follows a utilitarian 
premise, however, it becomes possible to evaluate these preferences on 
an inter- individual basis. If enhancement serves the interests of more 
people as compared to non-enhancement, then enhancement ought to 
be pursued and promoted. Thus, as is usually argued in the enhance-
ment debate, following the utilitarian premise, the basically accidental 
preference to enhance oneself turns into an ethical, inter-individual 
obligation. Conversely, this also implies that the autonomous individual 
decision on whether or not to enhance oneself becomes a choice between 
courses of action that can be ethically assessed. In the case of a utilitarian 
assessment, carrying out enhancements would be seen as favourable, as 
long as the benefit–harm ratio of enhancement is better than that of 
non-enhancement.
In this way, an inter-individual, reason-providing ethics supplements 
the autonomy principle with content that guides actions, thereby making 
it possible to understand and reconstruct what it means to critically assess 
one’s own preferences and those of others. On the basis of the autonomy 
principle alone, reflecting upon and debating preferences is a pointless 
undertaking, since in this case there are by definition no inter-individual 
reasons that could always serve as a shared basis for this reflection. 
Individuals may agree on a certain preference, but if they do not agree 
and do not find shared basic interests underlying their diverging prefer-
ences, the disagreement cannot be bridged. Supplementing the auton-
omy principle with a reason-providing ethics thus places all individuals in 
a shared space of reasons, in which debating preferences and reaching 
consensus are in principle always possible.
However, introducing a reason-providing ethics can also have nega-
tive consequences for autonomy. For example, one of the conundrums 
of the current enhancement debate is that each individual must be free 
to choose whether or not he or she wants to make use of these tech-
nologies. This is the case in the debate on reproductive enhancement, 
for example. The term “liberal eugenics” was introduced in this debate 
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in order to highlight that it should be up to individual parents whether 
their offspring ought to be enhanced.1 At the same time, when argu-
ments in favour of enhancement are based on utilitarian assumptions, 
as they often are, it follows that when enhancement results in benefits 
for the majority, it ought to be obligatory. It has been suggested, for 
instance, that if an enhancement drug of the future would allow sur-
geons to save more patients, the use of this drug could be made obliga-
tory for this profession (Greely et al. 2008). In such cases, autonomy 
gives way to a reason- providing ethics, since nothing can be put forth 
in defence of autonomy apart from the fact that following ethical, in 
this case utilitarian, reason may not conform to the will of the indi-
vidual. Now, changing the will of an individual in accordance with 
inter-individual reasons is what ethical demands and ethical reasoning 
are all about. Simply combining the autonomy principle with an inter-
individual reason-providing ethics account therefore necessarily weak-
ens autonomy.
 No Conception of a Shared Good
These relations highlight an important point. It becomes apparent that the 
autonomy principle is a non-ethical principle in the sense that it does not 
provide reasons for acting one way rather than another, provided the act 
does not directly interfere with the well-being of others. Under these con-
ditions, the autonomy principle can provide no inter-individual reasons 
for preferring one specific course of action over another. As a correlate, the 
autonomy principle cannot provide any guidance for decision-making in 
these cases. The process of will-formation thus appears to be a matter of 
accident. Whatever comes to be one’s interest is what guides one’s deci-
sions and must be accepted as such.
Someone who observes behaviour that they find puzzling or wrong- 
headed is not obliged to interfere, ask for reasons or try to convince the 
observed actor of the superiority of a different way of behaving. To take 
up an example provided by John Stuart Mill, if I observe someone who is 
headed towards a bridge and I know that it will collapse under the per-
son’s weight, I am not obliged to interfere, to ask why the person is put-
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ting himself into such a dangerous situation or to try to convince him that 
it would be better to stay away from the bridge. All these interventions 
would be based on the assumption that my preference not to plummet 
ought to be the other person’s preference as well. However, this is clearly 
not the case, since the observed person is choosing to step on the bridge. 
As Mill argues, the only mistake I may presume the person walking is 
making is that he is not correctly informed about the bridge’s condition. 
If I have provided him with this information and he keeps on walking 
anyway, further attempts to prevent him from his course of action must 
be seen as unwarranted interventions into his individual freedom (Mill 
1869, chapter 5, p. 5).
The most fundamental way to express these characteristics and impli-
cations of the autonomy principle is to say that the autonomy principle 
does not include a conception of a shared or potentially sharable idea of 
a good life. Such an idea would justify attempts to understand and dis-
cuss reasons for acting one way rather than another. Interests could be 
understood as preliminary judgements on what ought to be regarded as 
good, which are then always open to revision. In contrast, following the 
autonomy principle, one may help others to fulfil their will if one is in 
a position to do so and if the other person asks for and needs help, 
regardless of how one assesses these aims oneself. The justification on 
which this option to help rests is that the end which the other person 
wants to realise is obviously in their interest and thus promotes what 
they regard as good for themselves. Conversely, if the person rejects an 
offer of help, such as a medical treatment, this is what they want, and 
no further attempts to change the will are called for. Attempts to alter 
what a person wants are confined to giving factual information. Doing 
more would have to be seen as unduly influencing the other person’s 
will, since there is no way to understand this exertion of influence as 
part of what the other person themselves would do or wants to do. 
Giving reasons for alternative courses of action becomes an unwar-
ranted act of intrusion as soon as these reasons do not refer to the given 
interests and preferences of the other person. In other words, according 
to the autonomy principle, reasons for actions are solely the given inter-
ests of the acting person. Inter- individual reasons cannot be part of the 
individual process of will-formation.
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 The Autonomy Dilemma
The argument so far appears to end in a dilemma. Relying solely on the 
autonomy principle makes individual decision-making look like a speech-
less, almost mechanistic, or at least communication free activity. With 
regard to actions that do not directly harm others, no inter-individual, 
ethical reflection should make sense. However, if one introduces inter- 
individual reason-providing ethics accounts in addition to the autonomy 
principle, these accounts necessarily tend to diminish the validity of 
autonomy, as the utilitarian reasoning in the enhancement debate shows. 
As the dilemma stands, one must choose between contingent autono-
mous will on the one hand and universally prescriptive ethical demands 
on the other.
Neither of the two alternatives fits very well with how humans actually 
tend to behave when confronted with individual therapeutic choices that 
have a significant impact on their future life. Patients can reflect upon 
such choices together with relatives, friends, or members of their health 
care team, without thereby sacrificing their autonomy to universal ethical 
demands. Quite the contrary, this inter-individual reflection on the good 
life is often the catalyst for truly autonomous choice. What is more, help-
ing someone facing such a choice by supporting them and promising 
future support is often regarded as ethically valuable rather than as an 
intrusion into personal freedom. Hence what is needed is a concept of 
autonomy that can account for these phenomena and thus resolve the 
autonomy dilemma.
 Kant on Autonomy
When looking for alternative concepts of autonomy, Kant’s philosophy is 
a natural place to start. After all, it is Kant who explicitly uses the term 
“autonomy”, whereas Mill, for example, speaks of freedom and individu-
ality instead. For Kant, autonomy is not just the ability to act upon indi-
vidual preferences and to grasp factual information that has relevance for 
how to accomplish an end. On the contrary, acting in accordance with 
one’s autonomy for Kant is tantamount to acting ethically. This is because 
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when one reflects on a possible action from the perspective of autonomy, 
one applies a test of practical reason, that is an ethical test, to this action, 
namely the test of universalisability. One is supposed to ask oneself 
whether what one plans to do could be done by everyone “without con-
tradiction” (Kant 1996, p. 75, BA 57). According to Kant, this is a test 
which one must necessarily accept, because as a practically deliberating 
person one is part of the realm of universal practical reason, and in this 
realm, the only ethical criterion that does not rest on contingent prefer-
ences is the test of universalisability. Moreover, this test is not imposed on 
reason and practical reasoners from somewhere else, but originates within 
reason itself. It is a law that reason and oneself as a reasoner impose upon 
concrete cases of reason-guided will-formation and decision-making.
For example, refusing to help someone when help could be provided 
at no great cost to oneself cannot be universalised, according to Kant, 
since if this preference were a universal law, a situation could arise in 
which one would need help oneself and not receive it. Hence, Kant con-
cludes that a world in which no one helps others might be thinkable 
without contradiction, but it cannot be desired without contradiction 
(Kant 1996, p. 75, BA 56). To take another example, the desire to take 
one’s life when one’s future appears to bring more harm than happiness 
is, following Kant, contradictory, since if everyone adopted this prefer-
ence, humankind would extinguish itself and there would be no one left 
to formulate and pursue preferences at all. Therefore, he claims, this pref-
erence contradicts its own condition when universalised (Kant 1996, 
p. 73f, BA 53).
Much has been said for and against these examples and for and against 
Kant’s approach to autonomy and ethics in general. In the context of the 
discussion here, namely with regard to the autonomy dilemma, Kant’s 
approach initially appears to be a promising way to bring ethical content 
to the principle of autonomy and to understand will-formation as a 
reason- guided process. After all, autonomy is thought to involve ethical 
reasoning. Will-formation and decision-making about one’s own future 
and well-being can be regarded as ethical reason-guided phenomena, as 
especially the second example above shows. Upon closer scrutiny, how-
ever, Kant’s approach has serious limitations with regard to resolving the 
dilemma of ethical content. In order to resolve this dilemma, an account 
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of autonomy is needed. On the one hand, this account must understand 
will-formation as a process that is guided by ethical reasons. On the other 
hand, this must be an open process in which certain solutions cannot be 
flagged as right or wrong without a deliberative, intersubjective exchange. 
Such an exchange should be held together by a justified sense of having a 
shared aim, but, at the same time, it must be assumed that right and 
wrong cannot be inferred from this shared aim without intersubjective 
deliberation.
Kant’s use of the criterion of universalisability points in a different 
direction. The way in which he treats the question of whether it is ethi-
cally justified to take one’s life if one’s future life does not appear to be 
worth living is a case in point. He does not imagine this to be a weighing 
of multiple points of view or a process involving intersubjective social 
support. Rather he assumes that individually applying the test of univer-
salisability inevitably leads to the conclusion that suicide is not ethically 
allowed. In other words, the shared aim of acting in accordance with the 
test of universalisability does not leave room for interpretation or differ-
ent forms of concretisation in specific contexts as part of a process of 
intersubjective reason-guided communication.
What is more, critics have pointed out that contrary to Kant’s own 
supposition, planned actions cannot be ethically justified or prohibited 
on the basis of the criterion of universalisability. These critics claim that 
Kant relies on implicit hidden assumptions that render planned actions 
non-universalisable. Therefore, the criterion of universalisability as such 
is empty. To take the two examples given above, someone who is willing 
to accept that he will not receive help in cases where he might need it 
might not see any contradiction if his preference not to help others were 
universalised. In the same vein, it can be argued that the assumed fact 
that a preference for suicide, if universalised, undermines the possibility 
of there being any wills is only a contradiction if one regards the existence 
of wills as undoubtedly desirable.2
It might be possible to save Kant from this criticism and perhaps also 
to develop an interpretation of his theory that can resolve the autonomy 
dilemma.3 However, since there are other philosophical accounts of 
autonomous will-formation that are better suited to resolve this dilemma 
from the start, it makes sense to turn to these approaches instead.
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 Hermeneutic Autonomy
One way to escape the autonomy dilemma is to look for an understand-
ing of individual will-formation that introduces reason and inter- 
individual reflection as guiding factors in this process, without at the 
same time assuming a definite set of ethical norms that trump individual 
choice. Many accounts of the self that have been developed in hermeneu-
tic philosophy can be read in this way.
Most notably, Paul Ricoeur sees will-formation as a reason-guided pro-
cess. Reasons are not just given preferences. They always include a judge-
ment about what is to be regarded as good in an inter-individual sense. If 
a certain course of action is judged as being good, any person in a similar 
situation ought to be able to follow this judgement, regardless of whether 
or not they initially have such a preference. The judgement need not be 
restricted to instrumental goodness, according to which an action is good 
if it serves as a means to bring about a desired state of affairs. “Good” also 
covers actions of which one assumes that they can be part of what consti-
tutes a “‘good life’ with and for others, in just institutions” (Ricoeur 1992, 
p. 172). Therefore, forming one’s own will is potentially always an inter-
individual, communicative relation and contains a “dialogical dimension” 
(Ricoeur 1992, p. 180). Recognising and weighing reasons involves tak-
ing up the perspective of others. One does not begin decision- making 
with a fixed set of preferences that just need to be correctly informed in 
order to lead to what the individual then can regard as a good decision. 
On the contrary, decision-making starts as an always in principle open 
search for reasons which are formed by taking up a number of points of 
view through which one finds one’s own perspective.
If this is a correct model of what it means to form a will, a debate about 
what is good is a seamless extension of the internal will-forming process. 
In such a debate, each standpoint functions as a reason that must be 
weighed and assessed, just as reasons and standpoints are internally 
assessed in the will-forming process. Hence, the result of a debate can 
have an influence on the individual will, regardless of the standpoint and 
preferences that made up this individual will in the first place. If someone 
is convinced by such a debate and changes their will accordingly, this is 
essentially identical to the process by which one forms one’s will oneself.
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A pressing question for any such account is how one can settle the 
issue of what is to be regarded as good in a specific situation. Ricoeur 
does not assume a fixed set of norms that can help solve this problem, nor 
should finding a decision be a matter of power or contingency or other 
factors external to reflection. It is important to adhere to this claim, since 
otherwise debating the good becomes a matter of prescriptively declaring 
the good or settling for an arbitrary assumption of what should be 
regarded as good. One would then find oneself back in the dilemma 
mentioned above. Hermeneutic ethics thus presupposes a shared orienta-
tion towards the good that cannot directly be translated into concrete 
aims and actions but that nevertheless acts as a transcendent, only partly 
achievable point of consensus. According to Ricoeur, the ethical orienta-
tion towards a good life is just this: a shared orientation which can be 
assumed to be of universal validity, while its concrete meaning can differ 
and needs to be determined with regard to context.4
It may be helpful to compare this understanding of the notion of the 
good to the notion of truth in science. In scientific practice, “truth” 
functions as a universal guiding norm that shapes actions and debates. 
At the same time, whether one has reached the truth or not can always 
be called into question. Agreeing that one is looking for the truth thus 
does not settle arguments about what is to be regarded as true in specific 
circumstances. Nonetheless, it provides a general and universal aim that 
guides scientific inquiry and, as such, provides a shared basis for resolv-
ing conflict.
Hermeneutic autonomy stresses the procedural and inter-individual 
character of will-formation and decision-making. Due to this shift of 
focus, hermeneutic autonomy does not dissolve individual will- formation 
into contingent autonomous willing, nor does it subject autonomy to a 
prescriptive, overarching ethical norm that in itself defines what a good 
will ought to look like. In this way, it escapes the autonomy dilemma.
This kind of an account of autonomy contains the idea of a good 
which, firstly, need not already be present in the form of given prefer-
ences, and which, secondly, can be grasped and shared by exchanging 
reasons inter-individually. Nonetheless, such an account does rest on 
non-trivial metaphysical assumptions—as does any theory that incorpo-
rates an idea of truth or truth-seeking that is intended to have an effect 
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on action. It is important to be aware of this point, since these metaphysi-
cal assumptions are one of the main reasons for objecting to these 
approaches in philosophical debates.5 A discussion of these implications 
must be left aside here, however.
 Enabling Autonomy
From this perspective, making up one’s mind and acting autonomously 
does not consist in determining and following contingently given prefer-
ences and being equipped with relevant factual knowledge. Rather, form-
ing an autonomous will means taking part in an ongoing dialogue. This 
dialogue need not be restricted to verbal communication and it need not 
always take place between co-present interlocutors. Convictions may be 
expressed nonverbally and affectively, and one may find convincing atti-
tudes and perspectives in books, films or other media. In any case, when 
forming a will, one is positioning oneself in this dialogue and finding 
one’s own standpoint and voice.
Respecting autonomy thus initially requires safeguarding the ability to 
develop and enact autonomy, that is to say granting the other person a 
place in the debate, listening, revealing one’s own perspective and taking 
the time to let the exchange evolve. At some later point, then, respecting 
autonomy will also entail refraining from intervening if a person has 
decided themselves that these actions do not harm others.
In the medical context, these presuppositions of autonomy can be 
translated into calls for caution and attention. For example, before fol-
lowing a patient’s request to end life-prolonging or life-saving treatment, 
one ought to make sure that the patient has had time to think for them-
selves, the opportunity to talk to others, and, not least, that they are 
assured that their future existence and well-being matters. The latter 
entails that once a patient has reached a final decision, this decision must 
be regarded as authoritative. However, it also entails that the patient be 
assured that they will not be left alone or be perceived as a burden, should 
they decide to accept treatment.
Respecting autonomy thus incorporates an orientation towards well- 
being. It is directed at physical, psychological, and social presuppositions 
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of autonomy. In what is to follow it will be argued that this understand-
ing of what it means to respect autonomy is at its heart an understanding 
of care.
 Care in Medical Ethics
The Oxford English Dictionary defines care as the “provision of what is 
necessary for the health, welfare, maintenance, and protection of some-
one or something” (Oxford Living Dictionaries 2016). Care ethicists 
Tronto and Fischer characterise care in the same vein as “a species of 
activity that includes everything we do to maintain, contain, and repair 
our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible” (Fisher and Tronto 
1990, p. 40). Today’s standard medical ethics approach, as introduced by 
American scholars Beauchamp and Childress, refers to the principles of 
autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice. As mentioned, care 
is prominent in the principles of both beneficence and non-maleficence. 
Beneficence calls on physicians to offer and apply only those therapies 
that promise to improve the patient’s well-being. Non-maleficence addi-
tionally demands that medical interventions ought to have as few side 
effects as possible. These two principles are thus oriented towards patient 
well-being and contend that well-being ought to be preserved or restored, 
not compromised. In other words, these principles describe what care 
amounts to and demands.
Now, from a standard medical ethics interpretation, basing medical eth-
ics solely on care runs the risk of justifying paternalistic attitudes and behav-
iour. If well-being in medicine is defined in terms of disease and illness, the 
experts on questions of patient well-being are the members of the health-
care team, since it is the healthcare professionals who are trained to diag-
nose and treat a disease and professionally care for the patient accordingly. 
In this scenario, it appears that healthcare team members can determine by 
themselves what must count as well-being for a patient. Consequently, 
treating and caring for a patient appears to be an activity that can be pur-
sued independently from what the patients wants and regards as good. 
Restoring health is considered good for the patient, and the healthcare team 
itself is in the best position to judge how to accomplish this.
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As a matter of fact, however, patients at the end of life may not always 
want to extend therapy as far as medically possible. Patients at risk of 
developing a disease may not always consider a strict regimen of daily 
preventive routines to be worth the effort. Other patients may reject spe-
cific medical interventions for religious reasons. That is to say, what con-
stitutes well-being for an individual patient depends on how she or he 
values health, disease, preventive efforts, and quality of life. Stressing 
autonomy in medical ethics helps to incorporate this fact into healthcare 
practice. Following this reasoning, autonomy can be introduced as a 
counterbalance to care in order to push back the ethically dubious pater-
nalistic tendencies of a solely care-based ethics.
 The Care Dilemma
Nonetheless, this strategy for dealing with the supposed paternalistic ten-
dencies of a care-based approach to medical ethics leads into a specific 
variation of the dilemma developed above. If one sees autonomy as pre-
vailing over care, it becomes unclear why autonomy should be restricted 
to rejecting medical interventions. As long as patient preferences do not 
harm others, why should theses preferences not be justified? From the 
point of view of the autonomy principle, there can be no meaningful 
debate about the patient’s preferences, neither based on supposedly inter- 
individually valid evaluations of health states, nor based on any other 
supposedly inter-individually valid reasons. If, however, one gives prece-
dence to care, it must appear irrational, for example, to accept a patient’s 
request not to undergo treatment when successful medical therapy is still 
possible. If the patient makes recourse to his own well-being, health care 
team members will be entitled to correct him or her, since defining well- 
being is, qua the hypothesis, part of their expertise.
What is needed in order to resolve the dilemma is an understanding 
of care that allows for reason-based debate about patient needs  
and preferences, without shifting the expertise on what is good for 
the patient completely into, in this case, the realm of medical and 
healthcare expert knowledge. Again, the hermeneutic understanding of 
autonomy is a viable option for resolving this dilemma. Approaching 
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this concept from the perspective of care allows one to focus on the 
concept’s ethical content.
Following Ricoeur, it is possible to understand autonomy as an inter-
nal dialogical process in which reasons and points of view on the good life 
are taken up and tested, thereby forming one’s own voice. Engaging with 
and forming one’s own will is thus inseparable from taking other perspec-
tives into account. In his further reflection, Ricoeur equates this relation 
of self and other with the basic evaluational attitude of esteeming oneself 
and esteeming others. Indeed, one of Ricoeur’s main aims is to show how 
being concerned with one’s own will is inextricably intertwined with 
being concerned with the autonomy of others. When one is concerned 
with one’s own good life, one esteems this life, and one does so also from 
the point of view of others. Conversely, if one cannot esteem oneself from 
the point of view of others and is not esteemed by others, one will not be 
able to esteem oneself (Ricoeur 1992, pp. 192–194). This is the reason 
why supporting autonomous will-formation can actually be regarded as a 
valuable aim from the point of view of an autonomous will. Esteeming 
oneself in autonomous will-formation is intimately linked to being 
esteemed by others and esteeming others, and ascribing to them the same 
abilities that one ascribes to oneself as an actor: “This exchange authorizes 
us to say that I cannot myself have self-esteem unless I esteem others as 
myself. ‘As myself ’ means that you too are capable of starting something 
in the world, of acting for a reason, of hierarchizing your priorities, of 
evaluating the ends of your actions, and, having done this, of holding 
yourself in esteem as I hold myself in esteem” (Ricoeur 1992, p. 193). 
Respecting the autonomy of another thus leads to supporting the social 
and physical presuppositions of this kind of internal dialogue. This turn 
does not rest on an ethical demand that is external to what one values in 
autonomy. Instead, it develops within the autonomy stance itself, since 
autonomy presupposes esteeming others as one esteems oneself. These 
presuppositions can be regarded as constituting basic human needs that 
must be present in order to allow for autonomous will-formation.
A hermeneutic conception of care thus resolves the care dilemma by 
calling for attention to needs. However, these needs cannot be defined 
independent of the preferences of the other. First, there are physical 
and social needs that must be fulfilled in order to enable autonomous 
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will- formation in general. Second, preferences might conflict with one 
another or with some of those very needs. Such preferences may appear 
puzzling from the point of view of hermeneutic care, or any understand-
ing of care indeed, but since the aim of hermeneutic care is to enable and 
sustain autonomy, these preferences will have to be respected as long as 
due care has been taken to ensure that these preferences are not the pre-
mature results of unfulfilled social or physical needs. Care responds to 
needs, hermeneutic care responds to needs which enable and sustain 
autonomy. This specification prevents hermeneutic care from turning 
into paternalistic neglect of patient autonomy.
According to this account of care, caring for a patient is, first of all, 
caring for individual well-being insofar as it can be regarded to be a 
prerequisite of the ability to form a will. Health, for example, can be 
understood as a prerequisite of this kind. Nonetheless, humans have a 
capacity to individually reflect upon these prerequisites, to reject, 
transform, or prioritise them. Some may think there are reasons to 
strive for super- human powers and medical enhancements of their 
physical abilities. Others may regard rejecting medical treatment as the 
best option in their situation. Since wanting to reject a promising treat-
ment appears to run counter to well-being, when caring for a patient 
one will have to learn more about why the patient prefers this option. 
There may be social or medical circumstances that lead to this prefer-
ence which disguise an otherwise present wish to receive therapy and 
which one may be able to change. Caring for the patient hence involves 
engaging with the patient and being attentive. If one ultimately learns, 
however, that the kind of life that the patient will be able to have after 
successful treatment does not correspond to what the patient thinks of 
as valuable and meaningful, even if all medical and social supportive 
measures are in place, hermeneutic care entails refraining from attempts 
to override this decision, since hermeneutic care is not bound to a sup-
posed objectively given well-being but aims at enabling and sustaining 
autonomous decision-making. If such a decision in a borderline case 
like this turns against its own prerequisites, this is disturbing. Yet ulti-
mately, if supporting measures do not change the decision, it bears 




In these cases, patients do not want for themselves what the health care 
team regards as necessary. It has been argued from the point of view of 
hermeneutic care that these preferences must ultimately be accepted. It is 
also worth noting that in cases in which the prerequisites of the autono-
mous will-formation of others are under threat, hermeneutic care has the 
resources to draw boundaries. Generally speaking, the closer an action or 
intention comes to threatening the very conditions of an individual to 
take part in a verbal or non-verbal communicative exchange of equals 
about reasons for actions, the more it becomes ethically dubious. At this 
point, Ricoeur makes use of the “golden rule”. He argues that the essence 
of this rule is to prohibit all those actions that deprive the other of his 
status as an equal other in an interactive of process of determining the 
good. He names as examples a descending slope from influence to the 
betrayal of friendship and faithfulness, threat, constraint, torture and 
murder (Ricoeur 1992, p. 220f ). All these acts are infringements on the 
ethical demand to treat the other just like oneself, as someone who is 
capable of reflecting, evaluating, and esteeming oneself and others.
 Conclusion
Construing autonomy as an ethical principle along the lines of a Millean 
account leads to a dilemma. Relying solely on this principle makes indi-
vidual decision-making look like a speechless, almost mechanistic, or at 
least communication free activity. However, if one introduces inter- 
individual reason-providing ethics accounts in addition to the autonomy 
principle, these accounts necessarily tend to diminish the validity of 
autonomy. As the dilemma stands, one must choose between contingent 
autonomous will on the one hand and universally prescriptive ethical 
demands on the other.
A hermeneutic understanding of autonomy can help us to escape this 
dilemma. Following Ricoeur, it can be argued that individual will- 
formation is a reason-guided process that necessarily involves taking the 
perspectives of others into account. This also holds true in those cases in 
which the consequences of an action or intention are exclusively borne 
by the actor him- or herself. Individual will-formation is directed towards 
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the idea of a good life, the content of which cannot be determined inde-
pendent of others’ preferences and perspectives. Respecting autonomy, 
then, leads to enabling and sustaining the individual will-formation pro-
cess, which is to say it leads to caring for the physical and social prereq-
uisites of individual will-formation. Respecting autonomy, thus, 
comprises care. It comprises a caring attitude towards others whose 
autonomous will-formation is to be enabled and sustained to the greatest 
extent possible.
Focusing on care as prime ethical principle can, in turn, once again 
lead to a dilemma, since care is a reaction to needs that might appear to 
be objectively identifiable. This is a variation of the autonomy dilemma 
named above. If one gives precedence to care, it must appear irrational, 
for example, to accept a patient’s request not to undergo treatment when 
successful medical therapy is still possible. If the patient makes recourse 
to his own well-being, health care team members will be entitled to cor-
rect him or her, since defining well-being is, qua hypothesis, part of their 
expertise. In contrast, if one takes recourse to a Millean account of 
 autonomy here, it becomes unclear why autonomy should be restricted 
to rejecting medical interventions.
What is needed in order to resolve the dilemma is an understanding 
of care that allows for reason-based debate about patient needs and pref-
erences without shifting the expertise on what is good for the patient 
completely into, in this case, the realm of medical and healthcare expert 
knowledge. Again, the hermeneutic understanding of autonomy is a 
viable option to resolve this dilemma. Approaching this concept from 
the side of care allows one to focus on the concept’s care-related ethical 
content.
Following this line of argument, it becomes apparent that respecting the 
autonomy of others can be derived as an ethical demand from an under-
standing of individual will-formation. If one grants Ricoeur’s assumption 
that concern for finding one’s own point of view on what constitutes a 
good life implies esteeming oneself, then esteeming others and their points 
of view is a necessary part of individual will-formation, since will-forma-
tion consists of taking other perspectives into account, testing them and 
thereby aligning with all those who have, have had and can have a voice in 
this inter-individual process. Furthermore, according to this account of 
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care, caring for a patient involves, first of all, caring for individual well-
being insofar as this can be seen as a prerequisite of individual will-forma-
tion and its intersubjective, dialogical structure. These constituents of 
well-being may, to a large degree, be common to all humans. Health, for 
example, can be understood as a prerequisite of this kind. Yet if one ulti-
mately learns that the kind of life that the patient will be able to have after 
successful treatment does not correspond to what the patient thinks of as 
valuable and meaningful, even if all medical and social supportive mea-
sures are in place, hermeneutic care entails refraining from attempts to 
override this decision, since hermeneutic care is not bound to a supposed 
objectively given state of well-being but aims at enabling and sustaining 
autonomous decision-making. If such a decision in a borderline case turns 
against its own prerequisites, this is disturbing, but ultimately, if support-
ing measures do not change the decision, it bears witness to what autono-
mous human reflection is capable of, namely neglecting itself.
Notes
1. Nicholas Agar introduced this term in Agar (2004).
2. The locus classicus of this criticism is to be found in the writings of Hegel 
(Hegel 1977, p. 256).
3. Most famously, Onora O’Neill has supplied a defence of a Kantian con-
cept of autonomy in ethics and bioethics especially (O’Neill 2002).
4. Ricoeur makes use of the Aristotelian concept of phronesis to make this 
point (Ricoeur 1992, p. 177). He stresses that living up to this ethical aim 
requires “unending work of interpretation” (Ricoeur 1992, p. 179).
5. Ricoeur touches on this issue when he writes: “What we are summoned to 
think here is the idea of a higher finality which would never cease to be 
internal to human action” (Ricoeur 1992, p. 179).
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Today commercial surrogacy is a “global baby business” (Donchin 2010, 
p. 323) valued at between US $500 million and US $2.0 billion in India 
alone (Knoche 2014). This boom in international surrogacy can be 
ascribed to the possibilities opened up by assisted reproductive technolo-
gies (ARTs) such as in vitro fertilisation (IVF) as well as affordable travel 
opportunities in the age of globalisation. Hence starting a family is no 
longer exclusively a question of intimacy and individual choice between 
two people, nor is it a question of having a vast amount of money. 
Surrogacy has become an attractive alternative for many couples 
(Robinson 2006) either when reasons of infertility or sexual orientation 
make a “natural” pregnancy impossible or when a woman is unwilling to 
carry a pregnancy. Although surrogacy is forbidden in many countries 
(e.g. Germany), some countries (e.g. the UK) permit altruistic surrogacy 
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and in others (e.g. India) surrogacy is actually a well-established form of 
medical tourism. Evidence suggests that the medical tourism industry 
will grow in the coming years, as for example, the surrogacy prices in 
India are five times lower than in some US states. Accordingly, Arlie 
Russell Hochschild describes commercial surrogacy as “the ultimate 
encounter between the market and intimate life” (Hochschild 2012, 
p. 178), where difficult questions about hiring others to perform personal 
acts arise. The practice of surrogacy is a sphere of life in which economic 
considerations, medical technologies and international regulations are 
indissolubly entwined. Because of its complexity, the practice of surro-
gacy makes ethical evaluation difficult.
Before presenting some ethical considerations concerning the practice 
of surrogacy, a short remark on terminology is required. In general, two 
kinds of surrogacy can be distinguished: In a traditional arrangement, a 
surrogate mother contributes her ovum and is genetically related to the 
child. Gestational surrogacy, in contrast, means that the surrogate carries 
a child that is not genetically related to her, but to the commissioning 
parents or a third party that donates the ovum and/or the sperm. This 
distinction is of empirical importance insofar as most surrogacy arrange-
ments today are gestational and most “dramatic surrogacy failures” 
(Shapiro 2014, p. 1355), such as the Baby M case,1 can be traced back to 
traditional surrogacy. Cases in which the surrogate mother is also geneti-
cally related to the child present a problem for the courts in particular, in 
that not only the legitimacy of surrogacy contracts has been called into 
question, but the issue has also been raised of whose right to the child is 
greater: the genetic and biological mother, or the genetic father and his 
wife, the social mother.
However, gestational surrogacy without apparent conflicts, which is 
relatively routine today, is not suited to serve as a starting point for a 
moral evaluation of the practice of surrogacy, and it is even less suited to 
present a moral argument to legitimise surrogacy. It can merely serve to 
emphasise different manifestations of problems within the practice of sur-
rogacy. And even though ethical questions, such as the role of embodi-
ment and genetic ties, are of greater importance in traditional than in 
gestational arrangements, I will show that both arrangements can share 
the problem of disconnected relationships. In this chapter, I consider 
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relationships to be an essential component for taking on responsibility. 
But this also requires that a relationship is recognised as such—a require-
ment which, above all in commercial surrogacy arrangements, is rarely 
fulfilled.
In addition to the distinction between gestational and traditional sur-
rogacy, some authors draw a distinction between commercial and altruis-
tic surrogacy in order to underline that the motivation for becoming a 
surrogate mother is central to the moral status of surrogacy itself. Many 
ethicists interpreting surrogacy as an arrangement of exploitation2 and 
commodification3 refer to the vulnerable socio-economic background of 
most surrogates and suspect them of having become a surrogate solely 
out of financial motivation. Because of this financial incentive, the sur-
rogate’s decision cannot be declared as autonomous (which is the basis for 
“right” actions) but as heteronomous, that is guided by external motiva-
tions. Indeed, the financial incentive for women in the “global south” to 
enter into a surrogacy arrangement is extremely high. A woman who 
works as a surrogate can assure the livelihood of her family for five years; 
furthermore, she is able to offer her own children a better future by send-
ing them to school (Karandikar et al. 2014; Panitch 2013). Besides the 
status of financial compensation in surrogacy arrangements, other condi-
tions are problematic as well. The educational level of the surrogates is 
low, which often prevents them from understanding the contract condi-
tions, the medical risks4 and the procedures they will have to undergo. 
There is a danger that the surrogates will make their decision under non- 
ideal circumstances and agree to give birth to a child that is not theirs in 
absence of the conditions for informed consent. Furthermore, their lack 
of education also diminishes their opportunities for other jobs. As a con-
sequence, surrogacy often appears to be the only option these women 
have (Pande 2010). On the basis of the socio-economic conditions of 
most surrogates in the global south, surrogacy can be interpreted in one 
sense as providing the wrong financial incentive to do something one 
would not otherwise do or, alternatively, as a realistic chance for the sur-
rogates and their families to live a better (autonomous) life (Fabre 2006; 
Macklin 1990).
From a libertarian standpoint, none of these socio-economic condi-
tions constitutes a reason to forbid surrogacy per se. A prohibition is 
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considered to be a restriction of the freedom of women rather than a 
protection against exploitation. Prohibiting surrogacy would diminish 
women’s autonomy and freedom of choice unjustifiably. Richard Arneson 
describes the libertarian position as follows:
No matter how restricted one’s life options, the idea that the narrow range 
of one’s options unacceptably constrains one’s choice is not a reason to 
limit further one’s range of choice. (Arneson 1992, p. 158)
In line with this opinion, Cécile Fabre argues that even though women 
in India often opt for surrogacy under non-ideal conditions (which should 
be improved), they live a “minimally flourishing life” (Fabre 2006, p. 187), 
which ensures that they can decide freely and in accordance with life 
plans. Any notion of further concerns, for example the emotional distress 
of being pregnant and giving birth to a child for another couple, is some-
thing that has to be taken seriously, but is no reason to deny people the 
possibility of choosing surrogacy (Fabre 2006, p. 199). Indeed, Fabre even 
allows surrogates to keep the child because of emotional ties; however, 
from her standpoint this is a question of “valid, but voidable contracts” 
(Fabre 2006, pp. 186–218). The eventuality of emotional bonding does 
not constitute a reason to doubt the correctness of the surrogacy contracts 
themselves. Even though some studies show empirical evidence that bond-
ing between mother and child during pregnancy does not necessarily 
occur (Robbins and Eaves 2013), the question remains whether the pos-
sibility of bonding and the consequential potential harm to the surrogate 
is a real challenge for the practice of surrogacy. These doubts are dismissed 
by Fabre: “we cannot and will not ever be able to live in a risk-free society, 
particularly one free of the emotional risks attendant on parenthood. Nor, 
in fact, should we aspire to do so” (Fabre 2006, p. 218).
Other authors who also do not condemn contract surrogacy in gen-
eral, but are rather concerned with gender inequality in the practice of 
surrogacy, mention the need to take care of “the most economically and 
emotionally vulnerable party in any such arrangement” (Satz 2010, 
p. 132), that is the surrogate, and thus demand an improvement in the 
conditions of surrogates in the global south. This may include, for 
instance, making third-party brokerage of pregnancy contracts illegal, 
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giving women the right to terminate the pregnancy against the will of the 
commissioning parents or making educational and occupational pro-
grammes available to Indian women. As a result of such measures, fewer 
Indian women would “choose” to become gestational surrogates (Satz 
2010; Schanbacher 2014). Leaving aside the feasibility of the implemen-
tation of these requirements as part of the practice of surrogacy, the ques-
tion as to the moral and social consequences of even an ideal practice of 
surrogacy still remains.
Already in the 1980s, the feminist philosopher Susan Sherwin claimed 
that it was a task for medical ethics to analyse ARTs in the context of 
control over reproduction. For her it is obvious that the increased use of 
ARTs, such as IVF, and the possibility of surrogate pregnancy imply a 
decrease in women’s control over their reproduction—especially for the 
surrogates.5 We must look not just to broad social policy, but also to the 
details of relationships to delineate the social attitudes and patterns that 
are at risk of being undermined (Sherwin 1989). The analysis must not 
be restricted to the individual and its situation nor to dyadic and personal 
relationships, but rather it must consider the relationships of all parties 
involved. Recently the care-ethicist Stephanie Collins wrote that, based 
on the inherent value relationships have for people, “relationships ought 
to be (a) treated as moral paradigms, (b) valued, preserved, or promoted 
(as appropriate to the circumstances at hand), and (c) acknowledged as 
giving rise to weighty duties” (Collins 2015, p.  47). This leads to the 
crucial question of what the moral foundation of relationships is and why 
relationships are important to individuals.
 Levinas and Ethics
A philosopher for whom the relationship with another person is central 
for morality and for ethics is Emmanuel Levinas. Based on a phenomeno-
logical methodology presented with Jewish-theological thinking and 
terms, he describes ethics as an intersubjective relation beyond the need 
of any consciousness, knowledge or reflective ability. Levinas’ ethics can 
be read in the tradition of phenomenology. He describes the phenome-
non of life by posing the question of what something means for us as 
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human beings. In an ongoing process of perceiving and interacting with 
the world, the self finds what it means to be ethical. For Levinas, ethics is 
the first and most important discipline of philosophy. However, his 
understanding of ethics differs from traditional ethical theories. It is nei-
ther based on a Kantian idea of self-legislation, nor the calculation of 
happiness, such as in utilitarianism, nor the cultivation of virtues. Instead 
it is best understood as a proto-ethics. This means that it focuses on the 
question of what it takes to understand ethics and why people should be 
moral at all. The idea of weighing different ethical principles is not rele-
vant to Levinas, insofar as he describes an ethics which initially only 
addresses the relationship of the self to the Other and what it means for 
the self to carry responsibility for the Other. Questions involving the 
needs of many people, for example concerning justice, are of subordinate 
interest to Levinas. Being-with-one-another is an ontological dimension 
of a person and not just a social fact without any impact on the individ-
ual. This is why the foundation of Levinas’ approach centres on the face- 
to- face encounter of the self and the so-called Other. The fact that Levinas 
presents the Other as fundamentally dissimilar, that is not merely as 
another self (the Not-I) or someone who displays similar characteristics, 
opens up the possibility, according to Levinas, to avoid reducing the 
Other in the self to a certain facet or a particular notion of the Other.6
 Levinas and the Ethics of Care: The Mother–Child 
Relationship
Even though Levinas never uses the word “care” to describe the relation-
ship between the self and the Other, the ethics of care and Levinas have a 
lot in common. Both take the mother–child relationship as a paradigm of 
their anthropological analysis. Although the phenomenology of natality 
is described as having all the aspects of a maternal body, the concept of 
the mother is not exclusive to women but rather independent of any cat-
egory of sex. The relationship between mother and child serves as a para-
digm for the fundamental vulnerability and dependency of the self. 
Without the mother, a child would not have been born and could not be 
part of this world. Life thus begins with dependency and with an 
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 asymmetry of power, and both these characteristics of life require the care 
of another person. Being in a relationship with someone is therefore the 
first condition for being in the world. An ethics which emerges from such 
an image of human contingency and dependency represents an alterna-
tive to the model that regards people as “self-interested strangers” (Held 
2006, p. 77) who simply enter into a contract with each other. It high-
lights responsibilities which exceed contractual models of reciprocity.
Furthermore, the mother–child relationship sheds light on the special 
characteristic of ethical relations: In the eyes of the mother, her child is 
special. Because of the fact of natality—which plays a crucial role both in 
the ethics of care and for Levinas—the concept of humankind starts with 
an emphasis on the particularity of every person and every situation. Just 
as the child is special to the mother, all people are of importance to some-
one. They are unique and irreplaceable in their meaning to someone else.
Finally, both ethics underline the importance of the attitude of being 
responsive to the Other and the world. Being responsive is not something 
one can really choose to be. Levinas uses the image of “being held hos-
tage” to describe the phenomenon of dependency. In pregnancy, this 
dependency becomes obvious. Having a baby limits the freedom of the 
mother—she is not supposed to drink or eat what she wants, her body 
changes enormously and feeling physically sick is often part of pregnancy. 
It is not unusual for women to wish for their “customary body” back 
(Staehler 2016, p. 31), that is the ability to perform everyday activities 
again as usual. A mother’s love for her child is not affected by these con-
straints, however. According to Levinas, the same is true for the relation-
ship with the Other: Being in a relationship with the Other represents a 
challenge for the self. This relationship is not freely chosen in its condi-
tions, but is based on unconditional responsiveness and responsibility 
towards the Other.
Being responsive and responding to the needs of someone else are thus 
central to both Levinas and the ethics of care. While Levinas primarily 
foregrounds the needs of the Other, an ethics of care also asks to what 
extent the self can fulfil the needs of the Other. According to the well- 
known definition by the care-ethicist Joan Tronto (Tronto 1993, 2013), 
care is best understood as attitude and as practice. While this differentia-
tion can be made methodologically, in daily life the phases of care often 
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occur (or at least should occur) all at once. “Caring about” and “taking 
care of” are descriptions of the attitude of the care-giver while “care- 
giving” and “care-receiving” touch on the practice of care. “To care” is 
about assessing a need (attentiveness), realising that one has the capabili-
ties to help the other (responsibility), coming in contact with the object 
of care (competence) and expecting a response from the care-receiver 
(responsiveness) (Tronto 2013, pp. 34–35). Although the Other obvi-
ously plays a crucial role in the process of caring, almost all discussions 
about caring start from the perspective of the care-giver and not the care- 
receiver, as Tronto states (Tronto 2013, p. 150). This is the point where 
Levinas can offer important insights to supplement the ethics of care, 
because he builds his concept of relationships on the role of the care- 
receiver, the so-called Other. While the ethics of care can create awareness 
of how care practices should ideally proceed and the social, economic and 
political conditions necessary to facilitate this, Levinas lays the founda-
tion for understanding why the Other approaches us and why we have to 
take responsibility for them. Levinas locates answers to the “why” of care 
in the Other, and not in the self.
 Levinas’ Concept of Responsibility
Levinas’ starting point for ethics is the Other. The Other contains a tran-
scendent part, a part which exceeds all experiences in the real world. 
Alterity—the being totally different than the self and different than any 
other object of experience—is addressing the self. It is challenging the self 
to give an adequate answer, because the self desires to understand the 
Other, but also lacks the capacity to fulfil this aspiration.
The relation to the Other is ethical, which for Levinas means that the 
self has to overcome traditional categories of thinking and acting, and 
that infinite responsibility for the Other is the mode of their relationship. 
This responsibility cannot be delegated, even if someone else can respond 
in a given situation. However, this should not be understood as an actual 
responsibility but rather as something pre-ontological that gives rise to a 
motivation to act ethically and to care for the welfare of the Other. How 
to respond to the call of the Other and to exercise one’s own responsibil-
ity is up to the self and its judgement:
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The will is free to assume this responsibility in whatever sense it likes; it is 
not free to refuse this responsibility itself; it is not free to ignore the mean-
ingful world into which the face of the Other has introduced it. (Levinas 
1991b, pp. 218–219)
When Eva Feder Kittay says that it must first be acknowledged that 
who is responsible for whom is often a matter of absolute judgement and 
less a matter of degree (Feder Kittay 1999, p. 56), she is actually making 
the same point as Levinas. To meet the needs of another person is an 
absolute necessity and cannot be rejected, because without the Other, the 
self would not be obliged to give reasons for its action or even identify its 
own capacity to act. The question of the right reaction to the need of the 
Other, that is the actualisation of responsibility, is secondary. In this way, 
Levinas’ conception of responsibility differs from what we usually think 
of when we talk about responsibility: The ability to act is typically under-
stood to be a necessary condition for recognising and exercising respon-
sibility. For Levinas, in contrast, being responsible for the Other is the 
foundation of every action. Before you act, you are already responsible.
The passivity of the self that is expressed by “being-already-in- 
responsibility” is why Levinas’ concept of responsibility cannot be attrib-
uted to an intentional act; it is nothing the self can decide on. However, 
responsibility is normative, because it is necessary in order to be ethical, 
to be part of humanity. Thus, from Levinas’ point of view, one may even 
say that the Other constitutes the self in its morality, because without the 
Other there would be no reason for being moral. Although the absolute 
responsibility for the Other seems to force the self into heteronomous 
actions, as Levinas sees it, this mode of relation constitutes an antecedent 
to freedom and the condition for being ethical. From this perspective, 
freedom is best understood as a liberation from ontological necessities, a 
“deliverance from Being” (Ciaramelli 1991, p.  88). The way Levinas 
thinks about the self also becomes clearer in this context: It is not a 
Hobbesian self that identifies the Other as a risk for one’s own life and 
freedom. Instead the self is ethical and becomes a subject of good will 
with the appearance of the Other, because “toward another culminates in 
for another” (Levinas 1991a, p. 18).
Levinas even goes a step further by claiming that the relationship to 
the Other is of a general non-reciprocal asymmetry. The self does not 
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expect any kind of compensation in return for its responsibility to meet 
the needs of the Other. Within the ethical relation, the Other and the self 
are so different that it is impossible to conclude that the Other also has a 
responsibility for the self. The attempt to draw an analogy between the 
self and the Other fails, because the Other is characterised by an absolute 
alterity,7 a transcendent part, as Levinas calls it. This transcendent part of 
the Other renders the expectation of reciprocity or symmetry within the 
concept of responsibility impossible:
The knot of subjectivity consists in going to the other without concerning 
oneself with his movement toward me. […] I have always one response more 
to give, I have to answer for his very responsibility. (Levinas 1991a, p. 84)
Whereas there are no restrictions on the responsibility of the self for the 
Other—even the responsibility of the Other devolves upon the self—the 
self cannot expect the other to behave in the same manner. To be is first of 
all being for the Other without expecting a reward. For Levinas, seeking 
reciprocity refers to the sphere of economy, that is to mere contracts. 
Within a contract there is no need to recognise the alterity of the Other, 
because economic relations are based on utility and the expectation of 
reciprocity between equals. Mere economy epitomises the “totalisation of 
unique persons” (Levinas 1995, p.  54). In this sphere, there is just a 
numerical alterity or diversity of Others, not a kind of recognition of the 
alterity of the Other. In contrast, ethics is the opposite. Ethics requires 
relationships between unique individuals and the recognition of their 
alterity. As a consequence, the purpose of ethics is not a search for rules or 
principles, but rather a search for the right response to a concrete Other.
 Levinas and the Concept of Relational Autonomy
Levinas’ conception of ethics is furthermore a warning not to place a 
specific concept of the self at the centre of ethics. According to Levinas, a 
self that has been reduced to self-consciousness and self-sufficiency is 
untenable. This critique can be read as a provocative shift of emphasis in 
times where the self and its autonomy are conceptualised as acting “freely 
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in accordance with a self-chosen plan” (Beauchamp and Childress 2009, 
p. 99), that is where self-reference is central. When Levinas refers to the 
self, he is referring to a subjectivity that exists in dialogue and not as ego. 
Of course, a “life of enjoyment” and independence from the Other are 
also part of the self. Enjoyment is not tied to an end; it is the hedonistic 
sensibility beyond any act of consciousness. In this sense, Levinas antici-
pates the critique of the absolute passivity of the self that may lead to a 
loss of self. However, the self of enjoyment is the self “who gives to the 
Other when called upon in the face-to-face relation” (Chanter 2005, 
p. 42). Only a self that is different from the Other can be for the Other. 
The aspect of enjoyment helps to emphasise this ontological and episte-
mological distinction between the Other and the self. In contrast, the self 
and the Other interact intensely on the ethical level. They do not just 
share the world with each other; instead, the Other is welcomed into a 
world of “hospitality.” It is necessary to include the Other in order to be 
ethical, to be responsive and to perceive the necessity of acting.
Vulnerability, exposure to outrage, to wounding, passivity more passive 
than all patience, passivity of the accusative form, trauma of accusation 
suffered by a hostage to the point of persecution, implicating the identity 
of the hostage who substitutes himself for the others: all this is the self, a 
defecting or defeat of the ego’s identity. And this, pushed to the limit, is 
sensibility, sensibility as the subjectivity of the subject. It is a substitution 
for another, one in the place of another, expiation. (Levinas 1991a, p. 15)
The passivity of the ethical self is connected to the ontological vulner-
ability of the self, namely its susceptibility to various harms or exploita-
tions. For Levinas, vulnerability is the basis for sensibility, for being 
responsive to the Other. In recent years, the discussion about  vulnerability 
and relationality of the self also became an integral element of the discus-
sion about “relational autonomy.” Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie 
Stoljar characterise relational autonomy as follows:
The focus of relational approaches is to analyse the implications of the 
intersubjective and social dimensions of selfhood and identity for concep-
tions of individual autonomy and moral and political agency. (Mackenzie 
and Stoljar 2000, p. 4)
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They consider the exercise of individual autonomy to be embedded in 
historical and social features and therefore criticise, for example libertar-
ians, for paying little attention to the background social conditions in 
which preferences are formed (Mackenzie 2014). Social structures and 
interpersonal relations are not just to be considered as a condition of 
causal control, instead they partly generate autonomy by affecting one’s 
capacity to live an “autonomous” life (Dodds 2007; Oshana 2006; 
Westlund 2009). In other words, autonomy is constituted by the social, 
personal, economic and cultural embeddedness of the self and is an ongo-
ing process that takes place in relation to others. In this sense, relation-
ships should not be understood as intrinsically good; they also exhibit a 
disruptive potential—for example, when they prevent a self-determined 
life from being led or undermine shared values. Thus, questions such as 
those regarding the emancipation from oppression, the recognition of the 
Other and how best to structure our social practices in order to allow for 
autonomy are of particular importance.
These insights can help to clarify what a relational approach to the 
practice of surrogacy means: Relationships are an indispensable part of 
constituting the self, and in the context of surrogacy, this leads to a recon-
sideration of the importance of all kinds of relationships inherent to the 
practice of surrogacy as part of an ethical evaluation. To look at the prac-
tice of surrogacy as an individuals’ choice (as libertarian positions do) 
means to refuse the complexity of such arrangements. Neither is the sur-
rogate solipsistic in her autonomy nor is the decision of the commission-
ing parents independent of the social world they live in.
 Levinas and Surrogacy
When Elizabeth Anderson states with regard to surrogacy that “by engag-
ing in the transfer for children by sale, all of the parties to the surrogate 
contract express a set of attitudes toward children which undermine the 
norms of parental love” (Anderson 1990, p. 77), she seems to agree with 
Levinas. Contracts cannot regulate the way in which people should feel 
responsible for the concrete Other. Contractual arrangements suggest 
that a parental relationship starts when the parents-to-be bring the child 
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back to their home country. In line with Levinas, it is possible to explain 
why the responsibility of the parents-to-be is not limited to the baby, but 
has to be extended to the surrogate. In order to form a more precise idea 
of the shared responsibilities and the parties involved in surrogacy 
arrangements, however, drawing a distinction from Levinas seems to be 
informative. In general, three kinds of relationship can be ascribed to sur-
rogacy arrangements (setting aside surrogacy agencies or sperm and ovum 
donors).
First of all, there is the relationship between mother and child. This 
relationship is central for Levinas’ concept of being ethical, because preg-
nancy exhibits the same features as being a moral agent: Not all respon-
sibilities for the Other are freely chosen, but the experience of the good 
is ubiquitous. The surrogate is bodily intertwined with the baby, and she 
“cannot choose not to be morally responsible for the fetus while it 
remains in her womb. In this sense, biology is certainly destiny” (van Zyl 
and van Niekerk 2000, p. 407). The relationship to the baby is based on 
sensibility beyond any genetic ties. It is not a question of knowledge of 
the Other or of the level of cognitive reflection, but it is instead the cor-
poreal experience of the Other which determines its own dimension of 
cognition and experience. Levinas characterises this corporeal experience 
as sensibility, which is present in every cognitive-reflexive experience of 
the self, thus:
Sensibility—the proximity, immediacy and restlessness which signify in 
it—is not constituted out of some apperception putting consciousness 
into relation with a body. Incarnation is not a transcendental operation of 
a subject that is situated in the midst of the world it represents to itself; the 
sensible experience of the body is already and from the start incarnate. The 
sensible—maternity, vulnerability, apprehension—binds the node of 
incarnation into a plot larger than the apperception of self. (Levinas 
1991a, p. 76)
The corporeal experience is much more powerful than a conscious 
examination of the self and the world can be. In this sense, alienation 
from the Other, the baby, is secondary to the immediate experience of the 
Other and only imaginable as a reflective and conscious act. This con-
scious alienation is exactly what agencies demand from the surrogates: 
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not to feel a deep connectedness to the baby, but rather to consider their 
wombs as “carriers” and themselves just as “prenatal babysitters” 
(Hochschild 2011, p. 24). From a phenomenological perspective, how-
ever, the body cannot be viewed exclusively as an object of ownership and 
control, but is rather a gateway to the world for the purpose of sensibility, 
which has proven itself independent of cognitive reflection. The concept 
of the “lived body,” which is greatly emphasised in phenomenology for its 
experience of the self (Carel 2011; Folkmarson Käll and Zeiler 2014), is 
knowingly manipulated and denied by agencies in the practice of surro-
gacy. Here mothers are prevented from bonding with the child during 
pregnancy, as this could potentially lead to the refusal to handover the 
child to the contracted parents and consequently result in a breach of 
contract—such as in the case of Baby M.
A second kind of relationship takes place between the parents-to-be 
and the baby that can be described in Levinas words as fatherhood. The 
main characteristic of fatherhood is not corporeity, but rather the unique-
ness a father attributes to his child:
The son is a unique son. Not by number; each son of the father is the 
unique son, the chosen son. The love of the father for the son accomplishes 
the sole relation. (Levinas 1991b, p. 279)
Whereas the image of the Other in the self plays a role in motherhood, 
the recognition of the Other in its Otherness figures in fatherhood. 
Therefore, it is a not a matter of defining the role of genetic paternity and 
the responsibility associated with it, but instead a matter of 
 Finding- Yourself- in-the-Other without being the Other. Responsibility 
and attachment are thus seen as a process of recognition. The commis-
sioning parents have a similar relation to the child—regardless of whether 
they are genetically related to the child or not. They are looking for their 
unique child and want to assume responsibility for the child’s whole life. 
However, as some cases in the practice of surrogacy show, this responsi-
bility is a fragile construct.8 Unconditional love can be compromised and 
depreciated by the existence of a contract that seems to regulate the needs 
and responsibilities inherent in surrogacy arrangements (Kuhlmann 
1998). Surrogacy contracts imply the possibility of control over the 
 purchased product, yet fail to recognise that in the case of a child, the 
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contract does not concern goods, but instead a person who is vulnerable 
and non-exchangeable in their uniqueness.
The relationship between the surrogate and the parents-to-be is the 
third relationship of special importance in surrogacy arrangements. 
Little attention is paid to this topic in scientific discourse, but for this 
analysis it is crucial to show that the surrogate and the commissioning 
parents are not just contract partners, but also interrelated in an ethical 
manner. Levinas’ concept of “the third” offers an interesting insight for 
the analysis of this special relationship, as it shatters the private relation-
ship between the self and the Other and introduces a different, although 
still ethical, quality. As Stéphane Mosès points out, the third is different 
from the Other in the sense of proximity, quantity and its selection: The 
third is further afar than the Other, it is numerous instead of unique, 
and it is the only one in an ethical relationship that is freely chosen 
(Mosès 1993). The surrogates meet the criteria: they are usually miles 
away from the commissioning parents, it does not matter to them 
exactly which surrogate carries their child to term, and it is they who 
choose to enter a surrogacy arrangement and involve a third party in 
their family planning.
However, for Levinas, the third does not need to be conceived as a vis-
ible empirical human being. Instead, it is best interpreted as reminder 
that other people who are not part of a personal relationship and differ 
from the self in terms of ethnicity, sex, status or religion must be consid-
ered as well. The third interferes with the relationship of the self and the 
Other and thereby challenges the privileged position of the Other. Thus, 
it opens up the frontiers of thinking. The relationship to the third is not 
personal anymore, but refers to the sphere of justice and equality.9 
Therefore, the third is also allied with institutions and universal laws 
instead of the particularity and context-sensitivity that is part of personal 
relationships. Levinas comments on the difference between the Other 
and the third as being a difference in thinking:
[…] what seems to me very important, is that there are not only two of us 
in the world. But I think that everything begins as if we were only two. It 
is important to recognize that the idea of justice always supposes that there 
is a third. But, initially, in principle, I am concerned about justice because 
the other has a face. (Levinas et al. 2005, p. 170)
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It is notable that Levinas recognises that we need institutions and rela-
tionships of reciprocity and equality. However, this cannot mean that the 
social and the political sphere—what he calls “justice”—render the face of 
the Other irrelevant. Quite the contrary: The presence of the Other must 
not be replaced by institutional structures. Responsibility is always present 
as if there were a concrete Other with specific needs. For the practice of sur-
rogacy this means that even though the surrogate is not part of a personal 
relationship, she is nevertheless part of a personal responsibility, and her 
needs must be met. In the current situation it is easy for the commissioning 
parents to shake off their responsibilities by referring to contracts with the 
agencies or to the fulfilment of governmental instructions. This is a devel-
opment that Levinas criticises in his work: Institutionalisation, that is the 
mere application of rules, principles and laws, allows people to forget that 
exercising responsibility for the Other is valuable in order to do justice. 
Alternatively, one may say that ethics needs forms of institutionalisation but 
this set of (universal) rules must serve ethics. And ethics is capable of form-
ing a better society only if people accept their personal responsibilities.
 Conclusion
The discourse about the global practice of surrogacy often focuses on the 
question of the exploitation of surrogates or the increasing commerciali-
sation of our lives. The point of view presented in this paper does not 
dispute such arguments, nor does it offer new concepts for dealing with 
the practice of surrogacy. It rather demonstrates a shift in perspective in 
order to provide a broader overview about the risks of surrogacy arrange-
ments, with a special emphasis on the responsibilities in relationships 
that are often subverted in commercial surrogacy. Despite its importance, 
the role of the commissioning parents in particular receives little atten-
tion in ethical discourse. This is surprising insofar as without the parents- 
to- be, the demand for surrogacy arrangements would not exist, and the 
ethical debate would appear more or less redundant. New forms of rela-
tionships are born in the context of ARTs—such as the one between sur-
rogates and the commissioning parents—but the allocation of 
responsibilities remains unclear. This gap can be filled by Levinas’ argu-
ments about relationships of responsibility. First of all, he shows that 
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relationships constitute the self as moral or ethical. Being dependent on 
others is not a form of oppression but rather the condition for under-
standing the capacity of accepting responsibility. Furthermore, relation-
ships of responsibility are not restricted to dyadic and personalities, 
because, particularly today, the parties involved in relationships are 
numerous, and people are indissolubly bound to each other as a result of 
global interdependence. Although relationships exhibit different modes 
of actualising responsibilities, this does not diminish the responsibility 
per se. In addition to this phenomenological description of relationships, 
Levinas can be read as a critical voice on the idea that international regu-
lation is the main issue in the context of surrogacy. From Levinas’ stand-
point, such an argument obfuscates the real search for justice, which 
must be located in the self and its responsibility. Being ethical is nothing 
definitive, but rather an individual’s endless search for an adequate way of 
being-for-the-Other. All these deliberations coincide with a reading in 
terms of the ethics of care insofar as revealing the need to take on 
 responsibility can be read as a first step in overcoming the “crises of care” 
(Parks 2010)—as Jennifer Parks characterises the practice of surrogacy.
Notes
1. Elizabeth and William Stern entered into a surrogacy contract with 
Marybeth Whitehead. In 1986 Whitehead gave birth to a girl, Baby M, 
but was unable or unwilling to surrender the child to the Sterns. As 
William Stern was the legal father of the child, having provided the sperm, 
and Marybeth Whitehead the biological and genetic mother of the child, 
a court battle over custody extended over several years.
2. For the different facets of exploitation in surrogacy arrangements, see 
Wertheimer (1992).
3. Commodification is the idea that the norms of the market are appropriate 
for regulating its production, exchange and enjoyment. Critics regard this 
as a fatal economisation of the social. cf.: Anderson (1990).
4. One of the main medical risks of surrogacy is the caesarean delivery that 
is often forced onto the surrogate in order to accommodate the paying 
couple. See: Knoche (2014).
5. Of course, it can also be argued that the infertile woman who seeks a child 
is a potential victim of power relations in our society as she is expected to 
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use all available reproductive technologies to fulfil her dream of her own 
child.
6. Even Martin Heidegger, with whose philosophy Levinas was well 
acquainted, characterises the ontological structure of the human being 
(Dasein) as relationality, the “being-with” (Mitsein), in his book Being 
and Time. The Other contributes significantly to the development of the 
self. On Heidegger’s relationality, Freeman writes: “Human beings are 
constituted by their relational, ontological structure of Mitsein, which is 
neither added on to Dasein as an afterthought nor derivative of it” 
(Freeman 2011, p. 368). Levinas goes far beyond considering being-with 
(Mitsein) as a phenomenon in which the self is found. Levinas character-
ises the relationship to the Other as an ethical relationship which 
 challenges the self in itself and in which the self is continuously searching 
for the appropriate response to the needs of the Other. While for Levinas, 
the relationship to the Other is essential for selfhood, Heidegger concen-
trated on the significance of the world and the Other for the Dasein of the 
self in its mineness (Jemeinigkeit).
7. This concept is criticised by Derrida: “The Other cannot be absolved of a 
relation to an ego from which it is other; it cannot be absolutely Other.” 
Compare: Bernasconi (2000).
8. For example, in the case of Baby Manji, the Japanese commissioning par-
ents divorced during the pregnancy and rejected their child. Ultimately, 
the grandmother adopted Baby Manji—otherwise the Baby would have 
remained parentless and stateless.
9. Most authors describe the third as Levinas’ concept of the political sphere. 
See: Bedorf (2003); Caygill (2002); Delhom (2000); Simmons (1999).
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Sociomaterial Will-Work: Aligning Daily 
Wanting in Dutch Dementia Care
Annelieke Driessen
 ‘Daily Wanting’ in Dementia Care
Then,1 finally, Ella Veenstra2 gets out of bed, and walks to her bathroom. 
Ella, as her care workers affectively call her, is living with Alzheimer’s dis-
ease in a Dutch sub-urban care home called ‘Zonneweide’.3 She moved 
here six years ago, when she was no longer able to manage by herself. That 
Ms Veenstra gets up in the morning is the result of a lot of work on the part 
of her care workers. Every day anew, when asked to get up, she insists on 
staying in bed, stating that she has a headache. Indeed, Ms Veenstra is 
known to have had migraines for most of her life and is given a light pain 
killer every morning and ‘more if necessary’. However, so her care workers 
tell me, her headaches ‘may have become a bit of an excuse to not get up’. 
Her caregivers check her perspiration and her eyes to determine when she 
‘really’ has a headache. When the care worker on duty thinks she does not, 
she4 starts to encourage Ms Veenstra to get up, acting on the team’s agree-
ment that it is best for Ms Veenstra to get out of bed: once she is up, she 
eats with the other residents and forgets about wanting to stay in bed. 
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Sometimes Ms Veenstra goes back to bed after breakfast, and her care giv-
ers agree that doing so should be allowed. In talking about situations like 
getting Ella up, care worker Anja tells me: ‘This is the difficulty with care 
work, especially with people with dementia.’ She gives me other examples: 
‘[Another resident] always says “Let me stay in bed, let me stay in bed”. 
[…] But she eats better when she is up—then she sits upright; she drinks 
better; she reads a paper and participates in activities. Then one sees that 
getting up has an added value. With people with dementia you typically 
have to make choices for them, because they cannot do that anymore.’ I 
push the conversation: ‘But they do make a choice, only not the one that is 
right in your eyes.’ Anja retorts: ‘I could follow [her] choice, but then I 
know I am not providing good care. […].’ I ask: ‘So it is about good care?’ 
upon which Anja answers: ‘Yes, good care is the basis. Taking one shower 
per week is really the minimum. There is another lady who has a trauma 
from showering because she once stood under boiling hot water. In that 
case, she really does not have to shower; I’ll wash her instead. […] I would 
not coerce her to get into the shower.’
These stories are examples of situations that many caregivers working in 
dementia care homes will recognise immediately: the resident wants some-
thing that the care worker thinks is not good for her. In other words, what 
a resident wants (here, to stay in bed) does not always align with what the 
caregiver wants (here, if the resident does not seem to have a migraine, to 
get the resident up, and, ideally, for the resident to want this as well).5
While the tension between opposing desires is certainly not unique to 
dementia care, it is characteristic for care encounters with those living with 
decreasing mental capacities. With the progression of the dementia, the 
person living with the condition requires increasing levels of assistance to 
complete everyday bodily tasks: she will need more help with getting up and 
being washed and dressed. Some people simultaneously lose their awareness 
of the need to get up and keep clean. Although staying in bed and refraining 
from washing is possible for some days, doing so for longer may come to 
harm one’s health and well-being. Therefore, accomplishing the tasks of get-
ting residents up and washed falls to care workers. This sometimes results in 
situations in which residents refuse to get up, do not want a shower or want 
to wear their favourite shirt while their care worker finds it too dirty to 
wear.6 Studies on care work have pointed out that care workers often call 
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residents who do not want the same as themselves in activities of daily living 
(ADL) care encounters ‘difficult’ or exhibiting ‘challenging behaviour’ (e.g. 
Higgs and Gilleard 2015, pp. 89–90). But they frequently stop short at 
unpacking how this encounter plays out when it presents itself.
To want something is an expression of subjectivity, and being respected 
in one’s desires is as much part of living a good life in a dementia care 
home as it is elsewhere. But how can we think about what residents want 
in cases which lead their care workers to assert that what a resident wants 
is not good for her? Indeed, if care were just about ‘getting the job done’ 
then the way it is done would not be relevant. In practice, however, this 
clearly matters. As care worker Cici remarked: ‘As a normal human being 
you do not want to be forced all the time!’ Similarly, one may not want 
to be left to one’s fate all alone either. Indeed, there is a lot in between.
This is not to say that coercion or neglect never happens in care work. 
When Ms Lichthart woke up covered in her own faeces, but was never-
theless resisting a shower, two care workers held her in a tight grip while 
another washed her quickly. It seemed ‘the only way to do this’. Ms 
Lichthart indeed needed a shower, but by washing her this way, what she 
wanted was overruled. Yet, rather than concluding that ‘things are not 
going well in care’ because these situations do occur, I want to emphasise 
here that such generalisations about care work miss something: they miss 
the work that care workers do on a daily basis to prevent these extreme 
measures. This work becomes most visible in situations in which what a 
resident wants is opposed to what a care worker wants.
Debates on the will are an obvious starting point to take a closer look at 
these situations. Thinking about the will has long been the domain of phi-
losophers. In the most general sense, philosophers have understood the will 
as the ‘“faculty, or set of abilities, that yields the mental events involved in 
volition”, where volition is understood to be “a mental event in the initia-
tion of action”’ (Brand 1995, p. 843 in Murphy and Throop 2010, p. 7). 
Debates on the topic have focused on the (in)compatibility of relative free-
dom and determinacy of human choice and action. Within these debates, 
moral philosophers attach particular value to the free will. After all, whether, 
or to what extent, we can act freely informs whether we have a choice to act 
in a good or bad way in the first place. Put differently, without a will that 
is free (at least to some degree), moral decision making is not possible.
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Dementia care presents an interesting case to think about ‘the will’, as 
dementia is usually said to invalidate it altogether. For instance, Dutch law 
uses the term ‘wilsonbekwaam’ (which translates freely to ‘will- incompetent’7) 
for those who are unable to understand or deliberate on information that is 
provided to them, who cannot make a decision and/or who no longer 
understand the consequences of their decisions (Rijksoverheid 2014). This 
legal category dismisses the person’s will, making possible, for example, a 
person’s admission to a nursing home against her will.8
The philosophical and legal accounts both reflect an understanding of 
the will as related to cognition and rationality. This understanding may 
be useful with regard to long-term decision making (which indeed 
becomes increasingly difficult for people with dementia with the progres-
sion of the condition). However, it is less helpful with regard to the ‘daily 
wanting’ on the dementia ward. Indeed, a lot is wanted on the dementia 
ward! How may we think about those situations?
Much anthropological writing can be read as a critique of the ratio-
nal understanding of ‘the will’. In using concepts such as agency, inten-
tionality, motive, desire, wish and motivation, anthropologists are 
perhaps only implicitly speaking about the will, but nevertheless bring 
to light a complex interweaving with emotional and physical states. 
This literature provides a helpful background against which to rethink 
the will in relation to dementia and dementia care, and situations in 
which residents want something different than their caregivers want for 
them in particular. However, this body of work lacks a definitional con-
sensus and thus a common ground for discussion. In their edited vol-
ume ‘Toward an Anthropology of the Will’, Keith Murphy and Jason 
Throop (2010) make considerable steps towards such a consensus. In 
his contribution to the volume, Jason Throop argues that the will is 
experienced as somehow one’s own, goal-directed and effortful (2010, 
p. 34). While this is important when thinking about why what some-
body wants cannot be simply overruled, Throop is right in suggesting 
that there is still
a necessity of shifting from this descriptive phenomenological approach to 
willing to exploring how these various experiential correlates of willing may 
be differently organized, affected and expressed in the context of unfolding 
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social interaction, personal narratives, and reflections upon past, present 
and future experiences. (Throop 2010, p. 49)
In this chapter, I take up Throop’s invitation to think further about 
‘willing’ in interaction. However, as I discuss in more detail in the follow-
ing paragraph, I focus on ‘daily wanting’ instead of willing, as it is worked 
upon in the context of unfolding sociomaterial interaction. Moreover, 
I ask what we may learn about good care from taking a closer look at 
these practices. Based on my ethnography9 of ADL-care situations in 
which residents with dementia often want something other than what 
their caregivers think is good for them, I argue that, rather than coercing 
residents into doing whatever task is at hand, care workers attempt to 
align what residents’ want with what they themselves want (for them). I 
propose the concept of ‘sociomaterial will-work’ to describe this work 
and reflect on its limits and implications. At the same time caregivers may 
come to want something else too; will-work can thus align the wanting 
of residents but also of their caregivers.
 Work on Wanting: Sociomaterial Will-Work
Before going into the ethnography of ADL encounters in which wanting 
is aligned, I want to highlight two methodological interventions that I 
make with this chapter. Firstly, I contend that the term ‘will’ suggests a 
coherence that hides the relational nature of coming to want something. I 
therefore suggest that, rather than understanding the will as something we 
‘have’, we should understand it as something we ‘do’ in unfolding socio-
material interaction. Secondly, since my interest here is in understanding 
the alignment that is strived for in the process of wanting in dementia care 
settings on a daily basis, I differentiate between ‘willing’ and ‘wanting’. I 
separate a more cognitive intending, pertaining to the realm of the legal 
and long-term decision making (‘willing’), from a more immediate, emo-
tionally and physically informed activity (‘wanting’). I understand want-
ing10 to be a fundamental expression of subjectivity, including activities 
such as desiring, longing, wishing and, significantly, not wanting, which 
is done in unfolding sociomaterial interaction on an everyday basis.
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In defining the will as something we do in sociomaterial interaction, I 
align myself with the tradition of material semiotics, in which practices take 
central stage (Law 2009). I put my writings in conversation with the work 
on care practices (e.g. Jerak-Zuiderent 2015; Mol 2002; 2008; Mol et al. 
2010; Moser 2010a, b; Van Hout et al. 2015; Vogel 2017). Within this 
tradition, I have been particularly inspired by the work of Jeannette Pols 
with patients in psychiatric and residential care. She draws our attention to 
the fact that residents of psychiatric nursing homes, rather than saying what 
they like, make their appreciations known by enacting them (Pols 2005). 
Positing that appreciations can be enacted means that they can be expressed 
both verbally as well as non-verbally. Any interaction may thus include 
gestures, facial expressions and actions. This is important when thinking 
about dementia, as most nursing home residents—whether aphasic, pas-
sive, confused or hallucinating—can and do express whether they want 
something or not. They may do so by softly uttering a ‘yes’, seeking com-
pany or trying to escape it, pushing their plate away or, indeed, by not 
heeding the call to get out of bed. This has a crucial methodological conse-
quence: as residents do appreciations in situations that are co-produced by 
the material environment and other people, they may be observed.11
If wanting is done, as I suggest, in unfolding sociomaterial interaction, 
how it is then acted upon is almost inevitably an ethical and political 
question. As I have mentioned before, wanting is an essential expression 
of subjectivity, and is thus best respected and stimulated. Indeed, avoiding 
coercion was central to many conversations I had with care workers. They 
commonly held the understanding that in order to get residents to ‘coop-
erate’ [meewerken], ‘urging [aandringen] is allowed, but coercing [dwin-
gen] is not’.12 Care workers also told me time and again that ‘[i]f a resident 
really does not want to do something, then she does not have to do it’. The 
distinction that is made between ‘what a resident wants’ and ‘what a resi-
dent really wants’ is an interesting one. Indeed, the word really indicates 
that what is wanted is—at least to some degree—flexible. It is this flexibil-
ity that is used to ‘urge’ residents. The exchange with Anja makes this 
visible: while she says she makes decisions for residents, she adapts her 
way of providing care to them, and what they ‘really’ want, or do not 
want. She thus strives to complete ADL-care without coercion or neglect: 
the resident who is traumatised from standing under boiling water does 
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not have to shower, and Anja washes her by the sink instead. Indeed, care 
workers tried to negotiate with residents if they did not want to do a task 
the care givers asserted needed to be done. Care workers also often proved 
flexible in showering residents at another point in time and giving in to 
residents who, for instance, insisted on wearing certain clothes.
I propose to call the practices in which residents and care workers seek 
to (creatively) align what they both want ‘sociomaterial will-work’.13,14 I 
am indebted to three bodies of work for the concept. First, my choice of 
the word ‘sociomaterial’ builds on the material semiotic tradition. Herein, 
social and material ‘aspects’, previously separated in social sciences, ‘get 
mixed up in ethnographic descriptions of the practices in which they are 
being handled’ (Harbers et al. 2002, p. 208). Second, my choice for the 
word ‘work’ relies on theories of (interpersonal) body work (Gimlin 2007; 
Twigg et  al. 2011; Twigg 2000; Wolkowitz 2002), emotional labour 
(Hochschild 1979, 1983) and sentimental work (Strauss et al. 1982). This 
literature emphasises the dual nature of these types of work (largely organ-
ised as ‘women’s work’) as both a loving attitude and a form of (paid) 
labour. This insight informs the concept of will-work in significant ways: 
will-work is work; it takes time, effort, and skills, and it is a central aspect 
of care giving, which requires an attentive caregiver. The types of work 
described above and will-work can be highly entangled. Acknowledging 
this adds to a more complex understanding of what giving care to people 
with dementia entails. Third, the concept of will-work rests on the shoul-
ders of feminist care ethicists (e.g. Gilligan 1982; Tronto 1993), who have 
advocated for an acknowledgement of peoples’ dependence and interde-
pendency on one another. Will-work is a deeply relational practice: in 
doing will-work care workers rely on relational knowledge, acquired in 
their everyday work with the same people, often for the duration of years. 
In the unfolding interactions, resident and care worker relate to one 
another. Care ethics has been critiqued by disability studies for rendering 
care receivers passive recipients of care (Williams 2001, pp. 478–479).15 
While existing power differences in the care encounter should not be dis-
regarded, the concept of will-work is explicitly not applicable to the work 
of care workers only: care receiver’s wanting may be aligned to having a 
shower, but the caregivers’ wanting may also be aligned to flexibly adjust 
to what the care receiver wants. This could take the form of providing 
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assistance with a shower later, asking another caregiver to step in or per-
haps reconsidering whether the task at hand is necessary at all.
I contend that doing will-work (rather than neglecting or overruling 
residents’ wanting) makes the caregivers’ work good care. Good care 
includes being attentive to people’s desires and striving ‘to lighten what is 
heavy, and even if it fails it keeps on trying’ (Mol et al. 2010, p. 14). Good 
dementia care, then, ‘persistently strives to create conditions for and enable 
better interaction, and also to afford people living with dementia positions 
in which they can act and exert valued forms of subjectivity’ (Moser 2010a, 
p. 295). Coercion or neglect forecloses opportunities for ‘better interac-
tion’. Through coercion, positions in which subjectivity can be exerted are 
not afforded, and wanting can, by definition, not be shared. If wanting 
cannot be done together, and cannot be aligned, it remains unilateral—
which can be harmful in situation where one must agree and where there 
are power differences. In these situations, will-work aims to achieve what is 
good for those living with dementia (an assertion that often relies on pro-
fessional knowledge) in a way that is pleasant for the resident as well as for 
the caregiver. At the same time, it must includes a reflecting upon whether 
the task at hand must be completed now, and in this particular way.
In the remaining pages, I describe the work care workers do on resi-
dents’ wanting as (1) sculpting moods and emotions, (2) managing atten-
tion and (3) creative negotiation involving time and materialities.
 Sculpting Moods and Emotions
The first way in which will-work is done, begins before something is 
wanted. Consider the following interview excerpt:
Annelieke: Can you tell me something about ADL-care and dementia, 
and what is specific for people with dementia, particularly 
when compared to people with somatic complaints?
Leandra: Specific? I think it differs, and depends on the person [you 
are dealing with] and how you deal with it. […] I always 
adjust to how advanced someone is [in his/her dementia].
Annelieke: Hmm. What do you mean? Or—what do you do?
Leandra: You walk in [to the resident’s room] and then you try to 
come in as ‘cheerfully’ [luchtig] as possible.
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Annelieke: Do you mean like [happy tone of voice] ‘Hallo’?
Leandra Yes, you try to brighten up the room when you walk in [het 
zonnetje in huiszijn]. I notice that Ms Koch, […] when I 
go there and I am cheerful, then she also becomes cheerful. 
[I]magine you come in looking all serious, not even sad, 
but just neutral, […] then she is already more sad. So, the 
emotion that you radiate, she magnifies that. [Sometimes] 
you notice that nothing works and that [the fact that she 
does not want to be washed] is due to her mood at that 
moment. […] But I see that it works when I enter happily, 
because it relaxes her and she will allow me to do more. 
This example shows Leandra doing will-work. She wants to shower Ms 
Koch.16 In order to do this, she needs Ms Koch to want to shower, or at 
least to not refuse it. Leandra’s initial use of the generic ‘you’ indicates 
that entering the room cheerfully is a more general way of approaching 
residents. But she then adjusts to the person herself and to the severity of 
the resident’s condition, as is evidenced in Ms Koch’s example. In other 
words, generalisations are not useful here. To get Ms Koch to want to 
shower, Leandra attempts to sculpt her mood. Although sometimes 
‘nothing works’ and wanting remains not amenable to Leandra to work 
upon it, sometimes it does work: in those situations, Leandra’s smile 
causes Ms Koch to ‘also become cheerful’, to ‘magnify the emotion’ and 
to relax. This, in turn, results in her allowing Leandra ‘to do more’, 
including giving her a shower.
In another example of this way of doing will-work, Joani often brought 
three cups of hot chocolate to Ms Veenstra along with her medicine. We 
drank the chocolate by her bedside together. Meanwhile, we talked about 
the weather or what we had done yesterday, or about the joint breakfast 
awaiting her downstairs. By doing this, Joani hoped to get Ms Veenstra 
into the mood for getting out of bed, and it often worked. In those cases, 
what Ms Veenstra wanted was aligned with Joani’s desire for her to have 
breakfast, and for her to be with others.
Sculpting moods and emotions is one way to align wanting. Two 
important conclusions can be drawn from this. Firstly, the story affirms 
that moods and emotions cannot be separated from wanting.17 Secondly, 
it shows will-work as a relational practice: Ms Koch and Leandra are 
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responsive to one another’s moods, smiles and tone of voice. Joani and 
Ms Veenstra first had a chat, after which wanting to get up could become 
a shared desire. Thirdly, materialities, such as cups of hot chocolate or 
breakfast, may be part of the attempt to align wanting.
 Managing Attention
So far, I have described how care workers sculpt moods and emotions 
that then allow residents to want what care workers want for them. 
Sometimes, when Leandra enters the room cheerfully, Ms Koch ‘magni-
fies the emotion’. Leandra’s cheerfulness changes Ms Koch’s mood and 
thus her willingness to take a shower. But ‘coming in cheerfully’ is not 
enough. What do care workers do to keep the wanting aligned once they 
walk through the door? Leandra engages in a second way of will-work 
after she has entered the room cheerfully:
Annelieke: Okay, […] you try to brighten up the room when you walk 
in. […] And then?
Leandra: And then you start instructing [the resident]: ‘what are we 
going to do today’ […] and instead of pausing for a long 
time afterwards [you] talk about other things and […] you 
keep control over the topic of conversation. You have the 
lead in what happens. […] Take Ms Stein, if you tell her 
‘Good morning, I will give you a nice wash’, she will say 
‘yes, but but but […]’. But if you right away talk about 
something else, then the ‘but but’ that you could expect is 
over. Then she is already somewhere else. […] I say: ‘How 
did you sleep?’, ‘Not so well’. Then I say ‘How is that pos-
sible? Was it too warm? Was it too cold?’ ‘Well no, no, I 
don’t know. I don’t know’. ‘Are you hungry?’ ‘Yes, I am 
quite hungry’ ‘Well, then I will [say] ‘look, a wash cloth’ or 
something, you know, ‘Then you can have a nice breakfast. 
What would you like? White bread, brown bread? A whole 
conversation about what is about to happen. […] Well, 
then you are nicely engaged. I am too; I don’t like saying 
nothing. So it is also nicer for […] me. 
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Leandra seems to imply that Ms Stein’s cannot want something other 
than the tasks at hand—being washed while having a conversation. In 
other words, doing wanting (here, not wanting to shower) requires Ms 
Stein’s attention. Doing will-work in this situation entails managing that 
attention: Leandra orients Ms Stein towards what they are going to do, 
away from not wanting to shower, and times her questions to ‘keep con-
trol over the topic of conversation’. In doing so, Leandra keeps Ms Stein’s 
‘yes but’ at bay. By ‘talking about something else’, Leandra can distract 
Ms Stein from the task at hand and let it go almost unnoticed. Leandra 
thus prevents that Ms Stein comes to want something other than a 
shower. When Leandra ‘has the lead in what happens’, Ms Stein is ‘already 
somewhere else’ instead of in her rejection of the washing. Both are ‘nicely 
engaged’. This affects Ms Stein positively: if she is off to a good start, she 
is more likely to enjoy the rest of her day as well.
In a similar vein, Anja manages the residents’ attention by offering a 
choice about the timing of showering, rather than about showering itself:
Anja: My biggest trick is to give people one choice, no discussion. 
I ask […]: ‘would you like to shower now or in half an 
hour?’ Then they feel like they have a say in it, although 
they do not [have a say about whether to actually have a 
shower or not] … ‘It would be nice if you would wear a 
clean shirt today. Do you want this one or that one?’ (She 
holds up her hands as if she is holding two shirts next to 
each other.) Idem ditto with ‘do you want to have a shower 
now or in thirty minutes?’ In fact, they do not get a say. … 
‘Yes…’; ‘That one’ (and she points to one of her hands with 
the imaginary shirt). It simply is a bath-day! Then [when I 
pose this question], they are often so overwhelmed, that 
they just come along. (Emphasis original)
Anja emphasises that, if she does not provide ADL-care, she says that 
she knows she is ‘not providing good care’. Good care, as described by 
Anja here, means to make the resident want what Anja thinks is good for 
her. In providing a binary choice about timing, she offers the resident a 
sense of choice, yet makes sure that she chooses the shower, which Anja 
says is good for her.
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Leandra and Anja manage the resident’s attention to prevent that she 
may come to want something other than what they, as her care workers, 
contend is good for her. One could argue that these ways of doing will- 
work are manipulative.18 If we consider the will to be a fixed entity, it may 
well be. But if, as I suggested, we see wanting as done in unfolding socio-
material interaction (which may include cups of hot chocolate, smiles 
and a cheerful tone of voice, as well as attempts to keep control over the 
conversation), we can understand the attempts to manage attention as 
attempts to turn wanting into a relational activity, rather than an indi-
vidual one: Care workers take what residents want as something that can 
be worked upon and made relational in the care encounter. In doing so, 
care workers take residents’ wanting seriously in that it cannot simply be 
overruled, but neither can it be taken to be a fixed entity which cannot be 
changed. Rather than forcing their will upon residents, care workers 
remain in conversation. They offer a sense of choice where perhaps there 
is none (as Anja put it, it may be ‘simply a bath-day’!19), but do not 
merely impose something on the resident. Managing attention is thus 
part of the larger attempt to align wanting in a way that ensures that care 
tasks that care workers deem necessary get done, in a way that is as pleas-
ant as possible for both people involved. At best, both are ‘nicely engaged’.
 Creative Negotiation Involving Time and Materialities
Leandra enters the room in a friendly mood. She controls the conversa-
tion and diverts the residents’ attention away from coming to want some-
thing other than the care task at hand. Anja offers a choice on time, 
rather than on the task itself. These are ways to work on residents’ want-
ing before they fixate on wanting something. In this section I describe 
how care workers attempt to modify what a resident wants when a resi-
dent already expressed a wanting before it could be sculpted. I call this 
work ‘creative negotiation’.20
First and foremost, care workers ask residents for their ‘cooperation’ in 
the care activity. If this does not work, care workers also reason with resi-
dents, either jokingly or seriously. Herein they often argue based on 
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visible materialities in the present (‘Look, your shirt is dirty’), relating 
them to what is to be done now (‘Let’s put on a clean shirt’) or in the near 
future (‘Don’t you want to look clean when your family visits this after-
noon?’). These strategies seem to appeal to a cognitive willing (resonating 
the philosophical understanding of the will)—which is precisely what 
residents in the early stages of dementia seem to be losing grip on—but 
not to an emotional wanting. Indeed, these strategies do not work with 
all residents, and certainly not every time.
If reasoning does not work, there are other strategies. Care workers, for 
instance, play with the timing of caregiving. When Mr Bakker does not 
want to get up, Joani often asks: ‘Would you like me to come back in half 
an hour?’ If he agrees, she simply helps the residents in a different order, 
creating a temporary alignment between what she and Mr Bakker want: 
to not shower (just yet). Mr Bakker is often willing to get up after half an 
hour or so, perhaps having fulfilled his desire to stay in bed longer, or 
perhaps having forgotten his reluctance to get up in the first place. As 
such, time helps in aligning wanting.21
When continuing attempts to align the residents’ wanting with their 
own become too challenging, care workers sometimes call upon a col-
league to take over. Care workers remain patient with the resident by 
putting space between themselves and a resident whose wanting remained 
not amenable to negotiation. Sometimes a specific colleague is asked. 
This once again highlights the relational nature of will-work: if a care 
worker gets along well with a resident, aligning wanting becomes easier 
to do. For instance, when nobody can get Ms Veenstra out of bed and 
Lucia is working that day, her colleagues ask her to come and help. Lucia 
can ‘pull off’ a stricter approach and ‘get away with it’. She can tell Ms 
Veenstra: ‘My dear, you stink, you must get up’. Anja said: ‘Ms Veenstra 
would get angry at any other care worker for saying anything of the sort, 
but she loves Lucia’.
Like the cups of hot chocolate worked for sculpting wanting, materi-
alities can also play a role in creative negotiation. Take the case of Mr 
Bakker. Convincing Mr Bakker to wear clean clothes and to take a shower 
poses a challenge every day. He is known to feel cold and claustrophobic, 
so that the bathroom door cannot be closed to make him feel warmer. 
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Mr Bakker has vascular dementia and is aphasic: he can utter short sen-
tences, with the occasional loss of a word. Not being able to find and 
understand words frustrates Mr Bakker and reasoning is likely to upset 
him. Joani is particularly skilled22 in finding alternatives to reasoning by 
‘creatively negotiating’ with him, not only verbally, but also non-verbally: 
one day, when faced with his refusal to take a shower, she gave him a foot 
bath. Then he wanted the shower.
In talking about this situation, Joani and I offered differing explana-
tions for why the foot bath had worked. I suspected that giving Mr 
Bakker the foot bath made him feel less cold, undoing his reason to refuse 
the shower. Joani said: ‘The foot bath gets him out of his head. If he puts 
his feet in warm water—maybe he remembers something, that he walks 
down the beach for instance—but once his feet feel the warm water, he 
would have to hold onto his thoughts of “not wanting to shower” very 
rigidly’. Joani imagines that the sensation of warm water on his feet 
reminds Mr Bakker of the ocean. This goes further than to think about 
the ocean: the water makes him feel something he has felt before and thus 
conjures up (hopefully happy) memories. This pleasant feeling, then, in 
her understanding, made him let go of his opposition to showering.
How the foot bath ‘really’ changed Mr Bakker’s wanting is up for spec-
ulation. But two other points illustrate my argument about daily wanting 
and will-work here. Firstly, wanting something seems highly entangled 
with the feeling body, which may then be ‘tinkered with’ (cf. Mol et al. 
2010) in the context of the care relationship. In doing will-work, the feel-
ing body may be skilfully appealed to. Secondly, not only interactions 
between people sculpt or prevent a specific wanting, but so do non- 
human actors: here, work on Mr Bakker’s wanting required a foot bath. 
If the foot bath had not been part of the encounter, Joani could have tried 
cheering up Mr Bakker, arranging another time slot for his care or asking 
one of her colleagues to take over. But instead, the will-work was ‘dele-
gated’ (Latour 1988, p. 299) to the foot bath. Herewith, it becomes clear 
that will-work can be done involving objects: the foot bath creates the 
material conditions that work upon what Mr Bakker enjoys, and in doing 
so, change what Mr Bakker wanted. The foot bath opened up an avenue 




In this chapter, I set out to explore in more detail the way in which 
daily wanting is worked upon in the context of unfolding sociomaterial 
interaction in residential dementia care, and I asked what we may learn 
about good care from taking a closer look at these practices. I stated 
that wanting is an expression of subjectivity, and being respected in this 
is a prerequisite for living a good life with dementia. At the same time, 
wanting something is a relational process. How it is acted upon thus is 
an ethical and political question. Nobody wants to constantly be over-
ruled by another person, and indeed much work goes into avoiding 
coercing somebody. To describe what is done instead, I coined the term 
‘sociomaterial will-work’. The concept highlights care workers’ and resi-
dents’ attempts to align the other’s wanting with their own as a form of 
labour and as dependent on sociomaterial relations. I described care 
workers doing will-work by (1) sculpting moods and emotions, (2) 
managing attention and (3) creative negotiation involving time and 
materialities. With smiles, cups of hot chocolate and foot baths, changes 
to the order in which care is provided and to who shows up at a resi-
dent’s bed, care workers strive for a positive way of relating—of being 
‘nicely engaged’ in conversation and activity. Will-work ventures into 
the space between doing nothing and exerting force. It is the ‘urging’ 
that care workers name when seeking alternatives for coercion and 
neglect. I have argued that this aligning residents’ wanting makes the 
caregivers’ work good care.
I have offered an alternative understanding of the will—namely as 
something that is ‘done’ in sociomaterial interaction, in which it can be 
aligned by making it relational. Indeed, instead of dismissing ‘daily want-
ing’ of those living with dementia, my analysis enables thinking about it. 
At the same time, the finding that moods and the feeling body can be 
appealed to in care encounters and that materialities can be used in cre-
ative negotiation with residents, offers new ways of thinking about what 
good care may entail in situations in which residents want something 
that their care workers understand as ‘not good’ for them. As such, my 
contribution is one that can inform care practice.
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Some may say I have painted a rather ideal picture. What can be done 
when ‘nothing works’, which, as Leandra noted, sometimes happens? In 
these cases, will-work seems to hit its limit and coercion may seem the 
only way to get a task done (we may think again of Ms Lichthart, who, 
covered in faeces, resisted a shower). It is important not to forget that 
people living with dementia, who are often aphasic and have a frag-
mented memory, are particularly vulnerable to maltreatment and situa-
tions in which what they want (or resist) is overruled. Doing will-work 
requires the continuous reflection upon the fine line between ‘urging’ and 
‘coercing’. Once, when Ms Veenstra did not want to get out of bed, her 
care worker Linda turned on the TV, radio and shower, and pulled away 
her blankets. These were trying moments of participant observation, as 
being there without doing anything about it made me complicit. Upon 
my inquiry why Linda did this, she explained: ‘This will annoy her so 
much that she will get up. She is better off if she gets up and eats some-
thing’. Paradoxically, Linda was convinced that what she was doing was 
caring. The example shows that a care worker can easily abuse his or her 
power, even if the actions are based on the idea that the resident in ques-
tion is ‘better off’ like this. But the way in which care tasks are achieved 
matters. Coercion, neglect and incisive refusal leave no room for align-
ment in wanting. Wanting, in those situations, remains unilateral and 
cannot be shared. Although coercion does indeed result in Ms Veenstra 
getting up, how this is achieved imposes what Linda wants on her; 
 wanting, instead of being done together, remains unilateral. Indeed, it is 
dubious whether this can still be called good care.
I contend that will-work has failed when a resident is coerced into doing 
something. Sociomaterial will-work makes good care only if care workers 
continue to attempt to align residents’ wanting with what they think is 
good for them, after critically reflecting on the question whether this is 
indeed so. If will-work fails, coercion and neglect remain tragic occurrences. 
But if given enough time, trust and support, care workers doing will-work 
may indeed realise the proverbial ‘otherwise’ (Star 1990, pp.  89–90), 
enabling residents like Ms Lichthart to want the shower that they need.
I do not want to make it seem that care work is easy. On the contrary, I 
explicitly want to acknowledge that persistent tinkering without ‘suc-
cesses’ requires a lot of patience, which under trying circumstances is 
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sometimes sheer impossible. This is why time, energy and motivation are 
indeed essential for retaining the flexibility that is needed to do will-work 
in delicate care situations with frail and fragile residents. Cuts to staff, the 
subsequent increase in work load and a lack of trust within care teams are 
detrimental to the care staff’s ability to do good care. Under such circum-
stances, residents such as Ms Lichthart covered in faeces are sometimes 
forced to shower. At the same time, however, good care is already being 
done. I have taken all examples presented in this chapter from what I have 
seen in the care homes where I conducted my research. In writing about 
these, rather than about the situations in which care falls short, I hope to 
give this work the attention it deserves. I use these examples to hold up to 
others: that way, what already works well, can be done more often.
Notes
1. Like any text, this text is the result of a collaborative effort. I would like 
to extend my gratitude to the Gieskes-Strijbis Fonds for funding this 
research. I owe my deepest thanks to the care institutions which granted 
me access for my fieldwork, and the care professionals and residents who 
gave so much of their time to me, and patiently took me along in their 
daily life and work. In particular, I would like to thank the organisers of 
the summer school that led to this book, Joachim Boldt and Franziska 
Krause, and to the summer school’s participants, whom I can now 
proudly call my esteemed co-authors and friends. Special thanks go to 
Patrick McKearney and my dear colleagues at the University of 
Amsterdam, of whom I want to mention in particular Willemijn 
Krebbekx, Else Vogel, Lex Kuiper, Annekatrin Skeide, my in the 
Anthropology of Care research group Silke Hoppe, Laura Vermeulen, 
Natashe Lemos Dekker and Susanne van den Buusethe members of the 
Writing Care Seminar and the Walking Seminar Amsterdam. Daniel 
Guinness, thank you for editing my English! Lastly, but with emphasis, 
I want to thank my supervisors at the University of Amsterdam: Anne-
Mei The for giving me the opportunity to do this research, and Jeannette 
Pols and Kristine Krause for being such a big source of inspiration and 
support throughout the research and writing process.
2. All names used in this chapter, for sites as well as interlocutors, are 
pseudonyms.
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3. ‘Zonneweide’ (a fictitious name) is one of three care homes in which I 
conducted ethnographic fieldwork. It is a care home in a sub-urban area 
in the Netherlands and home to 50 people with a wide variety of diag-
noses. Fifteen of them live on the floor reserved for people with early 
stage dementia, although, if possible, residents live here until they pass 
away. Recent changes in Dutch health care policy resulted in the closing 
of many of the care homes that are providing care to people with ‘lower’ 
care needs. Those that remain open, like Zonneweide, are increasingly 
providing care to people with ‘higher’ care needs, including those in the 
later stages of dementia.
4. For purposes of legibility, I use the female pronoun to refer to residents 
and care workers in general.
5. The caregivers’ reasons to want something pertain to achieving a high 
level of well-being for the resident in question, and thus doing their job 
well. In a way, it is thus what professional caregivers want for residents 
and for themselves. If wanting can be aligned, the situation is signifi-
cantly more pleasant for both parties involved.
6. In this chapter, I focused on those situations in which residents want 
something else than the care worker(s) in care encounters that centre 
around activities of daily living (ADL). These particular situations are 
characterised mostly by a resident not wanting to do what the care worker 
has to ‘get done’: getting residents up, bathing and dressing them. I have 
chosen these situations because they most clearly bring out how wanting 
is negotiated in care encounters. However, in focusing on ADL care, my 
writing seems to suggest that residents merely refuse and hardly actively 
want anything. This is not the case in practice: residents want many 
things, some of which are equally ‘problematic’ for care workers (such as 
wanting to go home, contiuously wanting to go to the toilet or desiring 
intimacy with other residents. In those situations the family’s wishes may 
also play an important role, a party that I have not been able to include 
in this chapter). By the same token, the situations in which residents do 
not necessarily want anything, but care workers stimulate them to do so, 
are left out. Both this ‘wanting something’ and the ‘activation to want 
something’ warrant further exploration.
7. In English, a person is said to no longer have legal capacity or to be 
(legally) incapacitated.
8. The issue of admitting somebody to a nursing home against her will is 
more complex than can be accounted for within the scope of this chap-
ter. It must be noted here, however, that admission against somebody’s 
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will is only possible if (a) somebody is endangering her own or other 
peoples’ safety, (b) this situation cannot be resolved without admission 
to a nursing home and (c) a BOPZ-indication is assigned [a designation 
assigned to the person by a medical professional under the law of 
‘Bijzondere Opnemingen in Psychiatrische Ziekenhuizen’ (Special 
admissions in psychiatric hospitals)] (cf. Rijksoverheid n.d.).
9. I build my argument with ethnographic material that I gathered during 
14 months of fieldwork in three Dutch care institutions between sum-
mer 2013 and fall 2015. In all three care institutions I met the residents, 
and observed and participated in their daily activities. Additionally, I 
observed and participated in care practices, helping care workers with 
their ADL- tasks on the wards during day, evening and night shifts. I 
conducted interviews with carers and family members. The analysis con-
sisted of a careful readings and re-readings of all interview transcripts and 
field notes. I coded the data for recurring themes, using NVivo qualita-
tive data analysis software. One of these themes is ‘daily wanting’ on the 
ward and how it was negotiated in care encounters, the analysis of which 
I present in this chapter. Ethical consent for the research was obtained 
from the Anthropology Ethics Board of the University of Amsterdam.
10. I deliberately choose the term ‘wanting’ over ‘agency’. While agency, 
most generally, refers to the ‘socioculturally mediated capacity to act’ 
(Ahearn 2001, p. 112), hence potentialities of action, I here discuss actual 
practices in which wanting is done, and thus actually takes place.
11. This approach is useful to make visible how people with dementia who 
can no longer express themselves in verbally coherent ways, are neverthe-
less actors in the world. However, it simultaneously makes invisible 
mixed motives and intentions. If, for example, a resident steps into the 
shower upon the urging of her care worker, this action could, instead of 
an enactment of the will, also be a way to please her, or to put an end to 
the conversation. These considerations cannot be grasped through the 
approach chosen.
12. The statement can be said to reflect a wider shift away from coercive 
measures in Dutch health care, and may thus have been related to the 
language used in culture change programmes aiming to change care 
workers’ attitude towards the use of coercion. At the same time, neglect, 
or the milder form of ignoring somebody, was less discussed. These situ-
ations (for instance, when a resident indicates that she wants to use the 
toilet, but care workers assert that ‘she does not really need to go, she just 
thinks she does’) merit more analysis.
 Sociomaterial Will-Work: Aligning Daily Wanting in Dutch... 
130
13. For purposes of brevity, I hereafter use ‘will-work’.
14. I chose to call the practice ‘will-work’ rather than ‘wanting-work’ because 
it allows me to put my writings in conversation with philosophical work 
on the will.
15. Interestingly, disability studies itself has been critiqued for putting care 
recipients into the same position (Winance 2010, p. 95).
16. For a wonderful analysis of repertoires in washing practices, see Jeannette 
Pols’s ‘Washing the citizen’ (Pols 2006).
17. This illustrates the entanglement of will-work and emotional labour, 
defined by Arlie Hochschild as the ‘management of feeling to create a 
publicly observable facial and bodily display’ (Hochschild 1983, foot-
note p. 7) which ‘requires one to induce or suppress feeling in order to 
sustain the outward countenance that produces the proper state of mind 
in others’ (ibid., p. 7). Here, Leandra manages her own facial display to 
produce a happy state of mind in Ms Koch, who is then more likely to 
want a shower.
18. For an interesting reflection on deception and dementia, see ‘Nothing 
but the truth? On truth and deception in dementia care’ (Schermer 
2007).
19. On a critical note: it is important that care workers keep asking them-
selves whether the resident really cannot skip the shower, or really does 
not want to shower—if the answer is no to both, then the shower may 
just be postponed, therein aligning the care worker’s wanting with what 
the resident wants.
20. It goes without saying that the examples of creative negotiation provided 
here are not an exhaustive list. Whenever one ‘way of doing things’ did 
not work, care workers mostly tried another one, or combined them 
creatively. Therefore the list should not be seen as a scheme of possible 
actions, but rather to give an idea of how care workers improvise in situ-
ations in which residents’ wanting does not align with what caregivers 
believes to be good for the resident (and thus with what the care worker 
would want the residents to want as well).
21. Interestingly, asking and rearranging the order in which residents are 
helped during the morning shift can become part of the daily routine 
too, without clashing with the efficiency-based logic of work in today’s 
Dutch care homes. Indeed, investing time in doing will-work may thus 
even contribute to efficiency in some instances. As a care worker told me 
in response to a presentation of this chapter during a ‘Dialogue meeting’ 
[Dialoogbijeenkomst] organised by the Long Term Care and Dementia 
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research team I am part of, if a resident does not want to get dressed, 
time may be best spent ‘seducing’ that person into wanting to get dressed, 
rather than spending time in forcing the person into her clothes, as the 
latter action may be less pleasant for caregiver and care receiver, as well 
as more time consuming. 
22. Clearly, it is necessary to take into account that these are largely personal 
and cannot be transferred from one care worker to another in every case. 
Indeed, not all care workers put as much creativity into the negotiation 
with residents. For instance, when Joani told Lucia about the foot bath 
she had given to Mr Bakker, Lucia replied ‘I am not going to do that!’.
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The modern diagnosis of dementia has come to correspond with a num-
ber of connotations associated with old age: madness, incapacitation and 
psychological and social death.1 Most people have heard of dementia, as 
basic disease facts and the factors that supposedly trigger or prevent it 
have been widely reported for decades, either reliably quoted or flagrantly 
misquoted. In biomedical terms, dementia is not a disease, but a syn-
drome produced in large part by diseases such as Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s 
and vascular disease, to name merely a few (Haeusermann 2017). It is a 
cluster of symptoms and signs linked to the deterioration of cognitive 
abilities as a person ages. The word itself stems from the Latin demens, for 
“mad”—or, more accurately, “de-” + “mind” (mens)—and according to 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV (DSM-IV), 
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it may be caused or characterised by: “The development of multiple cog-
nitive deficits manifested by both (1) memory impairment2 […] and (2) 
one or more of the following cognitive disturbances: (a) aphasia,3 (b) 
apraxia,4 (c) agnosia,5 (d) disturbance in executive functioning”6 (Weiner 
and Lipton 2009, p. 47). The term “dementia” thus encapsulates a collec-
tion of symptoms resulting from a progressive deterioration of cognitive 
function that cannot be accounted for by normal ageing and that have an 
impact on day-to-day activities (Ballard and Bannister 2010).
In their heyday, large-scale nursing homes provided a domestic space 
for the elderly in cognitive and physical decline. Yet they were dominated 
by officialdom and adherence to acute care protocols. As many critics 
have rightly pointed out,7 such institutions did not always benefit their 
residents, especially those suffering from mental conditions. With time, 
the call for more individualistic and person-centred approaches was heard 
and new care models emerged. The initiation of a pioneering care facility, 
the Dutch Hogewey nursing home, strikingly embodies this shift. At its 
opening in 2009, it was the world’s first and only village for residents 
with dementia. It was touted as a place where people could live and die 
in a communal setting, stripped of the impersonal hospital feel and clini-
cal smell that most care homes still exude.8
The idea that it is more harmonious to live amongst primary groups in 
old age suggests itself intuitively. The significant media attention and con-
versations in geriatric circles surrounding the opening of the care villages 
made this plain.9 Even before the popular media had shown interest, the 
concept caught attention in geriatric research circles.10 Over the course of 
its first years and in response to the heightened media attention and the 
numerous requests from the geriatric community, the village offered one-
day workshops for groups of one to five visitors. In its first years, the home 
became a Mecca for tour groups from all across the globe, and the home’s 
administration decided to convert this rising public interest into monetary 
gain. Having heard of the new Dutch dementia village model, a team of 
employees of the Julius Tönebön Foundation in Hamelin, Germany, was 
sent to the Netherlands to learn more about the new approach with a view 
to incorporating their findings into a new project in Hamelin. Between 
May and December 2014, I conducted ethnographic research in the new 
German dementia village. This included a four-month period of intensive 
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study, during which I lived in Hamelin. I spent nearly every day at the vil-
lage, observing the typical daily activities and assisting the carers in their 
care routine. In August of that year, I accompanied the night shift workers 
for one month in order to gain insight into the village’s night-time care 
activities. In total, I observed approximately 650 hours of care work, which 
entailed countless conversations with carers, residents and administrators, 
and attended around 60 handover meetings.11
The following paper draws on these experiences. It begins with an intro-
duction to Germany’s first dementia village Tönbeön am See, its setting and 
environment, the village’s foundation, as well as the home’s care philoso-
phy. Throughout, I connect ethnographic observations with the broader 
events and developments. What follows is a discussion about the care vil-
lage concept. I frame this discussion by examining the fundamental 
ambivalence that is inherent in the creation of a dementia village, situation 
its modern forms between the competing ideals illustrated by the concepts 
of Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society). Can these two 
concepts be combined? To offer some tentative answers, I explore how the 
notion of dementia manifests itself in real life and in the everyday behav-
iour of the village’s residents, their families and the care takers.12 I place 
dementia care at the centre of my analysis. I explore how dementia is 
experienced, controlled and managed within a distinct socio- cultural envi-
ronment, at a distinct historical moment and within a specific body of 
knowledge available at the time. As such, this work’s purpose lies in bring-
ing light to the local dynamics and practices by which people with demen-
tia, their families and their care takers are reciprocally and actively moulded 
into Germany’s first dementia village. On a broader scale, this paper 
launches a more general discussion on ageing in contemporary society and 
shows how our representations of dementia and the ensuing care practices 
are largely determined by the social and cultural context.
 The German Village
Tönebön am See is designed to provide a home for people in cognitive 
decline. Divided into four self-organised communities, it follows the 
principle of a manageable life world. The village lies in Hamelin, the 
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capital of the district of Hamelin-Pyrmont, with a population of roughly 
60,000. Around 200 kilometres east of the Dutch border and a half hour 
drive southwest of Hannover in northwest Germany, it is tucked away in 
hills and acts as a gateway to the neighbouring Weserbergland Mountains. 
The latter are a popular destination for both hikers and cyclists, though 
the town attracts most of its tourists thanks to its legendary Pied Piper 
folk tale. The legend tells a story, partially rooted in fact, that took place 
in the town during the thirteenth century. The Brothers Grimm brought 
it into worldwide prominence and it formed the subject of renowned 
poems by Goethe.13 That Germany’s first dementia village emerged from 
the birthplace of the Pied Piper tale is not devoid of irony.14 While many 
tourists enjoy revelling in the thicket of Hamelin’s history, it seems to be 
once again a lack of young persons that concerns the town and Germany 
as a whole. Yet a new and additional loss is emerging: the loss of mind 
and memory; and a variety of organisations and agents are offering their 
help and expertise.
The Julius Tönebön Foundation owns and manages the new dementia 
village. For over 60 years, the foundation has been active in the care busi-
ness. They are, by their own valuation (and backed by official and semi- 
official comparison services), the regional market leader in the care home 
sector (Focus 2012). Based on their long-standing experience with 
dementia sufferers in their main care home, which is also situated in 
Hamelin and where the care recipients live in 3 residential groups of 18 
residents each, it was decided that, ideally, the resident groups should be 
smaller. Moreover, it was thought that the common areas ought to offer 
more living space to cater for the residents’ needs for intimacy, social 
proximity and security (Tönebön Stiftung 2016). Having heard of the 
new Dutch dementia village model, a team of employees was sent to the 
Netherlands to learn more about the new approach and how they could 
incorporate their findings into a new project in Hamelin. This resulted in 
four houses, all decorated in different colours and themes. Surrounded by 
a fenced-off space for 52 residents in total, the houses were intended to 
allow residents to feel at home away from their former homes. The home’s 
administration defines the main care duties as caring and catering to the 
residents’ physiological needs with food, drink and adequate housing. 
Meanwhile, their safety is protected by freedom from threats and 
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 economic deprivation, whereas their relational needs are met by the sense 
of belonging and affection offered through friendship, love and social 
interactions. Moreover, carers are instructed to approach residents with 
respect and to support their existing abilities. The residents, in turn, are 
expected to experience appreciation and feel self-esteem. In order to 
achieve this goal, the staff determine each resident’s resources, nurture 
their remaining skills and look for ways in which each resident can com-
pensate for deficient abilities by intervening individually and keeping in 
mind the specific situation. In line with these objectives, the residents’ 
psychological and emotional needs take priority over physical care.15
 Coming Home
I first found my way to the home on a hot and humid summer day. The 
home is difficult to reach by public transport. A bus stop is planned close 
by, but for now, a car is the primary and most sensible means of transport 
for visitors and staff. Some staff members who live in the vicinity, I later 
learned, cycle to work if the weather allows for it. I had thus decided to 
walk and was running late, as I had got lost in one of the many labyrin-
thine allotment gardens of Hamelin’s outskirts. I frantically asked for 
directions, though no one I encountered could point me to the home. “A 
brain is a terrible thing to watch waste away”, uttered a middle-aged 
woman, while clearing her neatly trimmed flower garden of weeds. “Good 
luck with your work, it is important to find a cure”. Without a compass 
and a map, but thankfully able to speak the local language, I could only 
imagine the disorientation in time and place experienced by some resi-
dents every day. It could lead to a sense of panic, even eased by the cer-
tainty that it will pass. After a few detours through a web of footpaths, it 
did pass and I eventually stumbled upon the recently completed con-
struction site. So new were its buildings that I could still smell the pol-
ished wood.
As I passed the entrance area and what turned out to be the home 
manager’s office, I walked up to the reception desk, which was staffed by 
a receptionist. She was chatting amicably with a person who seemed to be 
a resident’s family member. To my left I saw a café and a small  supermarket. 
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The latter has been deemed an integral part of the dementia village con-
cept, as it allows for a touch of normality. The supermarket is meant to 
distract from the clinical and cold ambiance commonly found in other 
care homes. Staffed by the receptionist, it is primarily open for residents 
who come accompanied with a carer. No money ever changes hands; the 
range of goods is limited to the residents’ everyday dietary needs and 
some basic toiletries. Meanwhile, the café welcomes residents and guests 
alike. It offers a cosy retreat overseeing and giving access to the sensory 
garden, and, on occasion, is used for events and festivals. “Hello, Doctor 
Häusermann, we have been expecting you”, the receptionist said. I 
greeted her and proceeded to inform her that I was not a doctor. The 
incident reminded me of the widely held German belief in authority and 
hierarchy. With half of my sentence still stuck deep within me, a resident 
scurried by and left the building. “Oh, would you mind running after 
Mrs Weber16 and telling her to come back inside?” the receptionist asked 
calmly but sternly.
I ran after Mrs Weber and barely managed to catch up with her. Once 
I did, she finally came to a stop. She now stood in the parking area look-
ing all around her, perplexed. Oblivious to my presence, she quietly 
mumbled some words to herself. I tentatively approached her, tapping 
her shoulder and introducing myself. She looked at me with tears in her 
eyes. With a soft and strained voice, she informed me that she was on her 
way home. I tried to convince her to walk back with me. While I spoke, 
she squinted her eyes, as though she were trying to decipher what I was 
saying. Then there was silence. Undoubtedly, I was having my first 
encounter with the slippery sense of truth in a world that, according to 
the media’s imagination, produces a feigned reality. Steeped in yearning 
and in a dizzying and disorientated tone, Mrs Weber informed me that 
she was meant to meet her daughter for dinner and was already running 
late. She walked another couple of steps towards the cars, wistfully look-
ing around as though she were selecting her vehicle of choice. I told her 
that dinner would be in the home tonight, which was true. But I lied 
when I was asked if I would call her daughter to let her know about the 
change of plans. “Do you know my daughter?”, she asked gingerly. I said 
I did and would call her. She gave me a fleeting smile through her tears 
but did not seem fully convinced. I felt her determination. After  repeating, 
T. Haeusermann
141
“Let’s go back inside where it’s not as hot”, I gave her a squeeze on her 
arm, after which she reluctantly followed me back inside. As I stood with 
her in front of the reception desk, elbow-to-elbow, she looked at me with 
a lively face. “Thank you!” she said and, in a perfectly coherent sentence, 
added, “It’s nice to see that some still pay tribute to the old- fashioned 
virtues of hard work”. Then she wandered off and soon faded into the 
distance in one of the brightly lit corridors. In the coming weeks and 
months, I would spend several moments trying to convince Mrs Weber 
not to leave the building.
The receptionist thanked me for my help and escorted me to one of the 
meeting rooms, where I was to be joined by the home’s head of care for 
an introductory talk. She explained that I was now in the main building. 
The main building boasts function rooms, the main nursing office (inter-
nally referred to as the “pool”), and some sanitary facilities for both visi-
tors and employees. The large window front opens to a small garden park 
with young trees and colourful flowerbeds. The park accommodates a 
meandering, circular promenade, alongside an aviary and a rabbit hutch. 
At the heart and centre of the garden, the so-called village square offers 
benches from which one may witness the water play in a small, electri-
cally operated fountain. Where the park is not marked off by one of the 
four houses or the main building, some green and a fence keep the resi-
dents safe. I would later learn that the entrance to the garden is designed 
in a way that invites residents to go for a spin. This is to ensure that resi-
dents with orientation difficulties cannot leave the terrain without proper 
guidance. To mirror a German village structure, two of the four houses 
are detached. In order to reach them, one needs to cross the park.
Matt, the head of care, entered the room. He was in his early 40s, slen-
der, with a strong jaw. Personable yet controlled in his demeanour, he 
appeared to be hands-on, pragmatic and continuously on the run. Indeed, 
this morning it seemed as though he held the home together with little 
more than his phone and his calm disposition. The phone was ringing 
every few minutes, so he needed to leave our meeting quite regularly. 
When he returned, he would apologise for the disruption, whereupon he 
would continue to tell me about the home and that he had only recently 
joined the team. When we spoke, he was welcoming and sincere. He 
promptly revealed in no uncertain terms that he was not interested in 
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portraying the project in only a good light, but also aimed to show me 
“what is really going on”. On the day of our initial meeting, he was 
unhappy with how disorganised the home was. When I began my field-
work, 27 residents had already moved in, amounting to half of the home’s 
capacity.
Matt’s new post was tailored to his strengths and attuned to his career 
trajectory:
I’m coming from another home, and was ready for this challenge. There’s 
so much right with this home’s visions and yet still so much wrong with 
how we’re doing things. Right now we can’t provide the quality here that I 
had initiated in the former home I worked at. But it’s hard. The foundation 
wants to break even and doesn’t give us the staff we need.
He spoke in a conversational tone, obviously aware of everything there 
was still to do. “I know that you’re coming from the Netherlands”, he 
continued. “Hogewey is a great project, but they have so many more 
financial resources at their disposal; something like that is not possible in 
Germany, despite our best intentions”. While he was happy with the ini-
tial concept of the home, he articulated many enhancements that needed 
to be addressed. He then offered to show me around.
 The Brickyard Mansion
We stepped into the first of four houses, the Villa Ziegelhof (“Brickyard 
Mansion”). The interior was designed in a modern and contemporary 
style, with brightly coloured walls. Matt then took me to one of the unoc-
cupied rooms, the “showroom”, as they call it. It was spacious and, aside 
from one bed, there was no furniture. Matt explained: “The residents 
ought to bring their own furniture, in order to feel at home, that’s impor-
tant, you know, so they have some memorabilia. When residents move 
in, it leaves a void, and familiar surroundings need to fill it”. The bath-
rooms were generous and finished from floor to ceiling with white tiles, 
which gave them a slightly clinical feel. They were easily accessible by 
wheelchair and the floors were evenly levelled. The shower was in the 
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corner, and no doors obstructed access. All the amenities were state-of- 
the-art. “Do you lock the doors at night?” I asked. “No, we don’t”, he 
responded, continuing:
You know, I believe that if we succeed in sheltering the residents from all 
danger, we will have failed as carers. This should not be a golden cage. It’s 
interesting, the relatives would rather have us increase security and lock the 
individual doors at night. At the same time, the social romantics criticise us 
for having the village fenced off, so one’s mother or father can’t ‘run there’.
I asked why he said “run there” as opposed to “run off”, to which he 
replied: “We say danger of ‘running to’ [Hinlaufgefahr], not ‘running off’ 
[Weglaufgefahr], because for the residents, they don’t feel that they are 
running away. They are going somewhere, they want to go home, or 
shopping, or whatever. So they are not running away”. He continued to 
tell me about an event that had occurred recently:
Two weeks ago we had one resident disappear. The two carers on the night 
shift called me. It was the weekend. They had looked everywhere, but they 
didn’t find her. So they called me in the middle of the night and we eventu-
ally had to call the police, and they came with a helicopter. We looked 
everywhere in the surrounding woods. It was late at night. Eventually we 
found the resident in the closet of an empty room, anxious and distraught. 
We were lucky to find her inside the village. But you see, when you’re deal-
ing with such cases, hearing people’s criticism of the fences becomes laugh-
able. Obviously it would be nice to live in a free and happy environment, 
but if something happens to a resident, if they get lost, or if they drown in 
the lake, who will be held responsible? The same voices will ask: ‘Why 
didn’t anybody stop her?’ Sometimes the dementia discourse is packed with 
hypocrisy.
In order for the residents to “feel” free and remain safe, the dementia 
village needs to draw clear boundaries. Where are the fences? How high 
can they be? Which doors should be locked? Which rooms ought to be 
accessible? How much hygiene is needed? The extent of freedom is highly 
negotiated between concerns for safety and freedom. On our way to the 
second house, we strolled by a couple sitting on the porch. I was about to 
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introduce myself but immediately sensed the weight of the moment we 
were walking into. The wife was a new resident. Ever since she had moved 
to the village, her husband would dutifully visit her every day, generally 
in the afternoon. They were sitting next to each other on two wooden 
lawn chairs. The wife was fighting back tears. We caught snippets of the 
conversation: “and you always told me, no, no, you’ll be back, don’t 
worry”, she said. Her husband spoke thoughtfully and deliberately, “Yes, 
that’s what I said”. The wife’s voice started trembling and cracking: “And 
I told you that I don’t want that. You don’t need to care for me; I’m per-
fectly capable of taking care of myself. Once I go back to school, and my 
house, then I’m happy. You might as well have thrown me into the Weser 
[the local river]”.
The husband looked at us, as though searching for comfort and reas-
surance. He then replied with casual interest, “I told you again and again, 
you can’t come home”. The wife noticed our presence and managed a 
tight-lipped smile. But her breathing was rapid and her face flushed with 
turmoil. Matt raised an eyebrow and answered his phone. We then 
walked across the square in the centre of the village, past the village foun-
tain. On our way, Matt told me that the wife had repeatedly locked out 
her husband and called the police, whereupon her two sons and husband 
had decided to bring her to the home. Additionally, she suffered from 
Hepatitis C, which made caring for her difficult, as one constantly needed 
to be cautious not to get infected. “It’s hard to move to a new place at this 
age. With emigration comes loss and then grieving”. Matt let this hang in 
the air for a moment, then continued:
You surely know Elisabth Kübler-Ross’ (1969) work. In her five stages of 
grief, the first is denial. In the beginning, many residents deny that they 
have actually left. But as the days tick by, the permanence of the move will 
sink in. But this is a journey they need to take together with their loved 
ones. And we need the families to be involved.
Indeed, the home’s management deems the families’ involvement an 
important element in the care routine. “The fates of family members and 
residents”, an internal care document states, “are inextricably linked”. For 
this reason, besides their daily nursing duties, the staff are responsible for 
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offering family members information, guidance and clarification with 
regard to their relatives in the home. Family members and caregivers are 
advised to be in close contact to understand and support each other effec-
tively. According to the village’s administration, this is achieved through 
several means. First, and prior to their relative’s entry, the families receive 
information about the particular services offered in the housing communi-
ties. Second, they are asked for biographical information and memorabilia 
that might make it easier for the relative to settle in and feel at home in the 
new environment. Third, the family ideally provides comprehensive infor-
mation on the relative’s possible behavioural problems, their background, 
their household routines and potential issues that may arise. Fourth, the 
families are encouraged to be involved in everyday nursing routines and 
the care design. Should a resident be dissatisfied, their family will be 
approached early and it will be stressed that all criticism will be perceived 
as an incentive to improve care and not as a personal attack. This is ideally 
facilitated through regular family events and a dialogue with the carers.
 The Lakeside Mansion
We moved to the next house, the Villa am See (“Lakeside Mansion”), the 
décor of which, according to the prospectus, was classic and timeless. The 
walls were painted in warm red and brown colours. Here, all residents 
had already moved in. The houses were connected through a glass hall-
way, something Matt was not happy about. “The initial idea really was 
that the houses stand individually and not connected, but well, we haven’t 
fully managed to have this materialised. Safety and comfort had to come 
first”. We walked through the sitting room, past a TV area with a giant 
state-of-the-art television, several sofas, and a bookcase filled with the 
works of many famous poets and authors, fairy tales and children’s books. 
On the bottom shelf, I saw various board games and play materials—the 
sort one finds in typical German households, ranging from Mensch Ärgere 
Dich Nicht (Ludo), checkers and playing cards to a myriad of colourful 
jigsaw puzzles and two large foam dice.
Most of the residents had already eaten and were either relaxing in 
their rooms or taking a rest on the sun terrace. On the terrace, six women 
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were sitting around a wooden table, serenely drinking coffee and water 
and looking out upon the neat flower beds and the village’s pastoral peace. 
To protect the residents from the harsh, unyielding sunlight, a dark blue 
parasol had been stretched to cover. The ladies sat in silence with a seem-
ing calmness about their twilight years. Every now and then one would 
utter a brief comment, either about a carer passing by, the heat or the bees 
and flies that kept settling upon every brightly coloured piece of clothing. 
In the background, one could hear the gardener mowing the terraced 
lawn behind the building; a smell of freshly cut grass and petrol from the 
mower lingered in the air. Beside the table, several wheeled walkers were 
parked together. An elegantly dressed woman in her early 60s, with 
bleached blond teased hair, was trying to cut through the convoluted line 
of walkers. She wanted to retire to her room and shot us a nervous glance. 
Matt tended to her well-being and wished her a good rest. Then a prim- 
looking carer walked out of the house, carrying more glasses. “Let’s make 
sure we all drink lots of water, we need it in this heat”, she said cheerfully, 
while pouring glasses of water for everyone.
 The Ridingyard Mansion
We returned inside the house and walked down a bright, glass façade cor-
ridor that connected the Villa am See with the third mansion, the Villa 
Reithof (“Ridingyard Mansion”). This third edifice overlooked the horse 
stables next door. The stables formed a striking contrast to the newly built 
care village. The grass needed cutting, the roof patching, and quite a few 
surfaces warranted a fresh coat of paint. The décor of the mansion was in 
the style of a country home. Matt then led me into the dining area, which 
was separated from the kitchen by a countertop, cluttered with leftovers 
from lunch. A feisty young carer with long dark hair was brushing off bits 
of salad and pasta from dishes and utensils before loading them into the 
dishwasher. Eight tables with chairs were arranged alongside the window 
front. Meanwhile, two residents were finishing their desserts in the din-
ing area. One resident was singing the same verse of an old German 
 children’s song. Every now and then the carer would sing along with the 
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resident by starting a new verse. The singing resident then made a violent 
lunge for her table neighbour’s spoon and began tapping on the wooden 
table. By the look on her neighbour’s face, this created an unsettling 
sound. The neighbour then stood up, rambled a bit, and dashed off to her 
room. Nearer to the carer, another resident was casually leaning against 
the counter, overlooking the kitchen. There seemed to be a warm quiet 
between the two. The carer would steal cheeky glances at the resident, 
and the resident would smile back. Yet due to the neighbouring horses 
and the summer heat, the carers struggled to cope with the flies sneaking 
into the house. One carer, folding clothes, was frantically killing the 
insects with a fly swatter. “This is the home I’d prefer for myself ”, Matt 
declared. “You see the horses from the window, so there’s always some-
thing going on”.
The home’s care philosophy posits that the staff see the residents’ 
behavioural syndromes as expressions of self-help, self-preservation and 
self-protection. Their actions are understood as a response to the feeling 
of loss that the residents experience. Also, any abnormal behaviour from 
a resident is appreciated as the resident’s way of adjusting to their new 
realities and compensating for their shortfall in other communicative 
means. In that vein, challenging behaviour is recognised as a self-healing 
attempt in response to physical, mental or social wounds incurred as a 
result of the disease. The behaviour is thus not perceived as a deficit, but 
triggered by the deeply painful losses and interventions in the residents’ 
lives.
Consequently, the carers are encouraged to see challenging behavioural 
manifestations as residents’ subjective and meaningful engagement with 
their own bereavement. Instead of surpassing the symptoms of such self- 
help attempts, the carers are meant to connect with each resident, to 
discuss, and to strive to understand the individual’s loss. Reportedly, 
there is a wide range of behavioural symptoms. While the residents fre-
quently undergo a personality change, their emotional feeling (it is 
stressed) is not clouded and their ability to direct attention to external 
stimuli remains. With this understanding of behavioural problems in 
mind, the carers are believed to be more successful in empathising with 
the residents. For the latter, the experience of distance and proximity is 
 The Dementia Village: Between Community and Society 
148 
sometimes skewed. While potentially incomprehensible to an outsider, 
residents often seek close body contact to get attention, to make them-
selves heard, or to deal with stressful circumstances. Furthermore, fear 
and distrust—and even hallucinations or delusions—may occur and 
unpremeditated, new or unpleasant situations such as a visit to the hair-
dressers or the doctor may cause fear and distress. Internal tensions and 
torment can lead to excessive motor activity, even agitation. Restlessness 
and confusion may increase in the evenings, which is referred to as “sun 
downing” and is often accompanied by a strong inclination to run away, 
or, in adapted care speech, to “run to”. Conversely, a lack of drive and 
motivation can occur, paired with a higher perception and expression of 
pain. Lastly, feelings of hunger and thirst generally decrease, and, sooner 
or later, the residents ordinarily become incontinent.
 The Hastebach Mansion
The last house we visited was the Villa Hastebach (“Hasty Brook 
Mansion”), which was named after the small stream meandering through 
the countryside not far from the house. With blue and white walls, giving 
it a Nordic Scandinavian feel, the mansion was still uninhabited. Some 
carers had cut out a few paper fish for decoration, some of which were 
already dangling from the roof. Next door, the former brickyard was 
being rebuilt into a day-care centre. “The idea is that the residents will be 
able to join some of their activities once it’s finished”, Matt declared. 
“This ought to offer them some more activities, while at the same time 
relieve the carers in the village. In general, there is no forced sociability”. 
He continued: “If residents want to spend the evening with other resi-
dents, it should be because they really want to”.
After taking a slight detour around the ward, we once again crossed 
the village square to return to Matt’s office. On our way we encountered 
another resident. She was sitting in one of the flowerbeds, engrossed in 
playing with some stones, watching the dirt slip through her fingers. As 
we passed, she noticed us. She stood up, gingerly brushing the dirt off 
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her trousers and moving a strand of her silver hair out of her face. With 
one foot bare and the other wearing a wet sock, she stood rooted to the 
spot. Her tan highlighted her finely chiselled features, emphasising the 
magnetic quality of her clear green eyes. Matt introduced me to her, 
mentioning that she had previously been a yoga teacher. She gave me an 
amicable smile. With a natural dignity and presence, she reached out her 
hand and placed it on my arm. “How wonderful to finally meet you”, 
she said enthusiastically. “It’s quite warm, isn’t it. Yes, it is indeed. And 
the flowers are just blooming like there’s no tomorrow, it’s just marvel-
lous”. I agreed and asked her if the hot weather was not bothering her. 
She looked at the sky, then away from it and back at it again. She then 
shut her eyes as though she were squeezing out a thought. She pointed 
at some tiny clouds in the sky and said, “I see it coming already, you 
know, these big, big, you know… you never know what’s going to hap-
pen, life is full of surprises, isn’t it?” I asked her if she enjoyed living in 
the home. She replied: “Oh, there’s always a little of this and that. You 
never stop learning, isn’t that so? And this here [pointing to the bush 
behind her], it’s quite remarkable, quite remarkable I tell you. But I 
think I had better get back to work now”. We said goodbye and she 
returned to her spot and resumed digging up stones. Mrs Edwards, Matt 
informed me, had been brought to the home by her son, a famous heart 
surgeon from the north of Germany. She had gone missing for several 
days in the city before someone eventually discovered her in a garden 
shed. What was remarkable about our conversation was that Mrs 
Edwards seemed to formulate well thought-out and coherent sentences, 
at normal volume and speed and with a conversational tone. Her speech 
was nevertheless detached from reality and context, just as her behaviour 
and attire did not really match the conduct normally associated with 
that of an elderly, elegant woman. “In a regular nursing home, Mrs 
Edwards probably wouldn’t be allowed to dress like that or play with 
dirt”, Matt told me while we walked back to his office. “But we don’t 
presume to know what she wants and enjoys, we provide a safe, familiar 
and human environment, so she can do what she enjoys. They don’t 
come here to die, but to live”.
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 Discussion
When the village was inaugurated in March 2014, the project’s chief 
administrator did not mince her words: “Here we see how care work 
works in the 21st century. This is a great project for Hamelin, it is a great 
day for the city”. And the chairwoman of the Tönebön foundation added, 
with reference to the village’s critics, that the residents should not be seen 
as having been “deported” or “marginalised”, as they would continue to 
partake in Hamelin’s social life. “We want to make their daily routine as 
normal as possible”, she emphasised, maintaining that what and where 
they eat is up to the residents themselves. “The refrigerator door is open 
to anyone, anytime. If someone wants to make coffee in the morning or 
eat a yoghurt, they can”. The village is a primary example of “full in- 
patient care where the residents remain self-determined”, which is “very 
labour intensive” (Keller 2014).17
The home had two advantages when it opened its doors. First, it could 
model its design and principles on the successfully implemented Dutch 
care home, learning from the Dutch experience and continuing the tried 
and tested approach. This circumstance proved vital in convincing inves-
tors and critics. Second, the model’s novelty and progressive methods 
invited not only many families and individuals from around Germany to 
consider it as a potential care home, but equally grabbed the interest of 
many carers.18 A few weeks after the inaugural celebrations, when I first 
visited, the village was still in turmoil. Undertaking a new project and 
implementing new processes is always a bumpy road, and launching the 
first German dementia village proved no exception. When I began my 
fieldwork, the care staff comprised 18 team members (15 women, 3 
men), and the residents occupied two of the four houses, with more resi-
dents moving in every day. Management did not know how much staff 
was needed, who exactly would move in, or how things would work in 
detail. The residents had been uprooted from their former lives, the new 
workers needed to acclimatise to their new environment, and all of this 
occurred in the presence of much uncertainty. In between the intricate 
rules and philosophies laid out in the village’s blueprint, and the frantic 
everyday care routine, there often was not much space for contemplation. 
Before we thus venture deeper into the everyday care routine, it is worth-
while to bring more attention to the idea of a dementia village.
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 Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (Community 
and Society)
The dementia village, by its very concept and application, creates a new 
demarcated space for its residents governed by societal standards of care. 
The residents live in the community. The carers, on the other hand, fulfil 
a societal function. They come in from outside to work, but do not live 
with the residents. This distinction between the two concepts—commu-
nity on the one hand and society on the other—ties into a long-standing 
tradition in social thought that speaks to the tension of combining social-
ity with rationalised bureaucratic efficiency. Ferdinand Tönnies (2001) 
distinguished this as a tension between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft.
The concepts of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, Tönnies (2001, pp. 27 
f.; p. 254) argued, form the ideal types of social organisation. Gemeinschaft 
represents the communal society, in which personal relationships are 
structured based on time-honoured social rules. Tönnies differentiated 
between three original types of community, bound together by blood, 
proximity or conscious thought, which he referred to as kinship, neigh-
bourhood and friendship/comradeship. Each of these forms of commu-
nity is defined by a specific set of roles and a distinct awareness of the 
place each person occupies in the group. The members’ worth and status 
stems from knowing who they are, where they come from and where they 
belong. Their worth is not tied to their achievements. This, however, also 
implies immobility, in both physical and social terms. Members com-
monly stay in one place and remain in their hierarchical positions. What 
follows is that a community is, by its very nature, exclusive. People out-
side the community may be welcomed as guests or workers who provide 
services on a temporary or permanent basis. They might even, with time 
and commitment, become passive members. Yet they hardly ever take on 
the role of a representative. Exclusion, not inclusion, characterises the 
communal spirit. While solidarity is at its core, it is also the core of a 
clearly defined circle, the borders of which are difficult to cross.
In contrast to the concept of community, Tönnies’ notion of Gesellschaft 
embodies an association that is regulated by modern, multicultural soci-
eties with their governmental bureaucracies and sizable institutions. 
Society comprises individuals who may coexist peacefully but are, in 
essence, substantially separated. In this manner, it is every man for him-
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self, living in a perpetual state of tension. The union is characterised by 
reciprocity, wherein for every service rendered and good provided, a 
return is not only expected but legally and socially required. In these 
social relations, roles are soluble and fluid, and individuals are detached 
from one another and become separate selves in the same way that deeds 
and goods become separate entities. “In Gemeinschaft”, Tönnies (2001, 
p. 52) writes, “[people] stay together in spite of everything that separates 
them, in Gesellschaft they remain separate in spite of everything that 
unites them”.19
In the dementia village, there is a contrast between the residents and 
the carers as of the village. The reality of living in a specially designed vil-
lage is that it makes reality feel just that little bit less real at times. Whereas 
the home was designed to be a “village” in which carers would cook with 
patients, do laundry with them, and so on—a village in which everything 
would resemble civic life—there is evidently a division into groups. Most 
prominently, residents and carers do not form part of a community exist-
ing side by side, but have very different interests and roles. For the carers, 
it is a job, but also a calling. And the residents form, similar to any other 
“village”, an inherently diverse and dynamic group. Some are happy and 
thankful, others are aggressive, hitting and punching the carers, and oth-
ers are sad and depressed. If you take a group of people and put them in 
a village, naturally you will find quite a wide variety of hobbies, sleep 
patterns, food preferences and so on. To build a community in Tönnies’ 
truest sense of Gemeinschaft, a care village, one could argue, ought to 
evolve internally; it should not be an organisation representing a form of 
Gesellschaft, driven by a single overbearing vision.
When thinking about the dementia village, we thus need to reflect on 
the often unasked and unanswered questions with which we need to 
reckon in a discourse about dementia care. As we have seen, several key 
themes ran through the media reports on the village, and the idea of a 
dementia village seemed to take on a life of its own. A tenaciously repeated 
opinion posited the concept of normality as the foundation of the care 
village. But what is normality? And if we need a care home to feign it, 
what is wrong with normality outside the confines of an institution? The 
principle of normality is, of course, an entirely subjective matter and 
defining it involves a normative, culturally informed choice. In order to 
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exist within an institution, the care home must necessarily dictate how 
normality ought to be experienced and lived, because otherwise order 
and safety could be threatened. If one resident’s idea of normality includes 
singing at midnight, another’s normal sleep pattern might be disturbed. 
The recourse to normality thus entails a moral and even political evalua-
tion by which the cohabitation form is mediated. For this reason, the 
concept of normality is, in each instance, a debatable principle.20
One of the striking differences between the German and Dutch model 
concerns the idea of community building within the village—or how 
normality is conceived. The Dutch village created different life worlds for 
their residents, wherein the residents’ backgrounds and former habits 
formed the basis of their cohabitation groups. In Germany, this approach 
was not adopted. On the contrary, the idea was rejected—possibly due to 
the nation’s very sensitive history with segregation and the idea of health 
care being distributed equally. The shared commonality of the residents, 
besides the fact that they were all German citizens, was their need for 
care. One of the project’s initiators phrased it as follows:
Whereas in Amsterdam the houses are divided amongst different groups of 
patients, according to their hobbies and origins, we didn’t copy this aspect 
of their model. Here we have rural communities, people share similar ori-
gins, and their houses are not divided. You may find a former sales assis-
tant, a teacher, and, yes, even a professor might move in. And we didn’t 
differentiate between those groups.
Another carer was a bit more blunt, saying: “Can you imagine? 
Separating people based on background in Germany? We might as well 
call it the Third Reich village!” An administrator, in turn, stressed that 
there is no singular admission criterion that exhausts the possibilities of 
the concept. Rather, the village concept should always be situated within 
particular contexts:
If we had followed the idea of the dementia village to the letter, this would 
beg the question of how demented you need to be to be admitted to the 
village. And I know of families who’d rather take their mother or father to 
a local care home that does not specialise in dementia, as otherwise every-
one would immediately think she is mad. So there is still a lot of educa-
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tional work ahead in order for the condition not be as disreputable. I think 
that whether you physically or mentally depend on care, there shouldn’t be 
a difference.
These social differences could lead to friction with those residents who 
did not feel at home amongst the other residents. The exclusionary prin-
ciple of the Dutch dementia village collided with the German under-
standing of equal health care provision. Certainly, the initiators of 
Hamelin’s dementia village never strived to create an exact replica of the 
Dutch dementia village. They explicitly adopted a “mix and match” strat-
egy for the project, to the extent that the carers often yearned for more 
structure than the model was initially designed for—a structure that 
would categorise residents according to the degree of their dementia pro-
gression in order for them to fulfil their professional duties better. The 
differences in the way in which the Dutch and German dementia villages 
conceived and delivered their care services does not mean that one 
approach is right and the other is wrong, or that one necessarily offers 
more person-centred or individual care. It only means that they are dif-
ferent, and that certain socio-cultural values inherent in the existing 
arrangements probably come into play.
By its very nature, an ethnographic account cannot demonstrate either 
the generalisability or predictive power claimed by other scientific disci-
plines, which tend to approximate such ideals more closely than ethnog-
raphy can, ever will and indeed should. Then again, ethnography derives 
its efficacy in no small measure from the insight that there are limits to 
our interpretations. It builds its strength by knowing its boundaries. This 
paper does therefore not depict an entire country or culture or a token 
programme representing Germany in a strong and distinctive fashion on 
a macro level. While it is vital to allow for both cultural and environmen-
tal factors (Jacobson 1991), we should refrain from artificially establish-
ing national binaries.21 Nevertheless, by pointing out the difference 
between the Dutch and German model, we can see how they both grew 
from deep historical and ideological roots. The same is the case with 
Tönnies’ conception of Gemeinschaft. Whereas his evaluation is struc-
tured around a sequence of conceptual dualistic contraries—or what he 
called “normal types”—they are not merely abstract analytical tools.22 In 
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Tönnies’ (2001, p. 17) view, social relations may be understood either as 
originating from genuine, natural bonds, which are the heart and soul of 
communities, or as an essentially mechanistic formation, steeped in rea-
son and thought, which is what we conceive of as a society. This differen-
tiation evidently implies certain judgements. Indeed, Tönnies framed his 
normal types with the underlying notion that naturally evolved social 
relationships in the community are favourable. By contrast, artificial and 
systematic relations in society are “predatory and pathological, a distinc-
tion that [bears] all the hallmarks, not of the ‘mechanistic’ outlook of the 
scientific enlightenment, but of Aristotelian and medieval scholastic 
roots” (2001, p. xxvii). The straightforward division between community 
and society does not conceal the circumstance that defining and using a 
community as an empirical field of study is a tricky and controversial 
task. “In considering the concept of community”, Colin Bell and Howard 
Newby (1971, p.  2) maintain, “the sociologist shares an occupational 
hazard with the architect and the planner; the more he attempts to define 
it in his own terms, the more elusive does the essence of it seem to escape 
him”. Too often, subjective value judgments colour the description of a 
community, and the mere definition of a group as a community might—
and indeed often does—involve one’s normative recommendation of 
what it should be.23 Just as the conceptual notion of “contract” domi-
nated the intellectual discourse throughout the Age of Reason, “commu-
nity” occupied a powerful position in the attitudes of nineteenth century 
sociological thinkers. The concept was not merely a callous, methodical 
instrument for reaching an empirical description of social relationships. 
Rather, the term accompanied an undercurrent of positive and nostalgic 
associations, to the extent that the move from close personal and com-
munal bonds to the contractual, utilitarian and impersonal relations 
found in an emerging industrial society was often lamented (Bell and 
Newby 1971).
Comte, for instance, held that Western states had emerged out of 
political and industrial revolutions and were abnormal and artificial fab-
rications, both dangerous and lacking emotional and social competence. 
He feared that modern-day authorities were negligent in taking care of 
their population. In view of the vast diversity in the populace and to 
regain a sense of community and connection, he suggested that modern 
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states be broken down into smaller units, comprising cities, towns and 
their surrounding countryside (Pickering 2009). In Suicide, Emile 
Durkheim (1897) expressed concern that the decay of collective con-
science and the deterministic shift to individualism was causing the fall of 
long-established communities. This could lead to what he termed “ano-
mie”, or a complete and utter loss of societal norms. Yet, as opposed to 
Comte, he believed that the rising division of labour would, while 
destroying traditional communal ties, lead to the formation of new and 
bigger organic communities, as different types of solidarity would emerge.
Lastly, Karl Marx’s use of the term “community” exemplifies the con-
trast in usage that pervades the above thinkers’ accounts. On the one 
hand, Marx held a more descriptive sense of the concept and saw com-
munity as a group of people living together as a collective and sharing 
various historical, social and economic ties. These primitive communi-
ties, which he refers to as “natural communities”, stand in contrast to the 
feudal community that, for centuries, formed the backbone of medieval 
European society. On the other hand, Marx held a normative prescrip-
tion of community, which he would sometimes term “the real commu-
nity”. This represented Marx’s notion of freedom, wherein one does not 
depend on the servitude of others (Brenkert 1983). Tönnies indeed dem-
onstrated his affinity to many Marxian notions of capitalism throughout 
his work and applied several elements of Marx’s ideas to his conceptual 
framework. Ultimately, however, he understood the emergence of a trade- 
heavy capitalistic society not so much as a cause for the demise of com-
munity, but turned Marx’s thesis around and argued for a structural 
explanation. In this fashion, he claimed that the loss of communal life 
provided a fertile ground for the growth of new social organisations 
(Cahnman 1973). Irrespective of their diverse approaches, all these 
accounts share a certain praise and positive regard for community. They 
see in it “man’s natural habitat” (Bell and Newby 1971, p. 22), endan-
gered by the faceless, impersonal and anonymous industrial society. A 
strong sense of nostalgia and an unsettling sense of placelessness accom-
pany most thinkers’ images of fading communal life. In the words of 
Keith Melville (1972, p. 171), however:
The danger of any form of nostalgia is that it is so simple to imagine a 
past which never existed. It is seductively easy to assume that, until the 
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beginning of the industrial age, community universally mean that one 
was always close to the warm bosom of cherished friends and welcome 
traditions.
Tönnies’ theory provides a simplistic notion of community and soci-
ety. Implementing one automatically rules out the other. In the real his-
torical world, however, the two types coexist; the boundaries are 
permeable. The dementia village presents a case in point. For that reason, 
it is not a question of whether individuals and organisations, in their 
thoughts and actions, form exclusively a Gemeinschaft or Gesellschaft. 
Rather, the question is where on the spectrum between these two poles 
the object of enquiry is located (Tönnies 2001, p. xxviii). We must bear 
this in mind when further exploring the village’s notions of community 
and society. While it is tempting to recognise the two concepts as physi-
cal, tangible bodies, the very character of a social group does not lie in its 
biological or geographical qualities but in the inherent relational connec-
tions that bind the group together.24
 Conclusion
“A brain is a terrible thing to watch waste away”, uttered the amateur 
gardener of the labyrinthine allotment gardens when I asked her for 
directions to the new dementia village. Her remark called up an image of 
a rotting brain that had once ripened. As some accounts in this paper 
have illustrated, however, life in a dementia care home can be much bet-
ter than what is suggested in some of the mortifying clinical portrayals. 
Questions addressing appropriate and novel ideas for dementia care, 
however, also resonate in utopian and theoretical accounts of commu-
nity, of which the dementia village is an example. The longing for more 
inclusive, collective care models that emphasise human relationships and 
solidarity rather than calculated self-interest is found in many care circles. 
It is felt as profoundly as the discontent with the diminishing bonds of 
kinship and family seen in nineteenth century thought. Yet the universal-
ity of home—or, in this particular case, “the village” as a place for care—
leads us to comprehend it as both undisputed and natural, and we tend 
to neglect or underrate the ways in which it is culturally determined. 
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Such ideas are strengthened by the common yet precarious view of home 
and community as the “natural” place of care and effortless relationships 
that are bound by emotions and connection, while medicine and cure 
carry the connotation of knowledge and comprehension of facts. The 
dementia village project evolved amongst many human and touching 
experiences, thankful relatives, husbands visiting their wives every day 
and a strong team spirit and cohesion amongst the carers.25 The home, 
designed to be a village in which everything resembles civic life, might 
not have met this vision, but it did not lack humanity. It did not lack 
care. Neither did I encounter insufficient or bad care. The carers did care, 
and most of them with sensitivity, rather than sentimentality. Nonetheless, 
the rising prevalence of chronic illnesses means that care is becoming an 
increasingly complex affair. It is with due regard for these actualities that 
we must construe the relationships between the village residents, the car-
ers, dementia and social life. And I hope that by outlining some of these 
complexities, this paper will foster a deeper and more critical understand-
ing of dementia, ageing and the care we all hope to receive in our twilight 
years.
Notes
1. In the mid-1960s, social psychologist Richard Kalish (1966) introduced 
the notion of “psychological death”, referring to a demise of conscious-
ness resulting in the individual ceasing to be aware of their own self. 
Thus, the individual not only forgets who they are but also that they are. 
Arthur Kleinman (1988), in turn, forcefully argued that language and 
social exclusion, consciously or unconsciously, can lead to a descent into 
a passive solitude, which literally engenders “social death” (also see 
George 2010).
2. The impaired ability to both learn new information (working memory) 
and recall previously learned information (long-term memory) (Weiner 
and Lipton 2009, p. 47).
3. Language disturbance (Weiner and Lipton 2009, p. 47).
4. The inability to carry out motor activities in spite of intact motor func-
tion (e.g. strength and coordination) (Weiner and Lipton 2009, p. 47).
5. A failure to either recognise or identify objects in spite of intact sensory 
function (Weiner and Lipton 2009, p. 47).
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6. For instance, planning, organising, sequencing or abstracting (Weiner 
and Lipton 2009, p. 47).
7. See, for instance, Townsend 1952; Goffman 1961; Foucault 1989 
(1963); Zola 1972; Rosenhan 1973; Smith 1974; Noddings 1984; 
Gubrium 1986; or Weinberg 2005.
8. Branded as an innovative, humane and affordable model of dementia 
care, the village today hosts around 150 residents, averaging 83 years of 
age. Roughly 250 full- and part-time health care workers and local vol-
unteers care for the residents. The residents live in 23 different homes, 
each catering for 6 or 7 residents. These are categorised in seven diverse 
“lifestyle categories”, which entail housing for the Dutch upper class, 
homemakers, trade/craftsmen and women as well as religious, cultured, 
Indonesian (for those who most value their ethnic heritage) or urban 
residents. Two core principles govern the village. First, the village strives 
to give residents a home in which they are surrounded by recognisable 
objects and people with similar values, backgrounds and interests, in 
order to create experiences that are reminiscent of the resident’s formative 
years. Second, much emphasis is placed on keeping the residents active 
and in a safe environment. Twenty-five clubs offer activities that include 
folksong, bingo, painting, cycling, literature and baking (Zorggroep 
(2016); Berry 2013; Carpenter (2012); Henley 2012; Tagliabue 2012).
9. See, for instance, Grün 1998; Hurley 2012; Jenkins and Smythe 2013; 
or Hogewoning-van der Vossen 2004.
10. In Switzerland, a care centre in the form of a mock-1950s is currently 
under construction, intended to cater exclusively to elderly residents 
with Alzheimer’s and other dementias (Grogg 2014; Paterson 2012). In 
the UK, a replica village high street was recently built at a dementia care 
home in Suffolk to help the residents retrieve some of their memories 
(BBC 2014). Also see Keller (2013) for other German projects.
11. The 650 hours correspond with the carers’ work schedule. I generally 
conducted participant observations during entire work shifts. Nightshifts 
would usually last up to 11 hours, whereas dayshifts spanned over a 
period of 8 hours. I did not explicitly call the interviews such; they were 
often down-to-earth chats peppered with banter, confessions and life 
stories. As the later chapters will illustrate, they were far from formal. 
They took place in between and on the way, over coffee and during ciga-
rette breaks, on benches and table chairs and while peeling potatoes or 
washing up, brushing someone’s hair, cleaning the floors, consoling a 
crying resident or chuckling over a joke while pulling support stockings 
over someone’s feet. The open-endedness of ethnography offers this 
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much-needed flexibility, making it, in the words of Sarah Franklin and 
Celia Roberts (2006, p. 93), “radically exploratory”. Initially, valuable 
findings took the form of questions, rather than answers.
12. In order to bring more clarity by way of a culturally informed view of 
dementia, I took a position—one also adopted by anthropologists 
Margaret Lock (1993, 2002) and Tsipy Ivry (2010)—that understands 
knowledge about our bodies and minds as a product of history and cul-
ture. When addressing the mythologies of menopause in Japan and 
North America, Lock (1993, p. 370) pithily concluded that the condi-
tion “is neither fact nor universal event but an experience that we must 
interpret in context”. To quote Darin Weinberg (2005, p.  7), “social 
studies of science have shown time and again that scientific discoveries 
are temporally situated social constructions rather than revelations of a 
timeless and uniform natural order”. In this view, care practices stem 
from their “embeddedness” in systems and ideas about health and illness, 
individuality and selfhood that exist in a “productive network” that per-
meates the social body in its entirety (Foucault 1980, p. 243).
13. In the English-speaking world, the tale is primarily known for Robert 
Browning’s poem The Pied Piper of Hamelin (Curren et al. 1942).
14. Perhaps the greatest ironic juxtaposition, however, is that Hamelin is also 
home to Germany’s largest juvenile detention centre, which lies less than 
1 km south of the newly built village. Hamelin’s youth detention centre 
provides accommodation for young people between the ages of 14 and 
24 who are remanded in custody or sentenced to a period of confine-
ment, of which the average length is 1.7 years. Although it didn’t open 
its doors until 1980, Hamelin’s prison history goes back a long way. It 
dates back to the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648), after which Hamelin 
was converted into a large country fortress. As such, it served as a prison 
for the “dangerous subjects of the country”. Throughout the following 
centuries, new buildings were added and the prison was continuously 
expanded. During the Nazi dictatorship, it was used to detain political 
prisons, opponents of the regime and homosexuals (40 of whom were 
violently liquidated in April 1945). In the post-war years, the British 
government briefly used it as a detention centre for war criminals and 
added an execution site. Once returned to the federal state of 
Niedersachsen (in 1950), it was eventually converted into a juvenile 
detention centre. The 150-year- old prison, however, proved entirely 
unsuitable as a juvenile prison, which is why a new building was erected 
in the south of the city (Jugendanstalt Hameln 2015).
T. Haeusermann
161
15. The sections discussing the home’s care philosophy are primarily based 
on extensive interviews with the head of care and manager of the village, 
as well as internal documents and guidelines to which I was given access.
16. To protect her identity and the identities of all other residents and carers 
discussed in this paper, I have observed the convention of changing the 
name and defining characteristics.
17. The vision of full in-patient care in which residents remain self- 
determined inaugurates a thematic dimension of this paper—namely, 
understanding dementia care as a way of managing contradictory and 
complex demands for safety, health and autonomy.
18. When I began my fieldwork, several hundred carers had already sent in 
their applications, some frustrated with the bureaucratic and rigid work 
environments in other establishments, some inspired by the concept’s 
apparent uniqueness, and others displeased with other homes’ prevalent 
tendency to medicate residents.
19. At the time, Tönnies’ assertions and theories contested widely held views 
of German philosophical circles. He challenged the then distinct ten-
dency in late nineteenth century political thought to overly confine itself 
to the “individualism vs. collectivism” debate. Tönnies claimed that 
drawing a clear line between the two concepts was a futile endeavour, as 
both simply embody two separate forms of individualism (Merz-Benz 
1991; Walther 1991).
20. Without a doubt, psychological and sociological literature, alone, is 
replete with examples of discussions of “normality”. To name but two: 
Margaret Lock (2013, p. 42) engages in detail with the biomedical side 
of dementia research and includes a detailed discussion of the relation-
ship between dementia and normal ageing. Drawing on Michel Foucault 
and Auguste Comte’s work, she writes that “until well into the 19th 
century use of the term ‘normal’ was virtually limited to the fields of 
mathematics and physics. It was not until an internalising approach to 
the body based on anatomy took hold that arguments about the rela-
tionship between normal and abnormal biological states were seriously 
debated for the first time”. In Concepts of Normality: The Autistic and 
Typical Spectrum (2008), Wendy Lawson, on the other hand, compel-
lingly outlines theories behind the Western conception that has led to a 
culture that fails to be inclusive.
21. Nevertheless, my research reveals levels of explanation that touch on 
national or cultural idiosyncrasies in the observed care approach. Such 
differences include political-economic variances, contrary ideas of 
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autonomy and family ethics, and contrasting gendered expectations. Yet, 
as George Marcus and Dick Cushman (1982, p. 31) note, traditional 
chapters on “geography, kinship, economics, politics and religion” 
merely suggest the theoretical stance that societies can be synthetically 
divided into such analytical elements.
22. Tönnies wrote his influential work at a time when the German empire 
was striving for national unity, ready to take great leaps forward to 
achieve their lofty goals. In 1878, when the first edition of Gemeinschaft 
und Gesellschaft was published, the German election had been won by 
the Conservatives, while the Liberals and Social Democrats had lost 
many seats. National unity was not achieved as a result of a republican 
movement, as had happened in neighbouring France, or as a compro-
mise between the democratic bourgeoisie with the nobility in England. 
Rather, unity was the result of an imperial alliance of German states 
under the hegemony of the Prussian nobility. Germany was missing the 
embourgeoisement that had taken place in England, the Netherlands 
and America. Seven years before, the young state had won the Franco-
German War and the resulting tribute payments from France boosted 
German industry. Meanwhile, with the onset of industrialisation, emerg-
ing cries for social change began to undermine the once resilient feudal 
order, which spurred on a strong and confident labour movement. These 
new influences found themselves facing the old forces of nobility, the 
Church and the politically weak bourgeoisie. While Tönnies sympathised 
with the labour movement, he did not necessarily see his role in advanc-
ing the processes fuelled by socialist theory. Rather, he wanted to enhance 
the civil structures needed to achieve a democratic-republican civility. It 
was this contract for civility that he attempted to fulfil in his function as 
a social scientist, and he did so by juxtaposing the social philosophy of 
the contemporary German Wilhelmism and the historical school of rela-
tionalism with its roots in seventeenth century natural law. With impe-
rial Germany lacking a sovereign rationality theory, Tönnies sought his 
role models in countries where reflections on civility (Hobbes in England 
and Spinoza in the Netherlands) had prospered more than in his native 
land (Merz-Benz 1991; Walther 1991).
23. They further state, “the task that faces the sociologist of the community 
is to generalize, whilst avoiding normative prescription, from the basis of 
empirical descriptions based on a myriad of theoretical positions which 
vary enormously in their explicitness. The studies themselves are too 
often incomplete descriptions of the locality because the ‘problem’ or the 
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‘theory’ dictated that only certain areas were investigated. This is an 
enormously difficult and challenging task” (1971, p. 252).
24. It must be added that whenever Tönnies addressed the purpose of com-
munal social norms, he tended to employ historically narrow ideologies. 
In his view, the patriarchal form of community is the necessary conse-
quence of evolution and is thus, by implication, the general and most 
natural form of community. In truth, however, this is not a mandatory 
result of the anthropological process but rather plays into the common 
myth of community as a patriarchal system. It may be the uncritical 
acceptance of such historical prejudices that motivated numerous politi-
cal groups after the 1920s to use Tönnies’ work to legitimise their con-
servative ideologies of community (Walther 1991).
25. It also must be noted here that care at a distance, whether physical, geo-
graphical, emotional or technological, need not result in less intensive 
care for patients or residents. In Care at a Distance: On the Closeness of 
Technology, for instance, Jeannette Pols (2012) persuasively demonstrates 
by drawing on ethnographic observations of both carers and patients 
involved in telecare, that there is a rise in the frequency of contact 
between the two.
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They came. Too late. They were angry. […] I was not the only one on this 
unit. They cannot wait on me hand and foot. They left me there just like 
that. And no, I could not get a slice of bread. Breakfast is at 7:30. […] I 
looked upwards, to a dimmed spotlight, to the red light of the camera, and 
to the two sprinklers. Would they spray water in case of fire? Or gas? 
(Froyen 2014, p. 37)
In her diary, Brenda Froyen—who was treated for a postpartum psy-
chosis—describes her experiences in a seclusion cell shortly after being 
admitted to a psychiatric hospital. She compares the practice of solitary 
confinement in seclusion cells with the depersonalizing techniques used 
in concentration camps. This is an implicit reference to Tzvetan Todorov, 
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who described the deprivation of clothing, the reduction of the victims to 
their animal-like basic needs, the loss of names, the large scale and the 
avoidance of direct communication as means to neutralize the call for 
help visible on the face of the other (Froyen 2014, pp. 37–39; Todorov 
1999, pp. 158–177).1
From a care-ethical perspective, however, recognizing and responding 
to this call is vital. Care ethics stresses the fragile aspects of life and focuses 
on the interdependence and relations between the actors, thereby aiming 
to improve the moral integrity within these relationships (Bowden 2000, 
p. 39; Engster 2004, p. 114; Herring 2013, p. 14; Sander-Staudt and 
Hamington 2011, p. IX; Slote 2007, pp. 10–12; Tjong Tjin Tai 2007, 
pp. 15–26). According to Tronto, care is an ongoing process of intercon-
nected phases. The first is to notice that care is necessary, which is to care 
about. Ethically, this requires attentiveness. Second, one must assume 
responsibility for the identified need, and thus take care of. Therefore, 
care requires responsibility. The third phase requires the caregiver to actu-
ally respond to the need, which means he should give care. Ethically, this 
calls for competence. Fourth, an observation of, and a judgement on, the 
response of the object of care is demanded. This is what Tronto calls care- 
receiving, an act for which responsiveness is needed. Recently, Tronto 
added a fifth phase, caring with, which requires consistency between the 
previous phases and the democratic commitments to justice, equality and 
freedom (Edwards 2009, pp. 234 f.; Tronto 1993, pp. 100–126; Tronto 
2013, pp. 22–24).2
From this perspective, depersonalized “care” is thus no care at all. 
According to Froyen, the obscuring nature of institutions and regulations 
distracts nurses from assessing and responding to needs. Therewith, she 
experienced in practice what care ethicists often claim: principles and 
rules of action are not always the right manual for human(e) and caring 
behaviour (Koehn 1998, p. 26; Noddings 1984, pp. 5 f.).
This is where the legal scholar turns up. From a care perspective, his 
hunger for equality, universality, objectivity and positivistic rationality 
has a suspicious undertone.3 Via a rephrased version of Todorov’s deper-
sonalization thesis, this contribution tests whether the current Flemish 
regulation on the use of seclusion cells as a coercive measure is an obstacle 
for care and verifies what could be a supporting role for regulation on 
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solitary confinement. Regulation is interpreted broadly and does not only 
include rules issued by the Flemish (Belgian) government (“external regu-
lation”) but also written rules issued by psychiatric hospitals (“internal 
regulation”). For the internal regulations, we rely on quality manuals of 
Flemish psychiatric hospitals and inspection reports of the Flemish Care 
Inspectorate (Zorginspectie 2015). When preparing this contribution, 
the nine inpatient psychiatric hospitals in the province of Flemish Brabant 
were asked to send their internal regulations on the use of seclusion cells. 
Five hospitals sent sufficient information. This contribution therefore 
does not give a comprehensive overview of all regulation(s), but points 
out some trends.
 Depersonalizing Regulation?
In a first step, I slightly adapt and generalize the above-described charac-
teristics of depersonalization to make it a touchstone for regulation on 
seclusion in inpatient psychiatric hospital care. Seclusion is defined as a 
type of solitary confinement whereby a patient resides in a specially 
designed locked room without his consent (Broeders van Liefde 1995; 
Steinert and Lepping 2009, p. 136; Voskes et al. 2014, p. 766). This con-
tribution starts from the premise that seclusion might be executed in a 
caring way (Van Den Hooff and Goossensen 2013; Verkerk 1999; Voskes 
et al. 2014).4 Care is proposed as the counterpart to depersonalization. 
Thereby, the definition for care in health care as set out in this volume is 
applied: “Care in health care is a set of relational actions that take place 
in an institutional context with the aim to create, maintain, improve or 
restore well-being”.5 Consequently, if one cares about care when using 
seclusion cells, this definition should be met.
 Deprivation of Personal Belongings (“Deprivation 
of Clothing”)
I was wearing a deep blue, shapeless apron on my naked body. (Froyen 
2014, p. 34)
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Clothing and personal belongings are an expression of humanity. In 
the event of seclusion, however, patients must often hand them over for 
safety reasons (Kontio et  al. 2012). In Flanders, Belgium, there are no 
external rules on patients’ rights during seclusion (see Put et al. 2003), 
and the inspection authority rarely looks into the content of hospital pro-
cedures. Consequently, whether clothing and personal belongings have to 
be turned in is up to the psychiatric hospitals themselves. They internally 
regulate the issue in quality manuals. In the five different manuals, four 
provisions can be distinguished: (1) clothing and personal belongings 
must be handed over, (2) they must be handed over, unless there is no risk 
involved, (3) they need not be handed over, unless risk is involved; or (4) 
whether they are handed over is decided in the individual treatment plan.
The perspective of care does not object to safety rules, though it 
opposes the possibly categorical character of these rules, requiring uncon-
ditional obedience in every single case (Tjong Tjin Tai 2007, pp. 258–259). 
Categorical rules should be avoided for at least two reasons: First, they 
gloss over the complexity of care (Koehn 1998, p. 40; Sevenhuijsen 1998, 
p. 115). While in many specific situations, depriving a patient of clothing 
and personal belongings might be desirable or even necessary, it is imag-
inable that in some cases, this might have a counterproductive effect. 
Second, and more importantly, a categorical rule skips the role of nursing 
staff. The road to answering the question how to meet one’s caring respon-
sibilities in the best possible way—and thus to “care”—is closed down by 
categorical rules (Noddings 1984, p.  51, p.  56; Fisher 1995, p.  200). 
Consequently, a quality manual not drawing upon the responsibility and 
engagement of the caregiver is not a caring manual (Voskes et al. 2014, 
p. 771). For care ethics, a manual must offer guidance, but may not over-
rule the responsibility aspect of the patient-caregiver relationship 
(Edwards 2009, p. 234; Tronto 1993, p. 137).
 Alienation (“Reducing the Victims to Their Animal-Like 
Basic Needs”)
I resisted like a threatened animal, a lioness, a beast. That’s the way they 
have treated me.




The content of regulation or a wrongful dealing with it might lead to 
alienation (Jeandarme 2010, p. 149); the patient is not, in the first place, 
perceived as a human being but, for example, as a problem. In the regula-
tions, danger is inherently linked to seclusion (Sabbe and Bervoets 2010, 
p. 197). For example, in the external regulation, there is no specific rule 
on involuntary treatment or involuntary measures in psychiatry (Rotthier 
2012, p. 295). Therefore, open norms not specifically linked to psychia-
try have to be applied. These norms justify seclusion if there is a serious 
risk (when a patient’s life or health is seriously endangered or if there is a 
serious risk for the integrity of third parties) (Veys 2008, pp. 132–138).6 
In Flemish external regulation, risk aversion is the only legally valid goal 
(Omzendbrief 1991). The reason for it is fairly straightforward and well- 
intended: as a consequence of the client-centred concept of autonomy 
underlying the Belgian patients’ rights act, seclusion is one of the most 
far-reaching invasions on the freedom of choice, with a direct influence 
on a person’s privacy and integrity. Therefore, seclusion must be the last 
resort (Veys 2008, p. 137; Omzendbrief 1991).
Care ethicists have often criticized this biomedical concept of auton-
omy for its wrongful overlap with an independently made decision 
(Cardol et al. 2002; Gilligan 1982, p. 71; Noddings 1984, pp. 359–362, 
2002, pp. 109–117). Through this interpretation, care becomes a sign of 
dependency—opposed to autonomy (Tjong Tjin Tai 2007, p. 67; Tronto 
1993, p. 140). This negative concept of autonomy overlooks the essence 
of personhood as defined by relationships and interdependence. For care 
ethics, care is not opposed to autonomy, but leads to it (Janssens et al. 
2004, p. 454; Tjong Tjin Tai 2007, p. 365; Verkerk 1999, 2001). Not 
autonomy itself, but the capacity to attain it must be the focus (Noddings 
2002, p.  110; Slote 2007, p.  62; Tjong Tjin Tai 2007, p.  68). This 
 viewpoint on autonomy is expressed in Driessen’s contribution (Chapter 
“Sociomaterial Will-Work. Aligning Daily Wanting in Dutch Dementia 
Care”) in this volume, where she describes the process of socio-material 
will-work. As Verkerk notes, coercion that aims at restoring autonomy 
might be care. Non-interference does not necessarily respect a patient’s 
autonomy (Herring 2013, p. 174; Verkerk 1999, p. 366; Voskes et al. 
20147). Although a care perspective would come to the same conclusion 
as regulation—seclusion will always go with a certain degree of danger 
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and will be a last resort—it perceives the patient radically different. It is 
not in the first place about risk aversion but about restoring a person’s 
capacity to act autonomously.
As a consequence, care as a set of relational actions—a central aspect of 
the care in health care definition—might be obscured by a regulatory dis-
course based on danger (Fisher 1995, p. 194; Gregory 2010, p. 2276). 
The patient might be reduced to, and objectified via, the danger he causes 
(see, e.g. Desai 2010, p.  89; Du Plessis 2013, p.  426; Fisher 1995, 
p. 200).8 Internally, this is clear in most of the manuals that contain step- 
by- step analyses of the risk for both patients and personnel during seclu-
sion. Although in a manual these aspects are of major importance, the 
care perspective is not about a patient’s dangerousness, but about his 
well-being. The goal of risk aversion is part of this well-being, though 
subordinate to the goal postulated by care ethics: the restoration of the 
self (Koehn 1998, p. 456). Only one manual states that the prior goal is 
restoration, which comprises risk aversion. All other manuals as well as 
inspection reports merely focus on risk and may thereby result in 
alienation.
 Reduction to Procedure (“Loss of Name”)
No, I could not get a piece of bread. Breakfast was at seven thirty. I had had 
nothing to eat for over 18 hours. I was hungry, I was thirsty. (Froyen 2014, 
p. 37)
Procedural rules might detract a caregiver’s attention from the actual 
patient. This is an often heard statement linked to the so-called rising role 
of regulation in the domain of care (Put and Van Assche 2013). Although 
it is not substantiated that the role of regulation in Flanders has increased 
over the past decades (Put and Van Assche 2013), it is worth to cast a 
glance at the procedural burden of seclusion. The registration burden 
imposed by Flemish external regulation is rather low (Janssen et al. 20149; 
Rotthier 2012, pp. 311 f.). Although hospitals must register the duration 
of and reason for seclusion, there is no central register (Sabbe and Bervoets 
2010, p. 198; Omzendbrief 1991).10 From a legal perspective, this implies 
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a low level of protection: the inspection agency is not aware of individual 
cases, nor is there a specific complaints procedure (see Rotthier 2012, 
pp. 342–352, for the general complaint procedures). Internally, manuals 
often require a higher burden for registration, especially during seclusion. 
Every observation must be put down in writing, though one quality man-
ual explicitly warns not to use subjective terms—which care-ethically is 
questionable (Voskes et al. 2014, p. 771).
In addition, external regulation prescribes that the role of the institu-
tion and its nursing staff is to correctly execute the decision to seclude 
made by the physician. In liability law, the physician might be held liable 
for a bad decision on seclusion, the nursing staff for a bad execution of 
this decision (e.g. Swennen 2003, pp. 57 f.; Van Noppen 2013/2014; 
Veys 2005/2006; Omzendbrief 1991).11 This implies a fragmentation of 
the procedure and a division of responsibilities based on liability law. This 
is translated into quality manuals, in which nurses are not allowed to 
decide on the modalities of seclusion. Therefore, especially when a clear 
division of responsibilities is combined with strict manuals prescribing a 
caregiver’s behaviour, care might be reduced to the implementation of 
orders, which is also demonstrated in the contribution of Pei-Yi Liu in 
this volume.
Despite of this fragmentation in external regulation, manuals stress 
that the physician consults other team members prior to making a deci-
sion. This is preferable from the viewpoint of care, as a rupture in the 
phases of care is potentially prevented (Tjong Tjin Tai 2007, p. 326). In 
this context, Tronto incites institutions to develop a rhetorical space 
where conflicts on the interpretation of needs might be discussed (Tronto 
2010, p. 168). For her, dealing with conflicts through dialogue is essen-
tial for caring institutions.
 Normalization of Seclusion (“Large Scale”)
Many psychiatric hospitals apply rules which state that patients who arrive 
at night automatically end up in the seclusion cell. It is some kind of a 
security measure due to the limited number of personnel. That is what hap-
pened to me. (Froyen 2014, p. 121)
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Within a care trajectory, seclusion might seem a necessary step. The 
quality manual of one of the hospitals seems to suggest an automatic 
equation of urgency with danger, which in case of an emergency admis-
sion might lead to a low burden for seclusion. Moreover, the decision on 
urgency is made elsewhere and is possibly not reassessed. Overall, how-
ever, quality manuals suggest the last resort character of the measure 
(Omzendbrief 1991). Despite of this last resort character, seclusion seems 
to be applied quite frequently. Although there is no central record in 
Belgium, when inspection reports call a prevalence of 15% of the admit-
ted patients relatively low, this might give an indication.12
Moreover, Belgium is one of the only countries in the world where 
seclusion in psychiatric care is at the same time combined with other 
coercive measures, for example, fixation (Bowers 2015). It is unclear 
whether and to what degree regulation has an influence on seclusion and 
fixation rates. Nevertheless, there is an ambiguity in Flemish external 
regulation. On the one hand, the technical aspects of seclusion are regu-
lated: the presence of seclusion cells is a criterion for recognition (Rotthier 
2012, p. 308),13 possible coercive measures must be mentioned in the 
hospital rules,14 registration is obligatory (Omzendbrief 1991),15 those 
who are responsible are appointed (Rotthier 2012, p. 312),16 and so on. 
On the other hand, it is not specifically regulated who may be secluded 
(Rotthier 2012, p. 295). Consequently, regulation determines that cells 
must be present, but not in which cases these cells could or should be 
used.
From a care-ethical perspective, the absence of concrete and strict rules 
regulating caregivers’ behaviour may be applauded. Norms create a ratio-
nal and objective framework, wherein care may be reduced to solving “a 
problem” (Noddings 1984, p. 24). There are two arguments, however, for 
why in this case the presence of a clear legal outlook or vision—and thus 
at least a minimum level of regulation specifically on seclusion—is neces-
sary to enhance care. First, as demonstrated above, open and alienating 
norms based on risk dominate the decision nowadays.17 These open 
norms do not only aim at problem-solving actions, they also problema-
tize the patient himself. Open norms, without a clear perspective on the 
patient’s well-being, might make things worse. Second, the absence of a 
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clear perspective on seclusion, combined with the obligatory presence of 
seclusion cells, might lead to “defensive care” (Ankaert 2007, p. 9; Rom 
et al. 2006, p. 163). The psychological impact of liability law on caring 
practice must not be underestimated. Although care is a combination of 
an orientation and an action, liability law focuses on the latter (Tjong 
Tjin Tai 2007, p. 264). Psychiatric hospitals have a duty to protect resi-
dents from harming themselves or others. Jurisprudence accepts that a 
hospital can only commit itself to do everything that can be reasonably 
expected, but cannot be bound to the result (Veys 2005/2006).18 Since, 
in case of involuntary admissions, danger is a requirement for admission, 
judges reasonably expect more.19 Nursing staff—who are often unfamil-
iar with liability law (e.g. Scheepmans et al. 2011, p. 59)—might believe 
that in these cases, seclusion is what judges reasonably expect. An “if 
something happens” train of thought might lower the barrier to turn to 
seclusion (see, e.g. Van der Zwan et al. 2011, p. 125).20
I do not maintain that Belgian judges prefer seclusion. They do not 
have an a priori preference for it, nor do they reject it.21 For judges, the 
criterion is that whatever is chosen has to be well considered. Noddings 
remarks that “when we care, we should, ideally, be able to present reasons 
for our action/inaction which would persuade a reasonable, disinterested 
observer that we have acted on behalf of the cared-for” (Noddings 1984, 
p. 23). The judge as a reasonable, disinterested observer tests whether the 
caregiver has acted as a good housefather. If a hospital aims to reduce 
coercion in a reasonable and well-considered way, judges take this into 
account.22 Seclusion is, moreover, not necessarily a way to limit liability 
(Van Noppen 2013/2014). On the contrary, badly executed seclusion 
might lead to liability as well (Directoraat-generaal Basisgezondheidszorg 
en Crisisbeheer 2007, p. 7).23 Defensive care is thus a wrongful argument 
for seclusion.
What I do assert, however, is that for mostly not-legally educated nurs-
ing staff, the presence of seclusion cells combined with a vague, danger- 
based legal criterion and a falsely perceived liability-sword might lead to 
normalization. Therefore (knowledge of ) a clear regulatory outlook 
would enhance care.
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 Avoidance of Direct Communication (“Avoidance 
of Direct Communication”)
It was dark, except for the red flickering light of the camera. Smile, you’re on 
candid camera. (Froyen 2014, p. 122)
Over the last decades, surveillance technologies have found acceptance 
in care, even to the extent that all quality manuals refer to the use of 
visual and audio surveillance technologies. Externally, the use of these 
technologies in seclusion cells is not regulated—one could even ask one-
self whether their usage does not go against general privacy laws. For the 
inspection organ, their presence is neither required nor advised against. 
In the risk-based regulatory framework, the use of surveillance technol-
ogy is justified for reasons of safety (interestingly, the issue of privacy is 
not even raised) (Desai 2010; Stolovy et al. 2015, p. 276). Empirical lit-
erature, however, warns of the danger related to applying surveillance 
technology in a discourse of risk and safety, since technology might shift 
the already fragile balance between care and safety in inpatient psychiat-
ric care (Desai 2010, p. 89) and lead to a Foucaultian surveillance climate 
(Du Plessis 2013, p. 430; Holmes 2001). Moreover, cameras might rein-
force the previously mentioned alienating effects by creating a culture of 
fear (Jacob and Holmes 2011, p. 110).
However, inspection reports state very clearly that these technologies 
cannot function as a substitute for direct communication between the 
patient and the caregiver. Direct observation and communication remain 
essential. Nonetheless, for inspection, the reason for that is, again, safety, 
as cameras do not register everything. Consequently, again, not the 
patient, but danger and safety is focused upon.
Direct communication is not necessarily ruled out by the presence of 
surveillance technology. All quality manuals state that caregivers should 
regularly—the minimum intervals are internally regulated—visit the 
patient. On this point, external regulation requires intensified supervi-
sion.24 Three manuals consider visual and verbal contact to be supportive 
of the caregiver’s surveillance task. The two other manuals see communi-
cation as a way to contribute to the well-being of the patient. One of the 




 Towards a Supporting Role for Regulation
In the analysis above, I introduced care via a back door: when testing 
regulation on possibly depersonalizing effects, care—as opposed to deper-
sonalization—automatically pops up. However—except for categorical 
manuals and top down internal regulation—most of the depersonalizing 
effects are not due to regulation itself, but due to a type of institutional 
care where regulation wrongfully takes the first place. In this part, I aim 
to reconcile care and regulation, first by pointing at how—from a care 
perspective—regulation might create obstacles for care and second, by 
elaborating on how these obstacles might be overcome.
 Depersonalization Versus Care
As demonstrated, there are a number of depersonalizing aspects stem-
ming from regulation that should worry a caregiver. With this, I do not 
want to assert that regulation is intentionally drafted to generate deper-
sonalizing effects. I do not want to claim either that seclusion leads to 
depersonalization in the sense that caregivers necessarily act in an inhu-
mane way. What I do maintain, however, is that (wrongfully dealing 
with) certain aspects of regulation might unintentionally obscure care 
and that this might at least give the patient a feeling of being depersonal-
ized (see, e.g. Meehan et al. 2004).
The possibly depersonalizing effect of regulation stands out against the 
background of Tronto’s phased practice of care (Tronto 1993, 
pp.  100–126). First, care requires noticing the need to care [Caring 
About]. Regulation might distract caregivers from this need. A focus on 
danger—the patient must be undressed, observed and guarded—implies 
deviating from the reason for a patient’s presence in the hospital, restor-
ing the self. Legally, the moral element of attentiveness (needs) is reduced 
to alertness (danger) (Bowden 1997, pp. 113–114; Jacob and Holmes 
2011; Tronto 1993, pp.  134–135). Second, caregivers must assume 
responsibility for the needs they have noticed [Taking Care Of ]. If a 
caregiver believes there is nothing to do about it, the patient is not taken 
care of. Regulation might arouse the feeling that seclusion is the only pos-
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sible option, for example, because of categorical quality manuals, the dis-
tance between the caregiver and the patient or a fear for liability. Legally, 
the moral element of responsibility is reduced to the obligation to control 
the damage.
Third, the caregiver must actually respond to the need [Care-giving]. 
Even if a caregiver cares about and takes care of a patient, the risk of not 
being able to meet a patient’s needs is inherent. For example, a nurse 
might see a patient’s needs and might feel responsible for them, but in the 
end, he has to implement a physician’s decisions or has to follow strict 
quality manuals (Tronto 1993, p.  109). Moral competence is then 
reduced to legal incompetence. Fourth, care requires an observation of, 
and a judgement on, the response of the object of care [Care-receiving]. 
As regulation might obscure the prior phases, adequate responsiveness is 
under pressure, since the vulnerability of the patient is looked at from the 
perspective of danger rather than well-being. The actual needs of the 
patient are obscured in the first place. Moral responsiveness is turned into 
legal insusceptibility.
 Immanent Care, Transcendent Regulation
Despite the risk that concepts such as danger and liability might over-
shadow care, no single care ethicist claims we should get rid of regulation. 
Even Noddings states that regulation is not bad, as long as it does not 
oblige caregivers to prematurely switch to a “rational-objective mode” 
(Noddings 1984, p. 26). Recently, Tronto added the requirement that 
“needs and the way they are met are consistent with democratic commit-
ments to justice, equality, and freedom for all”, as a fifth phase of care 
[Caring With] (Tronto 1993, p. 171, 2013, p. 23). This is not only a clear 
message for caregivers to act in line with democratic commitments but 
also for democracy—and thus regulation—to be “caring”. How, then, 
should the relationship between regulation and care be perceived in the 
case of seclusion?
In his doctoral thesis, I believe Tjong Tjin Tai gives a clue when he 
demonstrates that acting out of disposition and acting out of duty are not 
opposing, but alternating viewpoints at two different moments in time: 
duty is what comes afterwards, at the level of justification, but has no 
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influence on the prior disposition for care itself (Tjong Tjin Tai 2007, 
p. 249). I maintain that the same is true for regulation: while regulation is 
(and should be) omnipresent in the domain of care, it should be invisible 
during the act of caring itself (Koehn 1998, pp. 6–7; Noddings 1984, 
p.  26; Robertson and Walter 2007, p.  210). Where care is immanent, 
regulation should be transcendent. Therewith I do not mean to say that 
caregivers should be unconscious of regulation: caregivers should certainly 
be aware of, and capable of dealing with, the regulatory framework (in 
advance). The act of caring itself, however, must not be subject to constant 
regulatory concern. This involves an appeal to both regulation and care.
 An Appeal to Regulation
There should be a smooth overlap between the way care is provided and 
the regulation dealing with it, as implied by Tronto’s caring democracy. 
This viewpoint has clear implications for the content and form of the 
regulatory framework on seclusion. Thereby, the functions of regulation 
serve as a stepping stone.25
First, regulation coordinates human behaviour [regulatory function], 
including in the domain of care. In the event of seclusion, this function 
is nowadays translated into quality manuals. Coordination, however, is 
not necessarily the same as determination. As demonstrated in Section 
“Deprivation of Personal Belongings (“Deprivation of Clothing”)”and 
Section “Avoidance of Direct Communication (“Avoidance of Direct 
Communication”)”, manuals can be drafted in a categorical way—pass-
ing over the caring disposition and thus turning care into a problem- 
solving action—or in an open way, pointing at what should minimally be 
done, but leaving room for more (Noddings 1984, p. 55; Voskes et al. 
2014). For good care, these quality manuals are nothing more than help-
ful guidelines—good practices—that do not stand in the way of a caring 
disposition and that in exceptional circumstances could be set aside or at 
least be discussed (see Section “Reduction to Procedure (“Loss of 
Name”)”) (Tjong Tjin Tai 2007, p. 259; Voskes et al. 2014).
Second, regulation provides for legal guarantees and legal protection 
[protective function]. For the moment, external regulation offers little or 
no protection to secluded patients: the legal position of psychiatric 
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patients is not regulated. Even though they may draw certain rights from 
general norms—for example, general privacy rights—it is difficult to 
challenge a seclusion. Consequently, from a regulative perspective, seclu-
sion is not over-, but rather under-regulated. A care perspective would 
not oppose more protective regulation, as long as this does not lead to an 
excessive procedural burden. In fact, care as a practice stemming from a 
caring disposition should not even notice the existence of a protection 
system. As long as there is a caring disposition and care is provided 
according to the five phases, the protective function of regulation stays in 
the background. Once care as a relational and dialogical type of protec-
tion goes awry, regulatory protection is brought into the open (Koehn 
1998, p. 40).
Third, regulation resolves conflicts [dispute solving function]. Under 
Section “Normalization of Seclusion (“Large Scale”)”, we have already 
demonstrated that a sole focus on this function might lead to distortions 
and even more seclusion. Nevertheless, in parallel with the protective 
function, conflict resolution should be invisible and superfluous for care. 
Within (the five phases of ) care, disputes are dealt with dialogically and 
outside of the regulatory framework. Tronto’s rhetorical space in institu-
tional care is a textbook example (Tronto 2010, p. 168). Besides, the shift 
towards alternative dispute resolution in law might contribute to the 
preservation and restoration of a caring relationship (Sevenhuijsen 1998, 
p. 116; Tronto 2010, pp. 166–169). Only when there is a rupture in care 
itself and care is, as a consequence, out of reach, classical regulatory dis-
pute resolution turns up (Koehn 1998, p. 40, pp. 51–52).
Fourth, regulation expresses cultural meaning and societal values [sym-
bolic function] and consequently enters into Tronto’s caring democracy, 
where justice is reframed as caring with for the common good (Tronto 
2013, p. 182). The protective values currently underlying the regulation 
on seclusion—autonomy, integrity and safety—should be subordinate to 
and assessed from the perspective of care as a central value in a democracy 
or a democratic institution (Koehn 1998, pp. 34–35; Sevenhuijsen 1998, 
p. 110–113; Slote 2007, pp. 94–96; Tronto 2013, p. 159, p. 164). The 
current rupture between danger and autonomy obscures the perspective of 
care (see Section “Normalization of Seclusion (“Large Scale”)”).26 It would 
be better to explicitly regulate seclusion, whereby its role as a protective 
measure should be exceeded and turned into the goal of restoring the self 
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in a context of interdependency. Legally, this implies that seclusion should 
be categorized and regulated as “forced treatment”, rather than as a “safety 
measure”. This requires a turnover of the concept of autonomy.
 An Appeal to Care
On the side of care, caregivers should not be overwhelmed or blinded by 
regulation. Many potentially depersonalizing consequences of regula-
tion—the concepts of danger and protection, the fragmentation of 
responsibility, the level of abstraction, the stress on actions rather than 
dispositions and so on—cannot be shove aside. These aspects may, how-
ever, not paralyse care. Depersonalization is not a feature of regulation, 
but a feature of an institutional care setting where regulation wrongfully 
takes the first place. Although not all aspects of regulation are supportive 
of care, even in its present form, regulation is mostly not opposite to care. 
On the contrary, some quality manuals even support and fuel a care- 
ethical reflection. Moreover, regulation might have a supportive function 
for care, for example, via the creation of a forum for interpersonal  dialogue 
or via a turnover of the safety perception in psychiatric care (De Benedictis 
et al. 2011).
 Conclusion
Through the concept of depersonalization, this contribution has demon-
strated that regulation might be an obstacle to care for secluded patients. 
Especially when rules are categorical or have a vague outlook, are frag-
mentizing or aimed at problems rather than persons, care might be 
endangered. However, we should not abolish all regulation or perceive it 
all sceptically. Nor should we turn care ethics into rules, since the disposi-
tion for care can, essentially, not be regulated.
This contribution maintains that, in the domain of seclusion, regula-
tion and care can fruitfully co-exist if, on the regulatory side, the func-
tions of the regulation are tailored to the needs of care and, on the side of 
care, regulation is not wrongfully perceived as the benchmark. For seclu-
sion in Flanders, Belgium, this requires a mental shift in attitudes towards 
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care. Regulation is not at the centre, but at the outskirts of care. At these 
edges, regulation aims to (1) support—not obstruct—care via references 
to good practices. There, the role of an open, dialogical and well-thought- 
out internal regulation is essential. Furthermore, regulation aims to (2) 
intervene when care goes awry. Even today, in most cases, care should not 
worry about regulation: the legal requirement of risk aversion, for exam-
ple, does not contradict the caring requirement to restore the self.
The possibly depersonalizing effects of regulation on seclusion are 
unfolded in the way care and regulation deal with one another, not in regu-
lation as such. Nonetheless, rethinking regulation, especially at the external 
level, would be supportive to care. In a regulatory framework that cares 
about care, seclusion should be turned into a well-regulated type of forced 
treatment—rather than a protective measure—with an outlook towards 
more autonomy and a clear—though not overburdening—protective 
framework, by which conflicts can be resolved when things go awry. This 
type of regulation would not be an obstacle but an added value for care.
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3 (2013–14)189; contra Rb. Tongeren 15 September 2004, Limb. Rechtsl. 
2004, 283.
19. See case law: Antwerp 11 October 2005, Limburgs Rechtsleven 3 (2006) 
179.
20. Also see Haeusermann (Chapter “The Dementia Village—Between 
Community and Society”) in this volume.
21. For case law, see Vred. Eeklo 12 January 1995, Tijdschrift voor Gentse 
rechtspraak (1995) 171–172; Antwerp 19 January 1998, Tijdschrift voor 
Gezondheidsrecht (1998–99) 312; See parallel for fixation Corr. Bruges 2 
May 2005, Tijdschrift voor Gezondheidsrecht 3 (2007–08) 228 and case-
law note Veys (2007–08), pp. 224–225.
22. For case law, see Antwerp 6 November 2003, Tijdschrift voor 
Gezondheidsrecht (2003–04) 40; Antwerp 11 October 2005, Limburgs 
Rechtsleven 3 (2006) 179.
23. For example in case law on fixation: Ghent 10 September 1997, 
Tijdschrift voor Gezondheidsrecht (1999–00) 130–131.
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24. Art. 5, §2 RO 8 July 1991.
25. The four functions of regulation are derived from Claes et  al. 2009, 
pp. 5–11.
26. See a similar debate in the Netherlands in, for example, Arends and 
Frederiks 2006.
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Witnessing as an Embodied Practice 
in German Midwifery Care
Annekatrin Skeide
 Introduction: Witnessing in Midwifery Care
The first birth I saw was a homebirth. At the time I was interested in 
becoming a midwife and I accompanied two midwives in order to get an 
idea of their work. They were living in my neighbouring village in the 
south of France and had been attending homebirths for over twenty 
years. It was a dark and silent night. When I arrived, the mother-to-
be—I will call her Lisa—lay on her bed in white sheets. The midwife 
Hélène sat cross-legged at the front-side of the bed. She appeared to be 
relaxed and highly concentrated at the same time. Hélène smiled slightly 
when I arrived, but barely took her eyes off Lisa. Lisa did not seem to 
notice me at all. She was lying on her side breathing heavily. I remember 
her wearing a white t-shirt. Her body seemed to dissolve in the white 
sheets, while her naked arms and legs seemed to function apart from her. 
Every time she had a contraction, she clutched the metallic bedframe 
with her strong, muscular hands and the whole bed was shaken by the 
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enormous tension of her muscles. She seemed to be in great pain: at the 
height of a contraction she screamed deeply and desperately. Meanwhile, 
Hélène remained silent and immovable. Her calm comforted and irri-
tated me at the same time. How could she leave Lisa suffering without 
doing anything beneath murmuring now and then that Lisa was doing 
very well? It seemed to be endless and circular: silence, a throaty groan-
ing swelling to a scream accompanied by metallic rattling and silence 
again. Then all of a sudden the midwife moved forward to take a look 
between Lisa’s legs. She stayed next to Lisa, telling her to breathe shortly. 
Holding my breath, I noticed the baby’s head appearing slowly. His slick 
and bluish body followed easily. Lisa took her child and lay down—she 
seemed exhausted but suddenly very present and relieved. I was over-
whelmed: still shocked by the force of Lisa’s contractions which had 
seemed to be torturous but amazed by this unbelievable miracle I just 
had been part of.
Hélène was witnessing Lisa’s birth: Highly attentive, she was sitting an 
arm’s length away from Lisa who was absorbed by the enormous effort 
and pain of giving birth to her child. Hélène knew that everything went 
fine. Lisa found her own strategies of handling the birthing pain and by 
doing so she enacted Hélène as a witness.
In the situation described, witnessing compromises embodied1 inter-
relatedness in a particular environment. The witnesses presence has to be 
characterized as an intervention: an activity which shapes and constitutes 
what happens but which is shaped and constituted by what is happening 
as well.
In order to elucidate why and how I use witnessing as a concept I am 
going to introduce juridical, religious and philosophical reflections on 
witnessing and connect them to midwifery practices.
In a second step, I will elaborate on witnessing in midwifery care 
with the help of my empirical findings. Firstly, I am going to introduce 
and confound two widespread stereotypes in midwifery care: the knit-
ting midwife and the head-led woman in labour. In doing so I would 
like to demonstrate that witnessing signifies ‘being-with’ and relates to 
mutual obligations; I also point out the limits of witnessing. Secondly, 
I develop the interpretative aspect of witnessing and displaying possible 
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 consequences. Thirdly, eye-witnessing will be revealed as a practice and 
a state. Fourthly, I am going to introduce touch as another sensual mode 
of witnessing in midwifery care. Fifthly, I define and illustrate trustful 
witnessing. Finally, I explain how CTGs perform technological testify-
ing. I shall reveal the limits of witnessing throughout the text. I am 
going to present these aspects separately for analytical purposes. 
Nevertheless, it hopefully becomes evident that these witnessing states 
and techniques are intertwined.
 Juridical, Religious, Philosophical 
and Sociological Facets of Witnessing Applied 
to Midwifery Care
At first view, witnessing seems to be inseparable from the legal sphere: The 
witness is the third person (Lat. terstis = the third) who assisted (Derrida 
2005, p. 23). A witness is called to court in order to testify. In the legal 
context, the witness seems to be indispensable, because he or she is sup-
posed to be the one who actually participated in the situation he or she is 
expected to bear witness about without being involved. He or she is the 
one who knows (old Engl. witnes = knowledge, understanding) without 
being the one who did it. In the quest to find just judgement, clear evi-
dence furnished by a neutral and objective observer is required. But it is 
also obvious that the witness cannot tell the truth because he or she is not 
independent, but influenced (and even transformed) by what happened, 
by his or her feelings and also by those assigning him or her the role of 
being a witness and testifying (Krämer 2011, pp. 122–125; Schmidt 2011, 
pp. 48 f.). Witnesses can but re-interpret situations they are involved in 
and so they have to be trusted. Witnessing constitutes sense and orienta-
tion (Krämer 2011, p. 128; Schmidt 2011, pp. 47–66). For being trusted 
the witness has to be self-conscious and responsible. Eye-witnessing is 
meant to furnish strong evidence not only in juridical but also in historic 
or religious contexts. The sense of sight is also of particular importance in 
certain philosophical traditions (Onfray 1992, pp. 34 f.). In rationalism, 
language is a fundamental medium of reason. However, Jewish and 
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Christian martyrs (Grk. martys = witness) testify divine truth not only 
through words but also through action which has to be seen (Drews and 
Schlie 2011, pp. 7–21).
The multidisciplinary approach to witnessing shows its epistemologi-
cal ambiguity: a witness is supposed to be the third, the neutral, the 
observing. But being the third does not mean not being involved and 
related. Being neutral does not mean not feeling or not experiencing or 
not reflecting and not acting. Being the observer does not mean only 
being made up of an eyed brain.2 Because it is situated and embodied 
witnessing involves trust.
The integrative active part of participating cannot be separated from 
the seeing and observing presence in midwifery care. Even if the midwife 
seems to do nothing else than observing, she actually is intervening and 
interpreting. As witnessing is inter-relational, the midwife is enacted as a 
witness too. Eye-witnessing in midwifery care has a distant and alienating 
potential, because it might stem from or lead to women’s bodily expo-
sure. Women feel a separation with regard to their body then. Midwives 
witness and testify3 birth which can be perceived and influenced by mid-
wives but ‘happens to’ childbearing women and regarding which mid-
wives have a certain professional knowledge and experience which the 
childbearing woman generally does not have. The childbearing woman 
for her part disposes of (medical, social, corporeal etc.) knowledge and 
experience, too. The witnessing role is socially and politically assigned to 
the midwife.4 This assignment is constantly renewed in interaction with 
women and families but also with colleagues, surroundings, and things. 
It is performative: Witnessing is established and maintained in and by 
acting. Legally speaking, midwives testify by doing paper work and docu-
menting what they saw and did.
Trust is conditional in the relationship between midwives and women. 
The midwife is usually met as a trustworthy person in regard to her com-
petences, her confidentiality and her good intentions. Trust is not only 
anticipated by mothers-to-be but also established or reinforced in reac-
tion to the required intimate exposure of themselves, especially during 
birth.
Midwives are using technical aids such as the cardiotocograph (CTG) 
in order to produce testimonials. Technological testimonies function as 
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providers of the objective and neutral evidence, the higher truth that the 
witness fails to provide. The CTG is enacted as the ideal witness, as a 
producer of a category of knowledge which is not partial and subjective, 
embedded in embodied presence, but which is total, neutral and objec-
tive. The ambiguity of witnessing becomes quite obvious when midwives 
use the CTG as a competitor, a colleague or a superior.
 Empirical Findings
I conducted one year of ethnographical fieldwork in two midwife-led 
birthplaces, one obstetrical ward in a mid-sized hospital and in numerous 
families’ homes in Northern and Eastern Germany.5 As I introduced 
myself as a midwife I was quite frequently asked for my opinion about 
how to proceed in certain situations by the midwives6 and often included 
in conversations between midwives and women.7 Sometimes I could lend 
a hand, too. Usually, I made quick notes during the rare pauses, which I 
elaborated after having left the field site. Furthermore, I conducted about 
twenty guided interviews with women and midwives. I conducted field-
work and data analysis parallel using theoretical sampling and conceptu-
alized the data by coding and memo writing as proposed by grounded 
theorists (Glaser and Strauss 1971; Strauss 1987).
 Witnessing as a Contractual Being-With
The role the midwife played during Lisa’s birth actually illustrates the 
topos of the knitting midwife8 which seems to do nothing apart from 
sitting and knitting. Actually, this is not the case. The knitting mid-
wife is the sage-femme.9 She does little because she knows a lot. She 
knits to occupy her skilful hands. Nevertheless, she sees, hears, feels 
and speaks. She could interrupt the knitting at any time in order to 
intervene actively if it would become necessary. Deciding if and when 
this necessity appears is crucial. The knitting midwife is “active-pas-
sive”. Hélène attended Lisa’s birth at Lisa’s home. The domestic setting 
relieves midwives from pressures initiated by institutional settings 
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such as  attending several women at once, working in shifts, following 
clinical guidelines, being subordinated to doctors and therefore being 
obligated to report and follow instructions. Being a guest, Hélène 
depends on Lisa’s permission and guidance when moving around or 
using anything. Lisa is all by herself, not tasking the midwife to inter-
vene, to validate or interpret her bodily functions. Hélène’s knitting 
midwife’s role is situated in a specific configuration, which yields the 
knitting midwife.
Midwife Anna describes a stereotype which I have been socialized with 
when becoming a midwife and which I met again frequently during my 
fieldwork: the head-led woman in labour. The head-led woman is not 
able to “let her body guide her” as midwives advise. In consequence, her 
birth has to be medically assisted. I would like to show that these situa-
tions rather lie on relational aspects: The configuration of midwife and 
woman in labour has contractual implications.
Anna, a young self-employed midwife, told me about Katharina, who, 
as Anna told me, had been quite exhausting to attend to during her 
homebirth. Katharina had the impression that Anna called her “every five 
minutes” during the night, even though she had only had light contrac-
tions. When Anna finally got there she had been quite annoyed because 
Katharina “had only been at two centimetres”.10 Katharina stared at Anna 
continuously and expectantly. Anna said that Katharina “had not been in 
possession of herself [nicht bei sich war]”. Instead Katharina had figura-
tively tried to “crawl into [hineinkriechen]” Anna. Anna felt like Katharina 
“wanted to get it done” by her, the midwife. Katharina for her part needed 
even more than the midwife’s interpretative support. She appealed to her 
midwife to manage the pain at her place and share it with her corporeally, 
what Anna described as “crawl into me”. In this situation, witnessing had 
not been possible anymore.
Apparently expectations and appeals towards the midwife’s participa-
tion differ in dependence on the woman’s experience of her body-in- 
labour (Akrich and Pasveer 2004, p.  65).11 Katharina had been 
overwhelmed by her labours. She desperately appealed to the midwife 
to define what was happening to her in order to make it understandable 
and even to handle her body-in-labour in her place. The alienation 
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Katharina feels towards her body-in-labour cannot be mitigated by 
midwife Anna, because Anna is neither able to remove it nor to handle 
it in her place.
Midwife and childbearing woman are situated in a kind of contract: 
The woman in labour cannot escape from her body. She has to fulfil her 
role and assume the birthing process in order to allow the midwife to 
fulfil her professional role for her part.
In what follows, I would like to show that corporeal insecurity women 
perceive during pregnancy and birth can also be reassured by midwives. 
If midwives concede a scope of action to women and if women are actu-
ally able to make use of it, they might handle what they perceive as their 
dys-appearing body (Leder 1990).
 Witnessing as a Reassuring Being-With
Most women undergo a feeling of uncertainty during pregnancy, birth 
and the postpartum stage, even if it is not the first time they are experi-
encing it. One main aim of the attendance by a midwife is to reassure the 
woman by “normalizing” her experiences. The feminine body is subject to 
significant changes. The usually absent body can become a dys-appearing 
body: it manifests itself as a difficult or disharmonious body. A problem-
atic interpretation could be that life phases in which this usually happens 
are identified as being dysfunctional or alienating themselves (Leder 
1990).
Eli had an appointment with the midwife in the early morning. She 
arrived crimson red and snorting, obviously suffering from her enor-
mously big womb. The expected delivery date had been three days ago. 
“I’m in such a bad mood”. Eli sat down straddle-legged, face-to-face to 
the midwife who looked at her attentively. Eli had given several false 
alarms because she had thought the baby would come. “I can’t sleep, I 
have cramps and my back hurts. I have been ill for nine months. It has to 
come now”. The midwife says that she understands her and then asks 
when Eli wants her child to come. “Tomorrow”. she answers. “What 
time?” “In the morning”. This would be doable with her schedule, too, 
the midwife says and Eli leaves apparently relieved.
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The midwife acknowledges Eli’s pain and legitimizes her anger by not 
refuting it or trying to calm her. Instead she establishes a scope of action 
or at least a scope of decision: Eli who had suffered from her dys- appearing 
body throughout the whole pregnancy is now taking the decision to give 
birth to her child.
Similarly, Melanie asks her midwife if it would be normal that she was 
having headaches very frequently since she became pregnant. Instead of 
answering her question the midwife asks her what helped her when she 
had these headaches. “Lemon oil”. she answers. “Well, it’s great that you 
found something which helps you”. Actually, Melanie had already 
adopted a strategy to get along with her headaches. Nevertheless, she felt 
insecure and needed support. The midwife normalized Melanie’s discom-
fort by evaluating her strategy.
Frequently, midwives attribute a scope of action to women during 
birth by encouraging them: “You’re doing well!”; “Yes, keep pushing. 
Your feeling is completely right”. Or by helping them to understand and 
interpret their body-in-labour and their emotional state: “You’re feeling 
tired, huh? You would like to go home, huh? That’s normal at this point. 
Your cervix is surely fully dilated now”. External interpretation does not 
necessarily create alienation, but joins or integrates corporeal dys- 
appearances. In order to make this work women have to cooperate with 
their dys-appearing body and to use their scope of action.
 Eye-Witnessing as an Alienating Being-With
I have described witnessing as an inter-relational practice which is situ-
ated in specific midwife-woman-body-setting-thing-time configurations. 
Witnessing is being-with, an active passiveness, an intervention which is 
associated with acknowledging a scope of action to women during preg-
nancy and birth. Witnessing is associated with fulfilling certain role obli-
gations. In what follows, I would like to show a different configuration in 
a clinical setting in which witnessing was experienced as alienating.
Samia, who had had a lengthy birth in hospital, had been attended by 
several midwives and she went through all the shifts she explained. Samia 
told me, she felt “unsheathed [blankgezogen]” during birth and that she 
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“really had to do circus there”. In the end, this would have been “the only 
way to make it work”. Samia had handed over responsibility: She said her 
head had been turned off. She simply did what she had been told know-
ing she was in good hands. “And at the end comes the child”. Samia had 
neither decided who had taken care of her during her birth nor what 
should have been done. She describes her birth experience through a dis-
tanced perspective, qualifying herself as being at the mercy of the event. 
Birth is the unforeseeable spectacle12 she had been involved in. In order 
to succeed in “giving birth to a healthy child” Samia had to cooperate and 
to expose herself. Samia had witnessed herself having been “handed off 
[weitergereicht]” and having done what she was told.
I would like to describe Samia’s perception of having been unsheathed 
as a state of existential nakedness (Janz 2011, p. 465)13: Samia felt ashamed 
because she was corporeally and existentially naked and was neither able 
to cover herself nor escape from herself.14 Being existentially naked means 
being aware of oneself while being in a kind of oblivion of oneself (Janz 
2011, p. 465).15 This alienating experience could be described in terms of 
eye-witnessing. Eye-witnessing as an analytic term stresses the existential 
nakedness interpreted in the sense of hierarchy and power differences. 
Being eye-witnessed signifies being exposed to someone else’s and to one’s 
own observation at the same time. So eye-witnessing describes a double 
witnessing.
Samia obviously doubted her “scope of action”, her own involvement 
in giving birth. She told the midwife that she, the midwife, would have 
been the one who had given birth to her child. “No, it has been only you”, 
the midwife reassured her and Samia seemed to be very happy about it. 
The midwife seemed to really mean it, Samia told me: “I could see it in her 
eyes”. Interestingly, the “cold” eyes she had been exposed to transmitted 
trustworthiness as well. This multiple and paradoxical potential of wit-
nessing is one of its characteristic features: Samia had seen herself being 
exposed to the clinical management of her body-in-labour. She had been 
alienated to a degree that made her doubt her proper participation in giv-
ing birth to her child. The midwife is responding to Samia’s need with the 
same eyes—not cold anymore, but warm and friendly—which unsheathed 
Samia during birth. In order to reconnect with her exposure Samia charges 
the midwife to re-establish her scope of action for her.
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Apart from seeing and speaking, touching is a significant technique in 
witnessing in midwifery practice. Of course, touching is not only witness-
ing, but also doing something practical. As I mentioned before: putting 
hands on is an active intervention. Anyhow, in certain situations touch-
ing can be understood as an active production of testimonials. These tes-
timonials differ depending on how, where and why they are performed.
 Touching as a Witnessing Strategy
The core element of what is called the midwifery craftwork or the mid-
wifery art is body work. Body work is leading from bodies and directed 
at bodies (Twigg 2006; Twigg et al. 2011). Body work includes profes-
sional competences such as observation, developing and using tacit 
knowledge and performed knowledge (Hirschauer 2008) and applying 
certain—for instance, labour- and birth-facilitating—postures, gestures 
or procedures. Several important examinations for surveying the growth 
and the condition of the child or the condition of the mother are per-
formed with the help of intimate touches. These touches can be realized 
in more or less caring manners and are not purely instrumental per se. 
Touch can be imposed: “I have to examine you”, or it can be proposed: 
“Do you want me to examine you?”; “Should we have a look at how it 
went?”. Touch can be a medium of creating a contact between mother, 
midwife and the unborn child: Midwife while touching the mother’s 
womb: “Hello child, how are you? Oh, you are awake?” and to the 
mother: “For how long has he been awake this morning?” or it can hap-
pen silently, routinely, en passant. In any case, these touches intentionally 
lead to a diagnostic or therapeutic result. They are testifying the position 
of the foetus, its existence even. In doing so, they are creating medically 
and legally relevant testimonials. But they create social and cultural testi-
monial as well. The midwife testifies certain traits (liveliness, laziness), 
gender (shy girl, strong boy) or the mother-child-relationship (“Where 
do you feel the baby kick?”) as well. Touching is always a strong interven-
tion and it depends on its qualities and aims if it creates or intensifies 
alienation directed to the touched body or if it intensifies or re-establishes 
the association of body and self (Akrich and Pasveer 2004, p.  64). If 
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touch supports association processes, it is to be performed within the 
woman’s scope of action: the woman is explicitly and honestly agreeing to 
be touched or she is asking for the touch herself, but also the midwife’s 
scope of action: time and a trustful, continual relationship permit a par-
ticipative and perceptive presence.
When I arrived at the birthplace late in the evening, Jasmin was taking 
a bath. The midwife and a friend were sitting next to her. It was very 
warm and sticky in the small and sparely lit bathroom. Jasmin laughed 
and talked a lot until contractions became heavier. The midwife praised 
Jasmin after each contraction: “Great! You are doing great!” She proposed 
that Jasmin change position when she said she felt a “pressing pain”. 
Jasmin was kneeling and saying that the contraction she was having 
would not end. Via the Doppler foetal monitor the midwife used, we 
could hear the heartbeat of the child beating slower and slower. 
Impressively calm, the midwife administered Jasmin with medication, 
ceasing the contraction. The child’s heart regained its rhythm. Jasmin was 
unrecognizable: distracted and carried away. She turned to her midwife: 
“I was afraid just now. Could you caress me? Could you breathe with 
me?” The midwife sat next to her and Jasmin fell into her arms.
As well as Samia and Katharina, Jasmin felt alienated and even threat-
ened by her body-in-labour. She asked the midwife to caress with her and 
breathe with her so that she could “re-corporate”. Witnessing as a percep-
tive and participatory presence can also be carried out by touch. This 
presence transmitted by touch can be a source of (re-)association of body 
and self. Touch as an intimate intervention is associated with trust. When 
being touched by midwives, women have to trust that midwives know 
what they are doing and that their touches are skilful and respectful.
 Trust as a Strategy of Being Witnessed
“Trust” or even “basic trust” seems to be a leitmotif, a grounding feature 
of the relationship between pregnant and childbearing women and mid-
wives. Firstly, midwives seem to have a kind of credit of trust. During my 
participant observation I always experienced that at the very moment I 
told women and families that I am a midwife, they open their doors for 
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me even though I am a stranger. When we had seen each other several 
times, they sometimes asked me what my research will be about, even 
though I had told them when we met first. What I was actually doing 
seemed less important than the fact that I am a midwife. A midwife’s 
presence nearby a pregnant or childbearing woman seems to be self- 
evident. Secondly, trust is intensified in bodily interaction and in relation 
to the degree of intimacy. Thirdly, trust is a strategy to handle potentially 
shaming and even molesting situations.16
Helma had been attended by the same midwife during both of her 
pregnancies, births and postpartum stages. She told me about the “basic 
trust” she would have for her midwife and the midwife would have for 
her. So I asked her what the midwife did that lets her, Helma, be this 
confident. Apparently it is more important what Helma herself does in 
order to establish and maintain a trustful relationship: “I open up com-
pletely. But I didn’t have any problems with it from the beginning on. 
You lay down and you are examined [vaginally]. Somehow this is the 
most normal thing in the world. And that, I think, is so nice”.
Helma describes trust and her capacity to abandonment relating to the 
midwife in the context of intimate physical interventions. Being exam-
ined vaginally out of an explicitly sexual context in agreement with all 
interactors is just not “the most normal thing in the world”. It seems to 
be the intimate intervention which “opens up Helma completely”. Helma 
legitimizes the vaginal examination by trusting and by perceiving it as 
being “the most normal thing in the world”. Samia described it very simi-
larly: “I would say the head was turned off, one simply did what was said, 
because then one had confidence, too, and one knew that one was in 
good hands and at the end comes the child”. Being trustful is also a legiti-
mizing consequence of handing over responsibility to the midwife. Samia 
is following advice in order to achieve a purpose, which is giving birth to 
her child. Being trustful seems to be without any alternative.
Finally, women expect to have an intensive and trustful relationship 
with the midwife as Dörte explained:
And that I know somehow for this period I can build up a very intensive 
relationship. Not only in prenatal and postnatal care but also that in the 
middle so to speak. That self-indulgence and intimacy somehow. And 
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 nevertheless dealing professionally with each other. This extreme opening-
up- to-each-other and just letting yourself go. I still find quite impressive. It 
starts with somehow being able to say all you want without feeling embar-
rassed. And during birth this self-indulgence and intimacy. Somehow just 
letting yourself go. This is definitely special.
As well as Samia and Helma, Dörte describes a trustful relationship as 
one in which she does not feel embarrassed or in which she is anticipating 
shame by trusting. Trust is intimately linked to the inevitability of bodily 
exposure during childbirth, pregnancy and antenatal care. In order get 
along with “this extreme opening-up-to-each-other”, “letting yourself 
go”, are required strategies within a professional relationship. Dörte 
defines professionalism as being able to say and do things in interaction 
with her midwife without fearing consequences. Dörte calls it the “objec-
tive gaze [den objektiven Blick]”17: She can speak to her midwife about 
difficulties in the relationship to her husband without worrying her mid-
wife “developing an opinion” about her husband as friends or family 
members would. Objectivity as a feature of the witnessing role does not 
exclude intimacy per se and does not necessarily lead to alienation. 
Witnessing objectively means to be an intimate part of a situation with-
out being durably involved. Temporal and local limitations seem to be 
important variables of witnessing in midwifery care.
 Technological Testifying
Finally, I would like to show that technical devices produce powerful 
testimonials in midwifery care. One of them is the CTG,18 which has 
advanced to be one of the obstetrics’ and midwife’s assistants.
In hospitals, CTGs are usually permanently located next to the head 
side of a bed replacing the bedside table. Often women have to stay next 
to it, because cables join the sonic heads to the device. During birth in 
clinical settings it is used regularly, even continuously. In birthplaces or at 
women’s homes they are replaced by much smaller Doppler foetal moni-
tors or a wooden ear trumpet called the Pinard horn. In hospitals as well 
as in birthplaces, CTGs often seem to replace the absent midwife, even 
though it is “only” registering the foetal heartbeat.
 Witnessing as an Embodied Practice in German Midwifery Care 
204 
I accompanied Agnes on a visit to Ruth. Ruth attended her fourth child 
and the birthing date had already passed. Ruth had had two of her three 
children at home with Agnes. Agnes visited her regularly now in order to 
register the foetal heartbeat, verifying if the baby is still going well. Agnes 
announced she would register for ten minutes only, because it would be no 
more than a “snapshot” anyway. While Ruth lay down on her sofa, Agnes 
installed the device in front of which she was kneeling on the floor. The 
CTG’s tone was set off, but both of them stopped talking and fixed the 
paper with the two jagged lines gliding out. A midwife’s witnessing exper-
tise is established with the help of the CTG. It produces a public and dura-
ble artefact which serves as a testimonial. This artefact testifies the foetus’s 
vitality without penetrating the mother’s body. Like ultrasound, it creates 
something visible out of something invisible. It seems to extend the wit-
nessing-room of the midwife, but actually it creates its own witnessing 
presence. The testimony it bears or produces is material and supposedly 
objective, which the midwife is not able to do. Agnes emphasizes the fugi-
tive character of the CTG to try to diminish its competitive significance, 
even though both Agnes and Ruth are subjected to its presence. In hospital, 
midwives do not seem to compete with the CTG, but co-operate and even 
subordinate. In this setting, the CTG is a potent producer of testimonials 
because of its objectivity, materiality, continuity and its impetus-giving 
character.19 Therefore, it fulfils the legal criteria of witnessing. The presence 
of CTGs is helpful when midwives attend several women at once in clinical 
settings, which usually happens. In this case, the midwives as well as women 
in labour usually seem to feel more secure as a result of the CTG’s continual 
presence and surveillance of the child. But the CTG certainly also affords 
frequent absences of midwives and doctors by surveilling mother and child.
 Conclusion: Witnessing Configurations 
in Midwifery Care
I introduced witnessing as a mode of being-with of midwives and women 
during pregnancy, birth and the postpartum stage. I pointed out that wit-
nessing as it is idealized in the legal context, but also in certain philosophical 
traditions does not work out. As the witness is embodied, she is not neutral 
but involved in situations and related to people, surroundings, and things. I 
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used witnessing characteristics as being more passive and receptive than 
active, being knowledgeable, being trustable and being a witness because of 
having been assigned to be a witness to describe midwifery care. Witnessing 
is not the only mode of action and interaction concerning midwives and 
women, of course. It has its limits: Witnessing ends if hands-on action leaves 
no room for passivity, for passive activeness as I called it. Witnessing cannot 
happen if women do not assume their body: their body-in-labour, their dys- 
appearing body, and want to escape and leave it to the midwife. Witnessing 
always involves a distance. Even if one and the same person is witnessing 
herself, which results from and leads to alienating experiences, there is dis-
tance involved. Women handle the shaming potential of being witnessed 
bodily exposed—I called it eye-witnessing—by trusting the midwife not 
only in advance but also in reaction. Witnessing seems to be easier when 
there are fewer temporal and structural restraints. In clinical settings, witness-
ing is a lot more difficult and eye-witnessing is more likely. How to witness if 
it is impossible to stay nearby the woman because several women at once 
have to be attended to? How to witness if guidelines and standards impose 
certain medical interventions? Apparently, midwives’ scope of action and 
women’s scope of action are entangled with each other. It would be helpful to 
create environments in which midwives-women relationships happen which 
give opportunity to midwives to have time and space to attend one woman 
continually, even at the hospital, and which give opportunity to women to be 
involved in decision-making and action-taking and to be carefully protected 
against exposure (see also Hodnett et al. 2013; Sandall et al. 2013).
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Notes
1. I understand embodiment as a corporeal bounded, interacting and inter-
active being-in-the-world. The phenomenological description of the 
body (the German Leib) as the condition of experience and concern-
ment as well as the sociological view on how bodies are constructed or 
shaped (doing bodies) are part of this embodiment.
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2. How uncomfortable this disembodied state might be is marvellously 
illustrated by Roald Dahl in his short story William and Mary (Dahl 
2004).
3. In legal contexts, witnessing and testifying are spatially and temporally 
separated. In contrast, I would suggest there is simultaneity of witnessing 
and testifying in space and time in midwifery care (apart from the paper 
work which serves as testimonial and can be defined as a legal act).
4. According to the Hebammengesetz (1985/2014), midwives are supposed 
to survey [überwachen] birth, provide intrapartum assistance and survey 
postpartum stage. Surveillance entails control and distance within a hier-
archical structure. Witnessing could be described as a “soft” surveillance 
which is interrelated, which involves mutual responsibility and trust and 
within which hierarchies as well as distance and proximity are constantly 
shifting.
5. In this article, I draw on observations I made during an internship in 
southern France and during my midwifery training in Germany as well.
6. Actually this did not seem to happen out of uncertainty, but in order to 
get to know my point of view. There might have been a certain appre-
hension about me judging about professional competences or the quality 
of the provided care. I am even more thankful for having been admitted 
to observe!
7. I am aware of the fact that midwives are women, too. In midwifery it is 
totally unusual to talk about women as patients or customers, because 
midwives usually tend to characterize pregnancy, birth and the postpar-
tum stage as a non-pathological process during which they do not pro-
vide service (only) but also care.
8. It would be interesting to spend more thoughts on knitting as a cultural 
phenomenon. Knitting is a traditional feminine occupation and craft-
work belonging to the private sphere. A renaissance of knitting as a social 
and ecological and therefore even political activity can be stated in west-
ern cultures. The act of knitting itself seems to be more important than 
its products, which is the case for the knitting midwife, too. The knitting 
midwife belongs to the private sphere and would not be situated in a 
clinical setting.
9. The French term sage-femme for midwife can be translated literally as 
“wise woman”. The English term midwife signifies literally “woman who 
is with”. Both terms contain the passive and knowing presence which is 
also described by the image of the knitting midwife. The German term 
Hebamme has a more practical-active meaning: The “ancestor/grand-
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mother who lifts the child (during birth)”. Wisdom (usually attributed 
to the elder) leads to a practical knowing-how.
10. Uterine contractions lead to a progressive opening of the cervix from ca. 
1 cm until 10 cm during birth. The first 3 cm of opening take quite a 
long time—especially if the woman is giving birth for the first time—
and this phase is not yet considered as the active phase of labour, but the 
so- called latent phase.
11. Madeleine Akrich and Bernike Pasveer analysed women’s childbirth nar-
ratives and concluded that women would differentiate between an 
embodied self and a body-in-labour. I would like to borrow the term 
body- in- labour from Akrich; Pasveer to the extent to which it illustrates 
 externally and internally induced objectification processes during birth 
which might create a sensation of this body-in-labour being separated 
from the embodied self of the woman in labour (Akrich and Pasveer 
2004).
12. I understand “doing circus” as being involved in a spectacle (Lat. spect-
are: to watch) which means having been watched.
13. In his article, “Shame and silence” the American professor of philosophy 
Bruno B. Janz develops further a former publication of Samantha Vice 
(2010). He refers to Emmanuel Levinas and Gorgio Agamben in order 
to show what “kind of self […] whiteness in South Africa makes possible 
today” (Janz 2011, p. 462). Non-white people might evoke an existential 
shame in white people because of the “immiseration and oppression of 
blacks during apartheid” (Janz 2011, p. 467). It might seem as if I was 
using an inadequate template—the midwife-mother relationship is cer-
tainly not necessarily comparable to the situation of non-white and 
white people living together in South Africa—but actually I am borrow-
ing a philosophical anthropological approach to the self in the same way 
in which Janz is using Agamben’s concept of witnessing of Auschwitz 
survivors (Janz 2011, p. 469).
14. Agamben explains that shame derives from discovering oneself (or one’s 
Being) and not being able to avoid it. Being ashamed also means being 
aware of oneself (see Agamben 2002).
15. Jean-Paul Sartre has also worked on “le regard d’autrui” (the look of the 
other), which objectifies and alienates (see for instance: Sartre 1982).
16. Luhmann describes trust as the anticipation of disappointment (cf. 
Luhmann 2014, p. 104). I would like to argue here that trust is established 
in practices and has to be constantly renewed. Trust can be a reaction to a 
disappointing (shaming, frightening, painful etc.) situation as well.
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17. Dörte does not use the term “objective gaze” in the Foucauldian sense of 
the “medical gaze” (Foucault 2011). For her the objective gaze is a relat-
ing, but respectfully distant gaze.
18. The CTG records the foetal heart sounds and the uterine contractions 
during pregnancy and birth. While recording it reproduces the foetal 
heartbeat laudably and prints out a paper with two curves on scales rep-
resenting the foetal heartbeat and the maternal contractions.
19. Intrapartum care is usually based on information given by the CTG.
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 Introduction
The prevalence of diabetes is rising worldwide and the condition has 
become a major health and economic problem. Diabetes is a chronic ill-
ness which results in a relentless, ongoing and incurable suffering, and an 
inseparable part of it is the suffering of the whole person. The appropriate 
management of diabetes care includes more than just glycaemic control. 
How to support patients to live well with diabetes is a tough lifelong task 
for both patients and healthcare professionals.
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Scholars have engaged in promoting the quality of diabetes care for a 
long time. Disease self-management and self-efficacy have been reported 
as important concepts in diabetes care and empowering patients to be 
active can lead to successful diabetes management (Moser et  al. 2006; 
Shigaki et al. 2010). For patients and healthcare professionals, respecting 
the disease without letting it dominate the patient’s life is key (Ingadottir 
2009, pp.  77–92). Normalizing the process of managing diabetes can 
encourage patients to regulate their lifestyles with respect to controlling 
the disease (Olshansky et al. 2008).
In diabetes care practice, an individual care plan tailoring to the 
patient’s needs and ongoing care provided by healthcare professionals 
who work together could be suggested as constituting good care 
(McDonald et al. 2012). A collaborative healthcare team can not only 
strengthen diabetes self-care in practice, but also ensure that effective 
medical, preventive and health maintenance interventions take place 
(Von Korff et al. 1997). The foregoing argumentation reinforces the need 
for implementation of “The Logic of Care” in diabetes care practice to 
achieve improvement.
“The Logic of Care” is based on Mol’s field research. Using methods 
such as ethnographic observations, background research and interviews 
with diabetes patients and medical practitioners in a hospital in the 
Netherlands, Mol (2008) engaged critically with the current healthcare 
models which see patients as consumers and citizens. In the light of Mol’s 
argumentation, care is not a limited product, but more like a dynamic 
and open-ended process (Mol 2008, p. 14). A caring process consists of 
interactive relationships among all of the caring actors (e.g. patients and 
professionals), and it can be shifted and adapted according to different 
care outcomes (Mol 2008, p. 20). With respect to the concept of patients 
as citizens who have abilities and rights to make their own choices and 
enact their will, Mol elaborated that the patient-citizens have little choice 
but to bracket a part of what they are and seek ways to live with a disease 
(Mol 2008, p. 35). Caring is therefore a matter of being attuned, respect-
ing and being adaptable instead of controlling (Mol 2008, p. 36).
By Mol’s assumption, care has its own logic. But one kind of logic (e.g. 
the logic of care) is not always intrinsically better than other kinds of logic 
(e.g. the logic of choice) (Mol 2008, p. 92). In practice, we sometimes 
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need the logic of care, but it can be employed alongside other logics 
depending on the care situation. It is important that all caring actors be 
active (Mol 2008, p. 93). In this paper, we utilized “The Logic of Care” 
conceptualized by Mol for our research approach. Meanwhile, we stressed 
the ethical dilemmas occurring in a home-based care team.
The notion of the global marketplace has spread to the domain of 
health services, so that health has come to be seen as a commodity, with 
the body as its site and the patient as a customer (Parker 1999). Patients’ 
satisfaction has become a significant indicator to measure the quality of 
care when patient-centred care is supplied (Robin et al. 2008; Wagner 
and Bear 2009).1 The challenge for healthcare workers is to work within, 
but also to resist the reductionist impetus of economically based and 
commercially driven approaches to healthcare (Parker 1999). Healthcare 
workers face the rigorous tasks of maintaining holistic care, preserving 
the personal and professional–recipient relationship and finding ways of 
demonstrating their capacity to deliver high-quality care in a cost- effective 
way (Parker 1999). Moral tensions may accordingly arise.
Moral tensions in care practice may additionally originate in the differ-
ent understanding of illness and the distinct demands of diabetes care on 
healthcare professionals and patients. Patients focus more often on con-
sequences and the impact on their daily life, while healthcare profession-
als pay more attention to the medical treatment and economic efficiency 
(Hörnsten et  al. 2004). Whereas healthcare professionals pay much 
attention to the best interests of patients, they usually have to exercise 
both clinical and moral responsibilities in relation with patients. For this 
reason, care responsibilities are determined not only by considerations of 
the patients’ rights and respect for their freedom but also by consider-
ation of the wider health needs of the individual and the community 
(Thompson et al. 2006).
In the healthcare system, medical orientation, hierarchy, authority and 
unequal power among physicians, patients and nurses are noticeable 
(Daiski 2004; Kramer and Schmalenberg 2003). The hierarchy between 
different professionals affects how a professional can act on his own moral 
position (Kälvemark et  al. 2004). How do healthcare workers work 
within this kind of medical environment and simultaneously preserve 
their professional awareness? Which care problems and ethical dilemmas 
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can be raised? How do healthcare workers practically reflect on care prob-
lems and ethical dilemmas? And how do healthcare workers deal with 
them in their daily work? To further grasp the ethical dilemmas in diabe-
tes care, it makes sense to take a look at the actors and to review how 
authority, responsibility and trust play out among physicians, patients 
and nurses in everyday practice.
Nurses have hitherto played a barely visible role in the German health-
care system, but they have implicitly been expected to fulfil the dominant 
care role. The nurse is not only the person who provides the care in prac-
tice, but also the one who has the most contact with patients and who 
understands patients better than other healthcare professionals (Rich 
2008). We would like to take home-care nurses as an example in this 
paper to explore how tensions arise and how they are dealt with in the 
field of patient care.2
 Methods and Materials
This study is a case study with a qualitative approach. This paper concen-
trates on home-care nurses’ experiences and tensions in diabetes care 
practice where complex care takes place involving a multi-professional 
team.
The home-care centre at the university hospital Freiburg in southwest 
Germany served as the setting for the research case.3 A field observation 
and in-depth interviews were implemented to collect empirical data. The 
interview participants were six home-care nurses who had a diabetes care 
education or a background of diabetes care experience and had held their 
current position in the German home-care context for at least two years.
From April to November 2012, direct and participant observations 
and structured face-to-face interviews with home-care nurses took place. 
Narrative thematic interviews were performed using an interview guide 
covering topics related to the experience in diabetes management, the 
experience of multi-professional team work and needs in diabetes care.4
Interviews and feedback sessions were audiotaped and transcribed ver-
batim for the thematic analysis of the content. Some selected transcripts 
of interviews were coded by a research group to identify additional 
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insights. Data management was facilitated by the use of a computer pro-
gram (NVivo 10). The analysis of the interviews was guided by Creswell’s 
thematic analysis (2007, pp. 147–176). A two-level coding scheme was 
used, starting with a provisional list of codes based on selected concepts 
identified in the literature, with new codes added based on the data 
(Miles et al. 2013). In an iterative process of coding and condensing the 
data, recurring themes emerged. In terms of an ethical scheme, three 
abstracted themes were identified as underlying or latent messages in dia-
betes care practice; these were then confirmed as being common to all 
categories.
 Findings
By analysing the empirical data focused on the experience of home-care 
nurses, three themes emerged: identification of care receivers, perfor-
mance of care actions and foundations of care relationships. These frame 
the tensions home-care nurses face while working with patients and with 
other healthcare professionals in the diabetes care context. The tensions 
around the three themes are:
• The identification of care receivers: Tension between patients and 
customers.
• The performance of care actions: Tension between an ongoing process 
and finding an end by acceptance.
• The foundations of care relationships: Tension between authority and 
responsibility.
 Patients Versus Customers
In diabetes care, home-care nurses stated that they treat their care receiv-
ers as patients instead of customers.5 For nurses, the person who receives 
medical treatment is considered a patient in the nurse–patient relation-
ship, whether his disease is acute or chronic. This way, nurses are able to 
provide continuous medical care for outpatients from hospitals to the 
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surrounding where they live. The care relationship ends the day when 
nurses accept that patients don’t want it and hand over the responsibility 
to them:
So we call all of our patients ‘patients’. So we don’t have customers. Because 
we get most of our patients directly from the hospital and they have been 
treated as patients there. Therefore, they will also be simply treated as 
patients by us. I cannot call a part of my patients ‘customers’ and the other 
part of them ‘patients’. […] When patients are independent someday, like 
Mr. Harry, then we can leave them and say that the patient relationship is 
closed. But as long as we take care of a patient, he is a patient for us. He 
won’t be a customer sometimes only because of his chronic disease. 
(I-NN-01)
When nurses talked about good care, it meant that all of the patients, 
nurses and physicians feel satisfied with their care outcome. A good care 
outcome for diabetes care was quickly linked to good blood sugar values: 
“For me, good care means simply that the patient is satisfied, we are satis-
fied and the family doctor is satisfied with the blood sugar values” 
(I-NN-01).
In care practice, nurses avoided to challenge patients’ autonomy and 
respected their right to choose the way they live. Nurses think that they 
can’t force patients to act, but can only offer suggestions.6 However, offer-
ing suggestions doesn’t always lead to success:
I can’t force anybody to do anything. I can only suggest to them to do 
things which are good for their bodies and I can always try to say, ‘You 
should move more often’, but it doesn’t always work. (I-NN-05)
 An Ongoing Process Versus Finding an End 
by Acceptance
Nurses recognized that creating fear and exerting control is not a good 
idea for diabetes care. They said, “We are not there to control” (I-NN- 
01). Indeed, nurses cannot control what their patients eat or what they 
do throughout the day since they only come for a short visit. Instead of 
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controlling, it is more important to offer an alternative way of keeping 
in touch with patients. However, attempts to work with alternatives 
have run into difficulties in practice. Eight minutes are planned in the 
schedule for one home-visit with a diabetes patient. The time pressure 
and insufficient knowledge limit nurses’ work a lot. In particular, 
nurses have no chance to try alternatives if their patients reject their 
advice:
It would be very good if we could take more care of diabetes patients, 
including offering advice on nutrition. But we have no time, and in many 
cases we don’t have current knowledge. We simply don’t have enough 
knowledge on nutrition counselling. And some patients do not want it 
either. They reject it. (I-NN-04)
Nurses expressed that continually trying to achieve their care goals is 
their wish as a healthcare professional, and a few nurses believed that 
“constant dripping wears the stone” (I-NN-06). Unfortunately, patients’ 
lack of intention to follow up on the principles of diabetes management 
restrains nurses from going further during the care process. In the follow-
ing case, a nurse tried to motivate her patients at the beginning, but after 
some failed attempts, the nurse eventually accepted her patient’s decision 
even though this decision was against her will. However, this outcome led 
to an uncomfortable feeling on the part of the nurse and hurt the patient–
nurse relationship as well:
The patient was exasperated one day and told me, ‘Stop now, I don’t want 
to hear about it [diabetes care] any more’. Then I said, ‘Okay, let’s let it go’. 
Then I said nothing about it any more. I had argued with him because of 
his diabetes. But he still eats chocolate, doesn’t change his life. Then he has 
to inject more and more Insulin and is getting fatter. He wants that. One 
day you have to say, ‘Okay’ and accept it. Although it is a difficult decision, 
but what should I do? I cannot beat him and push him on the way, right. 
(I-NN-06)
The tension, however, creates a lot of stress for nurses when they have 
to accept undesired outcomes. Nurses feel pity and are disappoint about 
situations in which improvements cannot be made: “This is of course an 
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example in which one has a bad feeling. At this point, you will ask your-
self about what you still expect” (I-NN-03). Sometimes, nurses face criti-
cal care situations without the possibility of making a difference. Nurses 
then have to deal with feelings of fear and guilt:
It happened often that his blood sugar values were 18 mg/dl or something 
like that. That’s a very, very uncomfortable situation. And I have faced such 
tense situations twice. That’s a very unsettling and scary situation. But as I 
said, it cannot be changed. (I-NN-01)
 Authority Versus Responsibility
In home-care practice, nurses usually identify as mediators vis-à-vis the 
healthcare team and see themselves as advocates for the patients. Nurses 
reported that their mission in practice is to create a bridge between physi-
cians and patients:
We can actually only play the role of a mediator or a messenger when, for 
instance, the patient has difficulties to communicate with his family doctor 
or when the family doctor doesn’t visit his patient regularly. Then we have 
to call the doctor and inform him, ‘The patient’s values are not good and 
we need to do something to change it’. In this case, we play the role of an 
advocate for the patient. So we are simply mediators and advocates. 
(I-NN-01)
Good cooperative teamwork is important for healthcare, but not 
always seen in practice. Information flows are often interrupted in a vari-
ety of ways between different medical organizations. In practice, home- 
care nurses often receive a medical plan without the related background. 
This is neither a satisfying nor a safe situation for nurses. For one thing, 
nurses are then unsure about their work. In addition, they cannot explain 
changes in their care to the patients. Nurses have pointed out that they 
have to take responsibility for the care they offer, and that they therefore 
want to get clear answers. Nevertheless, they are sometimes too fearful to 
clarify their questions with physicians because of the strict hierarchy and 
the nurses’ low position in the current healthcare system:
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I would like to know why the doctor raised the Insulin dosage. I’m still not 
sure what I should do now. Should I contact with the family doctor or a 
diabetes specialist? Should I send a fax to the family doctor and ask him 
why he has raised the dosage? But I think that sending a fax is so imper-
sonal. I do not know him. Maybe he will feel that I am stepping on his toes 
if I, as a ‘lowly’ nurse, ask him something about his medical plan. But I 
couldn’t explain to my patient why he needs more Insulin now, and I was 
also surprised about it myself. […] I am not one to merely follow orders. I 
also have a responsibility for what I do. (I-NN-06)
Many nurses have mentioned that communication with physicians is 
not always a comfortable experience. Nurses have complained that it is 
difficult to reach physicians or to talk to them. Sometimes nurses have 
tried to communicate with physicians via the patients. However, this 
indirect way may lead to inter-professional mistrust. Furthermore, nurses 
have sometimes suggested to their patients to change their family physi-
cian in order to create a safe care environment and allow for cooperative 
teamwork:
When I inform a family doctor that his patient is in a bad condition, then 
he must respond to my request and do something. […] If he doesn’t act, I 
will say to the patient, ‘It took such a long time until your doctor came. 
Maybe you should consider taking another doctor who comes quickly’. I 
have already done that. Whether the patient does it or not is another mat-
ter, because patients usually say, ‘Oh, we have already had that doctor for 
20 years and he has always come’. (I-NN-06)
Many nurses believe that patients’ have a lot more trust in their physi-
cians than in nurses. According to the nurses’ experience, patients follow 
what their doctors say, no matter what it is. This creates a tension for 
nurses. Even if the nurses disagree with the physicians’ opinions, they will 
still obey the physicians’ orders. Nurses do so not only because physicians 
have the legal right to have “the last word”, but also because the nurses 
don’t want to confuse patients with two opposing sets of advice:
What doctors say is right. So even if I sometimes don’t agree with what the 
doctors say, I don’t want to confuse my patients. I cannot just go to a 
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patient and say, ‘What a nonsense your doctor told to you’, because the 
patient will become totally uncertain. I have experienced that one time, 
when I said to the patient, ‘We must do that’, and the patient answered, 
‘Oh, but my doctor told me something quite different.’ And then he 
became very uncertain. (I-NN-02)
 Discussion7
 Can Care Receivers Be Both “Customers” 
and “Patients”?
The first theme of the research interprets the tension regarding the iden-
tification of care receivers as customers and patients. According to the 
research, home-care nurses consider their care receivers “patients” because 
this helps nurses provide a continuum of care with different organiza-
tions. Nevertheless, consumer sovereignty8 is usually taken into consider-
ation in healthcare. It is reflected in nurses’ care activities in that they 
avoid putting pressure on patients. For instance, when a patient rejects a 
nurse’s offer of a nutrition consultant’s services, this approach to care is 
discontinued in practice. In this case, the logic of choice is at work and 
the care receiver is treated more like a customer than a patient.
Since consumer sovereignty has high priority in the healthcare market, 
patients are often practically treated as customers and as citizens and 
choices are made following the patients’ wishes (Ryl and Horch 2013). 
Nurses then have difficulties carrying out interventions against patients’ 
will. As a nurse explained, “I cannot force anybody to do anything” 
(I-NN-05). Nurses often have to compromise, which may run counter to 
their professional awareness. While the understanding of care receivers as 
patients and of the value of the person’s wholeness is rooted in the iden-
tity of the nursing professional, the way nurses have to act is often con-
trary to this identity in practice. This contradiction can produce a moral 
tension in nursing work. It might lead to frustration with the caring pro-
cess or damage the trust-relationship between nurses and patients. We 
will discuss these two themes later in the second and third sections.
P.-Y. Liu and H. Kohlen
221
In home-care practice, satisfaction has been used as the main indicator 
to decide if good care is offered. The terms “quality in care service” and 
“patient satisfaction” are often connected and brought on the healthcare 
agenda (Bostan et al. 2007). Patient satisfaction is derived from the mar-
keting perspective. Patients are the most important clients of health insti-
tutions and their satisfaction is hence the main product of health 
institutions (Torpie 2014). Patient satisfaction has been explained in 
terms of adding value and creating a service exceeding or meeting patients’ 
expectations (Torpie 2014). However, when healthcare professionals only 
focus on patients’ satisfactions during a care process, they provide their 
services often as commodities according to the customers’ desires (Mol 
2008, p. 28).
There is a danger in thinking of care as a commodity, as a service for 
purchase. First, the diverse care goals and needs patients and nurses have 
may result in a tension for nurses. This is because patients place a lot of 
trust in those who care for them and for nurses to respond in a trustwor-
thy way, they must care about their patients, not just for them (De Raeve 
2002; Hörnsten et  al. 2004). Second, when healthcare professionals 
begin to talk in terms of commodification, they too quickly begin to slip 
into thinking of the time and cost for a service instead of the needs of 
those cared for (Olshansky et al. 2008; Tronto 2010). Third, caring for 
patients is a kind of caritas. Caring for ill people is valuable and meaning-
ful in and of itself and cannot be calculated and priced as a commodity 
(Maio 2009).
In the words of Duttweiler (2007), health is not a product that can be 
sold and a patient is not a customer who buys a product, but a person 
who needs professionals’ help to deal with his diseases. In this sense, care 
professionals have a duty to ensure that patients are able to give their 
agreement to the care process by, for instance, ensuring their  empowerment, 
which is considered a transformative way of autonomy (Duttweiler 
2007). Thus, thinking of care receivers as patients doesn’t mean ignoring 
their autonomy or denying their rights to make decisions about their 
needs, but providing alternatives, sources of legitimacy and information 
as counter-acting forces (Tronto 2010).
To take care of patients’ satisfaction, to respect patients’ rights of make 
their own choices or to empower patients are different ways of caring. 
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The concern in diabetes care is not which one is better, but which one is 
more appropriate to a situation and what can be done in practice (Mol 
2008, p. 92). That means that patients’ satisfaction can be one of the 
indicators to measure the quality of care, but it shouldn’t be the only one. 
Consumer sovereignty should be respected, but all of the patients’ expec-
tations should not necessarily be fulfilled in practice without thinking of 
the actual needs for care, especially when dealing with diabetes.
 Can “Finding an End” Be Acceptable in an Ongoing 
Care Process?
The second theme summarized from the research findings is around care 
actions. Within the logic of care, care is an interactive, open-ended pro-
cess that may be shaped and reshaped depending on its results (Mol 
2008, p. 23). Nevertheless, nursing care has its boundaries in practice. In 
the research, a tension emerged between continually trying for care 
improvements and finding an end by accepting an undesired care 
outcome.
This kind of distress is usually connected with the differences in care 
goals between patients and nurses, as well as their different perspectives 
on what “good” is. A care intervention such as asking patients to follow 
strict nutrition rules may be considered as good for diabetes manage-
ment, but may limit patients’ day-to-day life and happiness a lot. Patients 
may therefore reject an approach to care during a care process. The logic 
of care implies the need to pay attention to the information obtained 
from care practice without passing judgment as to what is good or bad, 
so that healthcare professionals and patients respect each others’  experience 
and are attuned to each others’ strengths and limitations (Mol 2008, 
p. 65).
While healthcare professionals are carrying out their duty of ensuring 
patients’ safety and devoting themselves to keeping risk and harm away 
from patients’ bodies, patients’ wishes and/or desires may often be 
ignored. For instance, if a nurse tries to prohibit her patient from eating 
chocolate, which is his favourite food, that patient may suffer from the 
feeling of being controlled. On the contrary, if the nurse knows more 
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about the background of her patient, she may be able to understand bet-
ter why the patient takes a given care decision and why the decision is 
important for him.9 If nurses can, in their care, balance the priorities and 
concerns of both patients and healthcare professionals and find a com-
mon denominator leading to an outcome in which the patient’s safety is 
ensured, nurses may accept that letting it go can, in some cases, be the 
best option for a patient, even it doesn’t meet the nurses’ expectation of 
the care process. As Mol explained, “The logic of care is not preoccupied 
with our will, and what we may opt for, but concentrates on what we do”. 
(Mol 2008, p. 8) Unfortunately, nurses do not, in practice, have the time 
to get all the relevant information or the space and ability to reflect on 
these kinds of dilemmas in care during their busy and stressful work.
Modifying one’s lifestyle is part of diabetes treatment, but it is the most 
difficult part of diabetes management. In the practice of care, the patients’ 
intentions to follow through on a care intervention influence the care 
professionals’ motivation as well. It is often seen in diabetes care that 
nurses stop trying to offer a care improvement (e.g. a nutrition consulta-
tion) if they recognize that their patients have no interest in it. Likewise, 
when patients show the will to take part in care activities, nurses do more 
for them. Yet, a clinician–patient relationship requires more than a cus-
tomer service oriented by customers’ decisions. It is a therapeutic rela-
tionship which focuses on caring for an individual more than on customer 
service (Torpie 2014). In other words, it is sometimes necessary in care 
practice to push patients to do things for their bodies, just like a diabetes 
patient must inject insulin regularly if they want to stay alive (Mol 2008, 
p. 45).
Encouraging patients to be active by sharing doctoring and care 
responsibility with other care professionals is advisable in diabetes care 
(Duttweiler 2007; Mol 2008, p. 65). From this point of view, it is impor-
tant that patients, as customers in the medical market, have to realize 
their limitations in professional care, to trust their care professionals and 
to accept help (Duttweiler 2007). Patients have to be educated about 
their disease and to act themselves during their disease management. 
Care professionals have to provide support until patients get a full under-
standing of their disease management and are able to integrate it into 
their life (Maio 2009; Raspe 1999). It is a long-term process which costs 
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time, money and manpower. When working within a medical care sys-
tem organized on the basis of economic efficiency, it is unfortunately 
difficult to bring theory into practice. As a nurse told us, “It would be 
very good if we could take more care of diabetes patients. […] But we 
have no time, and in many cases, we don’t have current knowledge. […] 
And some patients do not want it either. They reject it” (I-NN-03).
Accepting an undesired care outcome is symptomatic for an ambiva-
lence to their professional awareness for home-care nurses and leads to 
feelings of uncertainty and disappointment. As a nurse said, “ […] at this 
time, you will ask yourself what you still expect” (I-NN-03). In keeping 
with their professional identity, nurses expect that a care improvement 
can be implemented and patients’ safety can be ensured. In reality, nurses 
can have to deal with critical care situations without any possibility of 
changing the situation. Nurses might therefore fall into a kind of moral 
distress, doubting themselves and feeling fear and guilt. During nurses’ 
daily work, especially in home-based care practice, nurses have only few 
opportunities to exchange their experiences in care with their care team 
or to discuss ethical dilemmas with others.
ANA (2008) noted in the “ANA Nursing Code of Ethics”10: “The 
nurse owes the same duties to self as to others, including the responsibil-
ity to preserve integrity and safety, to maintain competence, and to con-
tinue personal and professional growth”. The research data reflected the 
requirement to enhance nurses’ personal and professional growth. The 
“Code of Ethics” further articulated: “Nurses are required to have knowl-
edge relevant to the current scope and standards of nursing practice, 
changing issues, concerns, controversies and ethics. Where care required 
is outside the competencies of the individual nurse, consultation should 
be sought or the patient should be referred to others for appropriate care” 
(ANA 2008). The logic of care states a similar aspect: “A care process 
involves a team and tasks are divided between the members of that team 
in ever-changing ways” (Mol 2008, p. 21). It is essential to develop effi-
cient networking among different care professionals in diabetes care prac-
tice. Meanwhile, each care professional has to learn how to work together 
with other care professionals and has to rethink collaborative ways of 
working within a team.
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 Can Care Responsibility Play Out Within Trust- 
Relationships Without Authority?
This is the third theme associated with the foundations of care relation-
ships. In this section, trust in a nurse–physician relationship and in a 
nurse–patient relationship is embedded within a healthcare environment 
full of a sense of responsibility without authority while professional care 
responsibilities are not made explicit.
The phrase of “responsibility without authority” has been widely used 
in various scholarly discussions such as social, economic, management, 
political, medical and healthcare discourses. It often designates the ten-
sion in relationships part of a hierarchy, for instance, in a nurse–doctor 
relationship (Burston and Tuckett 2013; Pendry 2007; Pullon 2008). 
While analysing the research data and reviewing the literature, it became 
clear that the expression “responsibility without authority” appeared 
within the relationships among physicians, nurses and patients in home- 
based diabetes care practice. While nurses are expected to be responsible 
for their work, they often experience powerlessness to act within the hier-
archical healthcare system where physicians have both the authority and 
the patients’ trust.
In the German healthcare system, medicine is considered as powerful 
and medical care is seen as a professional endeavour in care practice. The 
centralization of medical care in society causes an uneven power distri-
bution in professional relationships. Physicians have the power to take 
medical decisions and nurses have the responsibility to implement 
them. A moral dilemma can appear in the hierarchy between different 
professionals when a person who is lower in the hierarchy has to carry 
out orders from a superior against their own conviction (Kälvemark 
et  al. 2004). Burston and Tuckett (2013) have illustrated how nurses 
suffer from this care dilemma as “nurses [are] faced with the choice of 
either overstepping the boundary and acting, or waiting for the physi-
cian, watching the suffering of their patients”. The problem in this rela-
tionship may stem from the different approaches to healthcare delivery, 
such as a curative as opposed to a care-based approach (Burston and 
Tuckett 2013).
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Traditionally, physicians have authority in medical care and patients 
trust their physicians as well. A nurse described how she experienced phy-
sicians’ authority during her daily work in that “what doctors say is right. 
So even if I sometimes don’t agree with what the doctors say, I don’t want 
to confuse my patients” (I-NN-02). This quote reveals how authority, 
responsibility and trust play out in a care team: The patient trusts his 
physician; the nurse recognizes what doctors say may not always be right; 
the nurse experiences difficulties in influencing the decision of her 
patient; the nurse admits that physicians have the right to have the last 
word; the nurse knows that she has to be responsible for what she does; 
the nurse might communicate with the physician or she might be not; 
the nurse consequently follows the doctor’s orders. The care responsibility 
seems to be silently transferred from one hand to another when the nurse 
thinks that physicians are in charge. Actually, nurses still have to take 
responsibility for the care implementation and patients have the right to 
be informed. Physicians also have to take responsibility for ensuring the 
safety of medical care. From the above case, we can also observe that phy-
sicians’ authority invisibly exists within a nurse–patient relationship. 
Even on the scene, where physicians are not present in a care activity, 
their authority affects the interactions between nurses and patients.
Another nurse highlights how she is under the physicians’ authority in 
that, “Maybe he (a family doctor) feels his toes are being stepped on if I, 
as a ‘lowly’ nurse, ask him something about his medical plan” (I-NN-06). 
According to the research data, nurses feel dissatisfied and uncertain 
when communication within a care team is not flowing, when their 
voices are not heard or not accepted, or when they don’t have the author-
ity to negotiate within a care team. Pendry (2007) affirmed that nurses 
have to carry a lot of responsibility, but lack the necessary executive 
authority to do anything about a situation. From nurses’ point of view, 
some of the most painful practical tensions arise because they lack the 
authority to act on their own, to exercise their own judgment, to take the 
initiative and to go against physicians’ orders (Thompson et al. 2006). An 
international study demonstrated similar findings: “Nurses felt that they 
lacked either power to speak against physicians’ opinions”, or “[n]urses 
believed that their opinions would not be accepted” (Malloy et al. 2009).
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To hand over the care responsibility or to accept an undesired care 
outcome are not pleasant experiences for nurses. Nurses usually feel mis-
trust and disappointment about themselves, and sometimes about physi-
cians and/or the healthcare system. This tension, as Burston and Tuckett 
(2013) have articulated, may not only manifest internally or externally, 
but may harm the individual, others and/or the system. It may further 
induce feelings of anger towards oneself, self-doubt, diminished self- 
esteem, depression and even burnout and feelings of anger, bitterness, 
dismay and frustration towards others (Burston and Tuckett 2013).
An approach whereby all care team members, including physicians, 
nurses and patients, share the doctoring and the responsibility may help 
in dealing with this kind of tension in practice. That way, when nurses 
recognize that physicians are unable to make an optimal decision for a 
given care situation, nurses would be able to communicate with physi-
cians, enabling them to better take responsibility for the patients’ safety. 
The relevant professional care competencies should be taught in nursing 
courses and in practice in the field. Physicians also have a responsibility 
to enhance their professional competencies, including by creating an 
intensive networking with other healthcare professionals to share doctor-
ing. Additionally, healthcare institutes should be able to organize better 
cooperative teamwork so that an open and effective dialog among mul-
tiple professionals can take place.
 Can Professional Identity and Care Competencies 
Support Trust-Relationships?
Trust toward other professionals as well as towards patients directly and 
indirectly influences healthcare workers’ motivation in providing care 
(Okello and Gilson 2015). The research indicates that nurses sustain 
 relationships of mistrust with physicians and patients. This originates in 
the hierarchal medical society, the institutional organization and the care 
legislation. Nonetheless, nurses’ limited professional identity and insuf-
ficient professional care competencies are revealed as additional reasons 
which may frustrate communication with a care team and may further 
lead to mistrust between nurses, physicians and patients.
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Pullon (2008) articulated that the identification and separation of 
vocational and business roles and the development of a professional iden-
tity form the basis for the development of trust in the nurse–physician 
relationship. In home-care practice, nurses identified their professional 
roles as mediators and advocates in diabetes care. These two roles are 
indispensable in the home-based care context because they support inter- 
professionalism as a platform for the exchange of information. Some 
studies hold the same point of view and reason that nurses and patients 
have a closer relationship compared to other healthcare professionals 
because nursing care occupies an “in between” position in the organiza-
tion of the public response to the patients’ needs. Nurses act to follow up 
and address their needs appropriately (Rich 2008). Nurses’ role as media-
tors means not only delivering messages from patients to physicians; it 
consists of the missions to create efficient communication, to share care 
plans and to identify problems to the care team. Likewise, nurses’ role as 
advocates involves conveying patients’ needs in meaningful ways. That is 
to say that nurses should not only be able to protect patients’ rights when 
something goes wrong, but should also be able to establish a nourishing 
and safe caring environment. These expanded missions have to be taken 
into account when we talk about “good care” in home-based diabetes 
management.
Following Pullon’s argumentation, (2008) “[p]rofessional identity is 
related to the demonstration of professional competence, in turn it is 
related to the development of mutual inter-professional respect and 
enduring inter-professional trust”. Nurses’ professional competencies 
influence inter-professional trust and patients’ trust as well. On the basis 
of the research data, unequal trust-relationships between patients, nurses 
and physicians can be observed in home-care practice. Rørtveit and her 
colleagues (2015) explained that patients’ trust in nursing is dependent 
on the nurses’ knowledge, on their level of commitment to dialogue and 
to creating and developing the relationship and on contextual issues. Yet, 
the research conveyed a message that nurses are becoming aware of their 
insufficient knowledge and care competencies in diabetes care. Smith 
(2012) identified that, “[a]ntecedents to personal and external motiva-
tions include the attribution of and integrating of knowledge into prac-
tice, experience, critical thinking, proficient skills, caring, communication, 
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environment, motivation, and professionalism”. According to his argu-
mentation, issues such as confidence, safe practice and holistic care belong 
to the caring competencies as well (Smith 2012). In the current health-
care environment, nurses are too overwhelmed to develop the expected 
competencies and meet the expanded professional roles.
Responding to the argumentation by Maio (2009, p. 32), “[o]ne big 
problem in modern medical care is that healthcare workers are not reflect-
ing and not able to think about themselves, their identity and the reason 
why they provide care” (Ein großes Problem der modernen Medizin ist 
somit ihre Unreflektiertheit, ihre Unfähigkeit, über sich selbst, über ihren 
Ursprung, über ihre Identität nachzudenken). Encouraging nurses to face 
ethical dilemmas and to reflect on their nursing work is getting more and 
more important in care practice. Improving the theoretical and practical 
training in diabetes care during nursing training and further education 
programmes may offer a possibility of change. A nourished nursing prac-
tice has to be established, wherein nurses have time and space to keep 
trying to achieve improvements in care. Well-structured institutional 
regulations for diabetes care may additionally offer legal support for nurs-
ing work.11 It is also necessary to encourage nurses to get a clear under-
standing of external influences related to nursing education, health 
legislation and health policy. As Tronto (2010) advocated to healthcare 
professionals, “recognition and debate/dialogue of relations of power 
within and outside the organization of competitive and dominative 
power and agreement of common purpose” should allow nurses not only 
to recognize the ethical tensions raised in care practice and to learn to 
reflect on them but also to be able to push a dialogue with the healthcare 
team, the healthcare system and society. There will be new roles for nurses 
to grow into and to fill in their practice.
 Conclusion
Nurses work within a healthcare system oriented towards economic effi-
ciency. Nurses are, on the one hand, limited by the business approach of 
serving “customers” and, on the other hand, motivated by the profes-
sional awareness of offering medical care for “patients”. Nurses attempt to 
 Tensions in Diabetes Care Practice: Ethical Challenges... 
230 
provide patients’ with care regulated by their professional identity while 
satisfying customers’ expectations that are dominating the healthcare 
market. When customer sovereignty and patients’ autonomy are empha-
sized, nurses often have to accept a compromise against their own will. 
The nursing professional awareness hardly translates into care practice 
and ethical dilemmas may therefore occur.
Within the hierarchical German medical care system, nurses experi-
ence responsibility without authority in the care field. Without authority, 
nurses find it difficult to engage in teamwork while they are carrying out 
care responsibilities. Relationships of mistrust towards the care team also 
come with this. Additional reasons arise from limited professional care 
competencies and a narrow professional identity. Nurses are overwhelmed 
in diabetes care, especially in dealing with ethical tensions. To improve 
personal and professional growth for all healthcare workers and to 
enhance patients’ engagement in disease management is essential. It is 
also important to create a nourishing and safe care environment wherein 
professional awareness can be encouraged and acted upon by sharing 
doctoring and responsibility. The insights gained through this research 
may assist nurses and other healthcare professionals in reflecting on 
home-based care teamwork and improving diabetes care in general.
Notes
1. Robin and his colleagues (2008) indicated that patient-centered care 
(PCC) promotes adherence and leads to improved health outcomes. The 
fundamental characteristics of PCC were identified as patient involve-
ment in care and the individualization of patient care. Effective PCC 
practices were related to communication, shared decision making and 
patient education. However, our research findings showed that an effec-
tive PCC is difficult to carry out in practice because of the commercial 
healthcare market, insufficient competencies on the part of nurses and 
the hierarchy that arises when patients’ satisfaction is used as the indica-
tor to measure the quality of care.
2. Our research does not aim to measure the ethical competencies of 
healthcare workers or to resolve the ethical tensions that deeply affect the 
hierarchy. The purpose of this paper is to offer support for healthcare 
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workers to get a better understanding of the ethical tensions in diabetes 
care by reflecting on the interactions within a healthcare team, as well as 
enhancing the sensibility of healthcare workers towards these tensions 
and inspiring them to think about what can be done in care practice.
3. The Ethics Committee of the University Hospital Freiburg (EK-Freiburg 
43/12) approved the study and the participants received the usual assur-
ance about anonymity, confidentially and the right to withdraw at any 
point.
4. Research questions were asked like: “Can you tell me how you experience 
caring for patients with diabetes?”; “How do you experience working 
together with other healthcare professionals such as physicians?”; “Can 
you tell me an example of how you have reacted to a conflict in care 
practice?” and “Can you describe what good diabetes care is for you?”
5. The German healthcare is organized as a ‘Third Party Payer System’. 
Patients don’t pay healthcare providers directly for their medical treat-
ment within this healthcare system. The healthcare providers calculate 
the cost of medical services and then receive payments from healthcare 
insurance (Tscheulin and Dietrich 2010). Thus, patients have a customer 
status in relation to the health insurance as well as to the service provider, 
but their “needs” have been considered more often than their “demands” 
(Raspe 1999; Tscheulin and Dietrich 2010). Nursing care has been 
talked about as customer care according to the regulations of healthcare 
insurance as well (Raspe 1999). However, from the perspective of patient 
care, patients are not customers because their status has been greatly 
reduced by illness or injury and their sovereignty is therefore limited 
(Duttweiler 2007; Maio 2009; Raspe 1999; Torpie 2014). It is worth to 
take a detailed look at how healthcare workers think about their care 
receivers and how their understanding of care receivers influences their 
care activities in the field.
6. In the edited volume, “Socio-material will-work”, Annelieke Driessen 
elaborated how healthcare workers applied three kinds of will-work as 
alternative ways to deal with the wanting of patients to provide good care 
in the dementia care context.
7. In the discussion part, we draw up some questions formed around ten-
sions to  introduce our debate. But our purpose is not to  offer clear 
answers. Instead, we  would like to  encourage our readers to  rethink 
the tensions based on a variety of discourses. Thus, answers can be differ-
ent from  divergent perspectives, and  care work can be  presented 
with a variety of faces.
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8. Consumer sovereignty is a phrase often translated as ‘the customer is 
king’ and it lays the emphasis on the rights of consumers. Ryl and Horch 
(2013) indicated that sovereignty is usually presented in healthcare as 
citizen- and patient-centred care in order to improve the quality of care. 
In Germany, medical care responds to patients’ needs through patient-
centred care. In the past ten years, the concept of citizen- and patient-
centred care has further developed in the legal and political spheres in 
the German healthcare system (Ryl and Horch 2013).
9. Björn Freter took a philosophical view of caring for the whole person to 
discuss the norms for diabetes care. Please see the edited volume (Chapter 
“Nursing as Accommodated Care. A Contribution to the Phenomenology 
of Care. Appeal—Concern—Volition—Practice”).
10. ANA is the acronym for the American Nurses Association. The Code of 
Ethics for Nurses was developed as a guide for carrying out nursing 
responsibilities in a manner consistent with quality in nursing care and 
the ethical obligations of the profession (ANA 2008).
11. For more on the role of institutional regulation in care, please see the 
edited volume by Tim Opgenhaffen (Chapter “Regulation as an Obstacle 
to Care? A Care-Ethical Evaluation of the Regulation on the Use of 
Seclusion Cells in Psychiatric Care in Flanders (Belgium)”) with the legal 
perspective.
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Debates about care from an ethical perspective evolved in the 1980s and 
the work by Carol Gilligan (1982) and Nel Noddings (1984) in particu-
lar were influential in healthcare (Gallagher 2014; Kohlen 2009). In the 
USA at the same time, the inclusion of nurses in clinical ethics delibera-
tions and their participation in Hospital Ethics Committees (HECs) was 
demanded so as to bring in their voice (Aroskar 1984; Fost and Cranford 
1985; President’s Commission 1983; Youngner et al. 1983).
Over the past 30 years, many countries have encouraged or man-
dated hospitals to have multi-professional HECs. For example, in 
Germany, the German Lutheran and Catholic Church Association pub-
lished in 1997 a joint recommendation brochure to establish HECs 
(Deutscher Evangelischer Krankenhausverband and Katholischer 
Krankenhausverband 1997). Significant functions of HECs are to 
 conduct ethics consultations, patient care review, develop policies and 
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 organize ethics education. The committees usually meet once a month at 
a certain time and place in the hospital.
Engagement in caring about care in the hospital arena from an ethical 
perspective and trying to bring in nurses’ voices in HECs can be seen as 
a reaction to care deficits and loosening care practices that harm patients. 
Nurses in countries with distinctly different healthcare systems like 
Germany, Norway, the USA and Canada report similar shortcomings in 
their work environments and the quality of hospital care. A study in 2001 
of more than 43,000 nurses practicing in more than 700 hospitals in 5 
countries indicates that fundamental problems in the organization of 
work are widespread in hospitals in Europe and North America (Aiken 
et al. 2001, 2013). Maria Schubert and her colleagues (2008) as well as 
Beatrice Kalisch (2006) even refer to “missed nursing care”.
Nurses reported spending time performing functions that did not call 
upon their professional training (delivering and retrieving food trays or 
transporting patients), while care practices requiring their skills and 
expertise (oral hygiene, skin care) were left undone (Aiken et al. 2001).
Studies in Canadian hospitals reveal what actually happens to nurses’ 
care-giving in a hospital that is organized to be both efficient and effective 
in the use of its resources (Rankin and Campbell 2006). What emerges is 
a troubling picture for those who value and conceptualize care as a core 
practice for those who are dependent and vulnerable (Kittay 1999; Tronto 
1993).
In this chapter, nurses’ ethical problems in hospital care and their partici-
pation in HECs are traced over the last 30 years on the basis of studies in 
nursing ethics. HECs are seen as a discursive space to bring ethical problems 
to a head, including conflicts of care. Nurses’ voices of care are illustrated 
using a field study in Germany (Kohlen 2009) as an example. While studies 
of nurses’ participation in HECs can be traced back to the 1980s, investiga-
tions into their ethical concerns in hospital care go back to the 1990s.
 Nurses’ Ethical Concerns in Hospital Care
The dominant concerns found in stories and narratives of everyday nurs-
ing practice are of caring, responsiveness to others and responsibility 
(Benner et al. 1996). When the nurse ethicist and director of the Kennedy 
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Institute Carol Taylor (1997) interviewed nurses to get to know their ethi-
cal concerns, she had to realize that most of the nurses felt hard- pressed to 
describe the nature of their everyday nursing concerns that had ethical 
significance. She states that “...while some everyday nursing concerns are 
unique to nursing, most derive from tensions that involve the interdisci-
plinary team and raise broader issues about the human well- being that are 
best addressed by the institution or health care system at large” (Taylor 
1997, p. 69). In order to investigate their concerns, she analysed collected 
case studies which lead nurses to request ethical consultation. She identi-
fied that nurses mostly struggle for the respect for human dignity, a com-
mitment to holistic care, a commitment to individualized care which is 
responsive to unique needs of the patient, the responsibility for a continu-
ity of care and the scope of authority and identifying the limits of care-
giving (Taylor 1997, pp.  69–82). Taylor discusses that none of the 
concerns are unique to nursing, but they may be experienced with greater 
immediacy and urgency by nurses as well as other care-givers. She also 
observed that more nurses described their moral orientation as care-based 
rather than justice-based (see also Holly 1986).
 Conflicts and Invisibilities
Both nurse ethicists Joan Liaschenko (1993) and Patricia Rodney (1997) 
have specifically investigated the concerns of practicing nurses. In an eth-
nographic study of nurses practicing on two acute medical units, Rodney 
explored the situational constraints that made it difficult for nurses to 
uphold their professional standards. Varcoe et  al. (2004) support their 
findings of the serious structural and interpersonal constraints experi-
enced, for example, excessive workloads for nurses, the absence of inter-
disciplinary team rounds, conflicts between team members inside and 
outside nursing and conflicts with patients and family members. Rodney 
(1997) explains that the inability of nurses to arrange space to talk with 
patients constrains their ability to truly focus and be attentive to the 
authentic needs of the patients and families. In a further study with her 
colleagues (Storch et  al. 2002), in addition to a lack of time, another 
predominant theme was nurses’ concern about appropriate use of 
resources. They struggled with decisions made by others regarding the 
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allocation of scarce resources. Some of the nurses interviewed described 
physicians as not willing to listen to or to receive the nurses’ point of view 
and were reluctant to accept that nurses have any independent moral 
responsibility when caring for patients (Storch et  al. 2002). Moreover, 
the study gives evidence that the organizational climate, including policy 
development, is problematic for nurses. Sometimes this is related to a 
lack of policy, sometimes to the presence of a binding policy, and more 
often, to an ambiguous policy. For example, policies that were considered 
to be too binding, such as resuscitation policies, were related to patients 
whose best interest was overseen by following a code (Storch et al. 2002).
Central to the concerns given voice by nurses interviewed in Liaschenko’s 
study was their sensitivity to patient need. They were aware of the
… increased vulnerability to loss of ... agency in the face of disease, illness. 
... Need was not seen solely in terms of a biomedical model of altered 
physiology but was conceived broadly to include those things which helped 
the individual to initiate or re-establish routines of lived experience and to 
cope with the settings in which they found themselves. ... In this view, need 
was relative to the realities of the patient’s day-to-day life. (Liaschenko 
1993, p. 262)
Liaschenko (1993), Rodney (1997) and Varcoe et al. (2003) identified 
meeting the patients’ and families’ needs for emotional support as being 
undervalued and overlooked in nursing work. “Because emotional work 
is a social transaction and not a product, it is invisible in a product-driven 
society. New nurses learn very quickly what the ‘official’ work is and what 
the unofficial work is. Emotional work is extra, frequently coming out of 
the personal time of nurses” (Liaschenko 2001, p. 2). The authors argue 
that economically driven changes imply that only certain processes are 
remunerated. Consequently, only certain, measurable aspects of care are 
accounted for and funded, while other tasks of nursing care are ignored. 
Hereby, different values underlie what is accounted for and what is over-
looked in an evaluation and a decision-making process that follows rather 
managerial rules (Rankin and Campbell 2006). Dealing with social issues 
that actually have no place in the sphere of medicine and the mandate of 
the hospital, like homelessness and poverty, is also invisible in nursing 
work (Varcoe et al. 2003).
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 Moral Distress, Missed Connectedness 
and Fragmentation of Care
According to several research findings, there are significant personal costs 
associated with nurses’ caring work and concerns: fatigue, guilt and per-
sonal risk as well as the experience of anger, frustration and feelings of 
powerlessness (Erlen 1993; Redman 1996; Rodney 1997). Nurses feel 
frustrated because they cannot do what they should do with regard to 
“good care” and nurses feel powerless to affect their working conditions 
(Rodney 1997). The constraints limited the competences of nurses to 
care and resulted in moral distress, that is knowing “... the right things to 
do, but institutional constraints make it nearly impossible to pursue the 
right course of action” (Jameton 1984, p.  6). Moral distress is experi-
enced by practitioners when they confront structural and interpersonal 
constraints in their workplaces (Aiken et al. 2000; Gaudine et al. 2011; 
Rodney and Varcoe 2001). Lorraine Hardingham (2004) argues that 
nurses often find themselves in positions where they have to compromise 
their moral integrity in order to survive in the hospital or other healthcare 
environment. The consequences are a fragmentation of care as well as 
fragmented decision-making that can have negative effects for patients 
and families and foster feelings of powerlessness and stress on the part of 
nurses (Varcoe et al. 2003). Nevertheless, institutional constraints cannot 
be interpreted as a justification for leaving out nursing caring practices, 
but can only be an explanation that needs further investigation.
In the study, Power, Politics, and Practice: Towards a Better Moral 
Climate for Health Care Delivery, Patricia Rodney (2005) identifies the 
main problems that prevent safe nursing practice. She emphasizes the 
dangerousness of “normalization”:
This means that serious congestion of patients in the ED, mismatches of 
patient acuity to available treatment / care, and overall lack of resources 
have started to become taken for granted. For instance, when asking hospi-
tal management for extra staff or to look for beds, nurses have told us (and 
we have seen) that the rebuttal is sometimes ‘well, it was much worse the 
other day’. Nurses are sometimes asked to care for more than one venti-
lated patient plus other patients – a situation that would certainly not be 
considered ‘normal’ in a critical care unit. And patients are being held in 
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the halls for so long now that some physicians are asking to start treatment 
in the hall or rapid treatment area without nursing coverage or assessment. 
This is in violation of safe emergency practice standards. Furthermore, it 
has become too much the norm that patients and their families will have to 
put up with far less than optimal care in our currently over-stretched pro-
vincial health care system. (Rodney 2005, p. 2)
Moreover, she points out that nurses describe themselves as being dis-
connected to their colleagues, management, other departments in the 
hospital or the community and that they feel that they have no meaning-
ful say in how the emergency department is run, but are rather expected 
to put up with the consequences. Feeling connected and building up 
relationships in healthcare are important factors of healthcare outcomes 
for patients and the quality of work life experienced by healthcare provid-
ers (Varcoe et al. 2003, p. 959).
One reason is that nurses’ issues of concern are systematic, that is to 
say: the problems arise in predictable settings and not randomly. The 
organization can make it very difficult for nurses to fulfil their ideals of 
good care. The ones who carry out caring work find it impossible to 
approach care as a coherent process. The fragmentation of care threatens 
the unity of the caring process. It is not something in the nature of care- 
giving itself, but rather the low social status and the poor organization of 
care that can make nursing a difficult practice. Are there practices of 
resistance?
Practices of healthcare providers can be resistant to imposed rules, 
changes and dominant ways of thinking. In these situations, for example, 
individual nurses ignored rules and the system in order to practice care 
according to the needs of patients and families. Canadian researchers give 
the example of emergency nurses’ practices of “bending the rules” to give 
patients pain medication to take home despite the lack of a physicians’ 
order (Varcoe et al. 2003, p. 967). The resistant practices identified are 
going against both the prevailing ideologies and colleagues following 
them.
According to these studies, the goals and rules of the institution can 
become the driving force behind any kind of actions and procedures 
whereby nurses act as facilitators and negotiators who are no longer dedi-
cated to the well-being of patients, but to the system of management that 
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implies a kind of control over patients as cases. What does it mean to 
know the case in comparison to knowing the patient and the person?
 Knowing the Case Versus Knowing the Patient 
and the Person
Case histories and case records are part of a larger development of admin-
istrative technologies that can be called knowledge devices, used in pro-
fessional administrative practices. Procedures for writing them are 
manufactured in ways that records are collected according to standards so 
that the individual is put into categories and interpretative schemata. The 
facts are abstracted from the actual events that happen at a certain place 
and time. Dorothy Smith remarks that they are
typically embedded in and integral to forms of organization where the 
immediate and day-to-day contact with the people to be processed is at the 
front line and involves subordinates, whereas decisions about those people 
are made by persons in designated positions of responsibility who lack such 
on-going direct contact. (Smith 1990, p. 89)
Structuring the case story in such a way that meets this form, Smith 
explains, is articulated to an organization of power and position in which 
some have authority to contribute to the production of the textual reali-
ties and others do not. “Those who are the objects of case histories are 
normally distinctively deprived ... those who have direct knowledge of 
the patient’s life outside the hospital or of her daily routines in the hospi-
tal are least privileged to speak and be heard” (Smith 1990, p. 91).
Institutionalized hospital practices operate as information-based and 
as patient case knowledge that is business-oriented to make healthcare 
organizations successful, and are not necessarily consistent with caring. 
Nurses learn to leave out experience-based domestic elements of care 
that would disrupt the authoritative plan to meet desired outcomes 
(Rankin and Campbell 2014). The nurses are attentive to the required 
workflow and try to smooth over things that might disrupt it. They focus 
on the technologically structured work and miss other aspects of nursing 
activities that are unaccounted for in the formal plans, directions, 
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 documentation and requirements. “Any effort or use of time and nursing 
attention that is outside the institutional version of care becomes extra-
neous” (Rankin and Campbell 2014, p. 168).
Based on the analysis of their empirical research data, Joan Liaschenko 
and Anastasia Fisher (1999) differentiate between types of knowledge: 
the case, the patient and the person. Case knowledge they consider as 
generalized biomedical knowledge of anatomy, physiology, pathology, as 
well as therapeutics (Liaschenko and Fisher 1999, pp. 33–35). Liaschenko 
(1997) claims that case knowledge is disembodied knowledge. One could 
know, for example, all necessary facts about cardiac disease without per-
ceiving that disease as being embodied in a particular individual. The 
disease is understood as a deviation from the biological norm. Fisher and 
Liaschenko unfold the idea of case knowledge:
This case, or biomedical, knowledge is the primary knowledge of the con-
temporary health care system in that it legitimises the practice of medicine 
which, in turn, controls knowledge. It also legitimises that aspect of nurs-
ing work that is concerned with monitoring disease processes and thera-
peutic responses. (Liaschenko and Fisher 1999, p. 33)
This case knowledge is the standard against which the specific features 
of an individual care receiver are measured. The shift from case  knowledge 
to patient knowledge is made when the care-giver encounters the actual 
body of the care-receiver and, in doing so, knowledge transcends case 
knowledge and grows to patient knowledge. The care of the patient at the 
bedside requires knowledge of how the disease is manifest in this particu-
lar patient. It includes any unique features of anatomy and physiology in 
this patient, and how this patient responds to care and treatments. Patient 
knowledge also implies knowing how things get done for the individual 
within and between institutions as well as knowledge of other care pro-
viders who are involved. The complexity of patient knowledge is based on 
“... the fact that its content is no longer limited to generalized case knowl-
edge and the expectancies for action which it generates. Rather, it consists 
of the nurse’s interaction with a particular body, the responses of which 




In contrast to case and patient knowledge, person knowledge is defined 
as knowledge of the individual within his or her personal biography (Brody 
2002). It implies knowing something about what the specific history means 
to the individual. Studies revealed that person knowledge was used when 
there was some conflict between courses of action desired by the individual 
and those desired by the therapeutic team (physician, physiotherapist, 
social worker etc.). Person knowledge is useful for nurses “to defend their 
arguments for an alternative management of disease trajectories and to jus-
tify their actions when those actions support an individual’s agency, even 
though this can conflict with established biomedical or institutional courses 
of action” (Liaschenko and Fisher 1999, p. 39). In other terms, this dif-
ferentiation could be understood as a confusion of means and purpose. 
While the case knowledge assumes certain features that make up a certain 
profile of a person that fits the use of certain procedures, diagnostic tech-
niques and therapeutic possibilities, the person knowledge assumes an 
individual whose own biography and voice count to understand the case. 
Within the logic of the case knowledge, the individual can become a means 
to an end since you watch out for a profile that fits your available or pro-
spective answers. Within the logic of the person knowledge, the individual 
is the purpose and transitional means, and answers have to be found in the 
process of getting to know the individual by listening to his or her own 
voice and unique history. The person knowledge takes caring time and 
“understanding” becomes decisive, while case knowledge saves time and 
understanding becomes unnecessary. The organization of care serves to 
separate the individual from the context in which interactions take place. 
To be taken away from that context means to become detached from the 
context of one’s living. It becomes the organization’s business. Individual 
histories can be rendered invisible or abstracted into a package of reports.
Besides being resistant and bending the rules, nurses could articulate 
the dilemmas of and in nursing care practices within the hospital arena 
and bring in patient as well as person knowledge. Hospital Ethics 
Committees can offer such a forum and space for nurses’ voices. Joan 
Tronto (2010) convincingly describes in her article on how to create car-
ing institutions that this can never happen without a “rhetorical space” 
(Code 1995) or a “moral space” (Walker 1993, 1998) or “a political 
space” (Tronto 2010) within which caring issues can be debated.
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Thinking along the lines of John Dryzek’s idea (2000) of fostering a 
discursive way of communication and deliberation, I am in favour of a 
discursive space. HECs can serve as a discursive space in the sense that an 
expansive kind of communication is supported that allows unruly and 
contentious voices from the margins. The characteristics are: (1) the pres-
ence of a hitherto scarcely represented group and their voices increase 
among the actors who are in a position of decision-making; (2) the impli-
cation of inequality and power relationships being bound to traditions is 
seen as a problem to be expounded when issues are raised and struggles 
for attention occur; (3) participation becomes real rather than symbolic 
(Dryzek 2000, p. vi; Kohlen 2009, p. 159).
 Nurses’ Membership, Voice and Participation 
in Hospital Ethics Committees
From their start, Hospital Ethics Committees (HECs) have recognized 
the importance of including individuals from different backgrounds as 
members. The legitimacy of the nurse’s participation and their potential 
contribution as members of these committees has been acknowledged. 
Nursing as well as medical literature pays attention to the benefits of 
including nurses in ethics deliberations (Aroskar 1984; Aroskar et  al. 
2004; Fost and Cranford 1985; Fowler 1997; President’s Commission 
1983; Youngner et al. 1983). Nurses are supposed to add further dimen-
sions to the decision-making process because they are usually in close 
proximity to their patients and spend more time at the bedside than any 
other member of the healthcare team. What are the experiences of nurses 
with regard to membership, participation and contributing their voice?
Membership indicates who can speak, whose opinions are counted, and 
whose discounted. Membership may determine even which issues are seen 
as legitimate ethical concerns and which are not. ... So, to say that a hospi-
tal has an ethics committee tells us very little unless we know as well: who 




In 1991, a study on Physicians’ Attitudes Toward Hospital Ethics 
Committees found that merely 69% believed that nurses should be mem-
bers in clinical committees and only 59% thought that they should have 
access (Finkenbine and Gramelspacher 1991), and when the number of 
Hospital Ethics Committees rose drastically, the American nurse ethicists 
Barba Edwards and Amy Haddad (1988) remarked that the specific and 
unique ethical concerns of nurses had also not been adequately addressed 
by these multidisciplinary committees. Their issues were not framed as 
ethical issues and therefore excluded. The nurse ethicist Dianne Bartels 
et al. (1994) who co-chaired a Hospital Ethics Committee in Minnesota 
in the 1980s is convinced: “I do not think hospital nurses have trouble 
speaking up, they just need a place to show up. (…) you need a place to 
convene, and then, once you are there, people don’t have trouble … rep-
resenting their issues”. She also thinks that the co-chair model equalizes 
power, expands interaction on the committees and increases the comfort 
of nurses to be able to speak up. “Moreover, nurses need to learn the lan-
guage (spoken by ethicists)” (Kohlen 2009, p. 150).
Cheryl Holly (1986) found that nurses are forced to function at con-
ventional levels in the bureaucratic organization of the hospital. It was 
seen as a failure when they were not able to define concerns related to 
their practice in terms of rights and justice. Nurses who attempted to 
operate from a base of caring and responsibility were relegated to a con-
ventional role. Betty Sichel (1992) examined procedures, deliberations, 
goals and functions of Hospital Ethics Committees and realized that a 
model of rights and justice is not appropriate to describe ethical ques-
tions with regard to caring practices.
A study on the participation and perception of nurses in HECs gives a 
detailed overview that reveals changes compared to previous findings 
(Oddi and Cassidy 1990). The study was conducted in two phases. In the 
first phase, they determined the number of acute care hospitals in a 
Midwestern state that have HECs and obtained the names of the nurses 
who serve as members of these committees. In the second phase, they 
contacted individual nurses to assess the extent of their formal involve-
ment in ethical decision-making as well as their perception of the role of 
the ethics committee within their institutions. Of the 148 responses from 
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hospitals, 45% said they have an ethics committee. All hospitals reported 
that nurses serve on those committees. The average number of nurses was 
said to be 2. Nurses were invited to participate in the study by anony-
mously completing a brief questionnaire about their perceptions “... of 
how the ethics committee is involved with selected aspects of practice” 
(Oddi and Cassidy 1990, p. 309). Members were predominantly female, 
hold a master’s degree and served in administrative or management roles. 
The mean age was 42 years with a range of 25–65 years. The majority 
reported that they were either appointed or had volunteered to serve on 
the committee. They also indicated that they served on the committee 
from 1 to 7 years, with an average tenure of 2 years. Academic prepara-
tion, continuing education and self-directed learning were declared to be 
the main ways in which nurse members learn about ethics. Completion 
of an ethics course at either the graduate or the undergraduate level was 
reported by more than half of the respondents. Most of them indicated 
that they had attended continuing education programs, conferences or 
workshops on ethics. All respondents indicated that they contribute 
comments and ideas to the committee’s discussions. Only a few indicated 
that they sometimes contribute, over 40% stated that they usually con-
tribute and nearly half of them stated that they always contribute to the 
discussion. Only 1.4% indicated that their inputs were rarely sought 
(Oddi and Cassidi 1990).
The nurses interviewed in a study by Storch and Griener (1992) were 
generally positive regarding the perceived potential of a HEC, but only a 
few nurses were actually aware of the presence of the ethics committees 
(see also Pederson et al. 2009). For example, at one hospital, 20 nurses 
out of a total of 361 respondents were not aware of any ethics education 
being offered by the hospital. The study found that differences in ease of 
access to HECs by healthcare professionals were particularly pronounced 
between physicians and nurses. Physicians seemed to have greater access 
to the ethics committees and were perceived to have more support from 
them. In contrast, nurses did not perceive themselves as having direct 
access to the committees for consultation. They believed that access 
would be through their supervisor. Even though these gatekeepers posed 
no significant barrier, a few nurses interviewed stated that they would be 
too intimidated to go to the committee (Storch and Griener 1992, p. 23).
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Cornelia Fleming (1997) found: “In institutions with established 
Hospital Ethics Committees, nurses are routinely included as members; 
however, the number of nurses able to participate at this level is small and 
not proportionally representative of nurses in clinical practice” (Fleming 
1997, p. 7). A problem evolves: it is not bedside nurses as actors of caring 
practices who participate in HECs, but nursing managers. While nurses 
in management may bring a broader view, the perspective of staff nurses 
may be lost if they are not adequately represented. This is in fact a con-
tradiction in the given role of nurses pointed out above, since nursing 
managers do not know patients by direct contact and have textual case 
knowledge, instead of a patient and person knowledge.
Although an occupation may have an adequate numerical representa-
tion, there could be differential participation in terms of communication 
exchange, as the study by Charlotte McDaniel (1998) reveals with regard 
to the nurses’ communication exchange frequency as members in four 
sample HECs examined. Nurses proportionately represented the same or 
more membership numbers as physicians and the frequency of nurses’ 
communication exchange was comparatively modest in proportion. The 
nurses had one of the smallest proportions of communication exchanges. 
Although most of the nurse members contributed communication 
exchanges to a topic, there were also nurses who did not participate at all. 
Nevertheless, nurses rated their participation effectiveness quite highly. 
Although nurses were moderately communicative on the committees, 
McDaniel suggests: “... nurses are engaged, active, and selectively partici-
pating in the committee deliberations. Nurses appear to be comfortable 
with a less overtly active, yet representative numerical membership on the 
committees” (McDaniel 1998, p. 50). Further exploration of the content 
of nurses’ communication showed that they participate most in the dis-
cussions regarding patient care review and much less with regard to policy 
formation and education. McDaniel argues that nurses, representing the 
single largest group of healthcare personnel, need to be involved in the 
policies and decisions that surround and affect their administrative and 
clinical practice (McDaniel 1998, p. 48).
Sarah-Jane Dodd (2004) and her colleagues investigated the extent to 
which nurses engage with regard to “ethical activism” and “ethical asser-
tiveness”. Ethical activism they defined as “actions directed toward 
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reforming institutional policies and procedures, as well as attitudes of 
physicians and other medical staff, to create favourable climate for 
(nurses’) participation in ethical deliberations” (Dodd et al. 2004, p. 17). 
Ethical assertiveness is defined as “actions to enter or facilitate ethics 
deliberations in which nurses have not been included, whether through 
personal initiative, coaching patients, advocating patients’ wishes to oth-
ers, or ethical case finding” (Dodd et al. 2004, p. 17). The researchers 
contend that these two kinds of involvement are vitally important if 
nurses want to expand their ethical roles. The results indicated that nurses 
are more likely to employ ethical assertiveness and ethical activism in set-
tings that are already receptive to nursing participation. The authors rec-
ommend that nurses
need to try to change the hospital environment so that it promotes, rather 
than discourages, their participation. Even when not formally invited, 
(they) need to engage in ethical assertiveness when they advocate for 
patients, coach patients, act as ethical case finders, initiate ethics delibera-
tions, and not withdraw from deliberations when not specifically asked to 
participate. (Dodd et al., 2004, p. 26)
The findings of the studies raise questions. First, why do the nurses 
know so little about ethics committees? Storch and Griener ask whether 
this goes back to a lack of knowledge that is induced by medical politics 
or whether it could be understood as a strategy of nursing administration 
maternalism that keeps staff nurses and head nurses removed from such 
information, or whether it might be simply a problem in communication 
within the hospital (Storch and Griener 1992, p.  25). In a study by 
Gaudine et al. (2011), nurses still report about a lack of knowledge about 
HECs as well as lack of experience.
A second question is whether ethics committees support existing struc-
tures and power relationships in the hospital rather than a shift to a dem-
ocratic way of multi-professional discussion of ethical dilemmas and 
conflicts of care. The comments from physicians, nurses and administra-




The standards issued by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organizations in 1992 required that structures be in place 
within institutions to enable nurses to participate in ethical deliberations 
(Erlen 1993). The standard is also included in the Standards of Clinical 
Nursing Practice developed by the American Nurses Association in 1991. 
But, having structures in place for nurses’ participation does not necessar-
ily mean that their voices are heard and that they bring in issues of care. 
The nurse ethicist and nursing manager Hans de Ruyter who has more 
than ten years of committee experiences in two different hospitals has 
gained a rather critical perspective and explains:
Nurses’ issues get addressed if they present them the way that the people, 
the physicians and the kind of the leadership see it. So, you have to present 
it in a certain way, and if you go outside of that model, ... so, if you bring 
up an issue that they do not classify as being an ethical issue, you don’t get 
listened to. But people and nurses, I think, we are very adaptable, so there 
is [sic] always nurses that will learn the language and you get listened to (...) 
But then, you cannot truly bring up the issues that you think are ethical 
issues because it’s very much I think with ethical issues which issues are 
classified as ethical issues and which ones aren’t. And, I think that the 
nurses who do that and I can’t talk about ...their mind, but for me, the 
quandary is, do I want to be a part of the leadership and then I have to 
adapt, or do I speak what I think should be spoken, and that automatically 
makes me an outsider. (Kohlen 2009, p. 155)
 Nursing Ethics Committees
Some nursing professionals established Nursing Ethics Committees 
(NECs) as entities separate from the multi-professional HECs. These 
committees are structured within the healthcare organization created spe-
cifically to assist nurses in resolving ethical dilemmas. They are comprised 
of nurses who represent different positions of nurses within the organiza-
tion, such as nurse managers, nurse educators as well as staff nurses. They 
are supposed to assist nurses to identify, clarify and articulate the issues in 
their practice (Erlen 1993; Fleming 1997).
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A forerunner of this idea dates back to the time when the institution-
alization of HECs after the Quinlan decision first subsided. At that time, 
in many hospitals, some still rather small and unknown groups began to 
meet regularly to discuss clinical problems they were facing with their 
colleagues (Kohlen 2009). The nurse ethicist Ruth Purtilo at Massachusetts 
General Hospital (MGH) in Boston looks back to the mid-1970s and 
explains:
A group of nurses came to me telling ‘We need an informal committee’, ... 
what they needed, was a room and time to talk about daily conflicts and 
dilemmas in clinical practice. We established an informal forum to discuss 
nursing ethical issues. The goal was to get this forum more or less institu-
tionalized. One effect of the forum was the reduction of moral distress. 
(Kohlen 2009, p. 156)
One of the first official NECs was established in a Catholic hospital in 
Omaha, Nebraska in 1984. The vice president of patient care took the 
initiative to establish a NEC at the hospital, because she could not get the 
multi-professional ethics committee get moving (Kohlen 2009, p. 156). 
Amy Haddad, professor and director of the Center of Health Policy and 
Ethics at Creighton University in Omaha, and at that time doctoral stu-
dent of nursing, became a consultant. She explains in an interview:
... once the Nursing Ethics Committee was started and had a full day ori-
entation to what ethics was, how decisions would be made, how to struc-
ture it (...) we had representatives from all the nursing areas in the hospital. 
This was before the hospital had governance structures, so there wasn’t any-
thing else in place (...) we got the people who were most interested to do it. 
So, we probably met for six months, people on board for (…) physicians to 
establish the institutional ethics committee. So, I had to work as a consul-
tant to that committee (...) both committees, the nursing committee and 
the committee for the whole institution. (Kohlen 2009, p. 157)
NECs are described as a way to empower nurses so that they can more 
fully participate in multidisciplinary ethical discussions and prepare 
nurses to become effectively involved in HECs (Zink and Titus 1994, 
p. 70). On the basis of the descriptions, establishing NECs seems to be 
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an adequate way to address ethical issues including the ones that refer to 
caring practices. But critical considerations are also expressed. Erlen 
argues that nurses who only discuss issues with other nurses might be 
limited in their focus. Perspectives given by other healthcare workers 
could challenge the analysis of the conflict and broaden the enquiry. 
“Although all nurses do not hold the same exact philosophy of nursing, 
there is a greater likelihood that there will be less divergence of perspec-
tives and fewer alternatives presented when an ethics committee is com-
prised almost entirely of nurses” (Erlen 1997, p.  59). NECs might 
encourage division rather than collaboration with other disciplines 
(Fleming 1997, p. 8). The clinical ethicist, Mary Faith Marshall points 
out, that “nurses can be their best enemies, … a democratic process 
should be learnt … (and a) change in practices of local multi-disciplinary 
committees need to be supported by everyone” (Kohlen 2009, p. 157).
A closer look reveals that the question could be raised whether the 
functions of Nursing Ethics Committees are often the responsibility of 
other committees within the healthcare organizations. Moreover, while 
some nursing concerns are unique to nursing, most raise broader ques-
tions about human well-being that might be better addressed by the insti-
tution and the healthcare system at large (Taylor 1997, p. 69). A restricted 
discussion of these concerns to NECs may end up in their becoming 
trivialized or even marginalized. And, a separate nursing committee 
might communicate the image to the institution that these concerns are 
of lesser importance than those addressed by an interdisciplinary 
committee.
What happens if the committee actually serves to make nurses grow 
stronger in articulating their thoughts and put their issues of concern on 
the agenda? Haddad tells her piece of the story in an interview:
It created problems over the years because they stood up, collectively, you 
know, so you got now five people on the unit, and they are not only five 
people, they are five experienced people because usually people that volun-
teer for this had been there a while. And now we are going through years of 
running the committee, and learning a language and all that. Then you got 
five people who were saying, we are not going to put up with this. They 
started to present problems (and there came a new director). She was 
 Caring About Care in the Hospital Arena and Nurses’ Voices... 
254 
unhappy with how they (the nurses) reacted to (…). I mean, they had 
learnt to ask questions. They had learnt to say that they would not agree on 
policies: We are not following it. Why are we not following it in this case, 
so what is happening? They had learnt to use tools of good arguments. (...) 
They had been taught to tell why (...) you cannot go up to somebody and 
say you are wrong, you have to have good arguments, and be able to say, 
here are my concerns and this is why (...) and they had been taught to do 
that, and they had learnt to link arms in how to do that, because nobody 
wants to be the one going forward. (Kohlen 2009, p. 158)
Bart Cusveller (2012) studied HECs and nurses’ competency profiles. 
For future development, nurses ask for education in communication 
skills for all committee members, such as listening, speaking and writing. 
The ethics committee nurses were confronted with issues arising from 
constraints in the institutional context, such as budget issues and staff 
shortages.
In summary, the research findings about nurses’ participation in HECs 
show that their participation does not necessarily mean that their issues 
are raised and their voices are heard. The following example taken from a 
field study in Germany (Kohlen 2009) can illustrate how caring issues are 
minimized and dismissed.
 Voices of Care in a German Hospital Ethics 
Committee: A Petit Ethical Problem
A retrospective case consultation takes place in a committee meeting in a 
German hospital (Kohlen 2009, pp. 188–192):
A nurse had written down a concern in order to consult the commit-
tee. The female minister took the paper to the committee meeting and 
read it aloud. The nurse had experienced a situation two years ago that 
was still bothering her: An elderly female patient had been in need of a 
blood bottle. When the blood bottle arrived from the lab, it was still very 
cold, and the physician on shift asked the nurse to put the bottle on the 
old lady’s belly, so that the blood bottle would warm up easily for her. The 
nurse, who did know the patient, could not imagine doing it. The patient 
had been sleeping and was not in an alert condition at all. The female 
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physician then told her to ask another nurse to do it, someone who would 
be more professional than her.
The discussion in the ethics committee developed as followed:
Female 
Minister:
“It is really uncomfortable to have something cold on your belly!”
Physician A: “This is absurd from a medical perspective. There are, of course, 
other technical aids that can help to warm up blood bottles”.
Nurse A: “This nurse feels like an advocate for the patient, and wants to 
take care of her autonomy”.
Physician A: “This is really a mini ethical problem!”
Physician B: “I think the problem emerged from hierarchy!”
Minister A: “I think they have some communication problems on the ward”.
Physician C: “But this is really a petit ethical problem!”
The discussion ends after some minutes, declaring that this is really a 
minor problem. The minister explains that she will have to talk to the 
nurse who has revealed her concern.
Female Minister 
asks:
“What should I tell her?
Physician A: “You can tell her that she did not do anything wrong within 
the current knowledge of practice”.
Physician B: “And you can add that the problem had to do with 
hierarchy and failed communication”.
Physician C adds: “Well, the more I think about it, the more I feel 
instrumentalized by this nurse, because this is not an 
ethical problem at all!”
Nurse B: “You can tell that she did not do anything wrong, and you 
can tell her about the possible hierarchy and 
communication problem behind it, but never tell her that 
this is not or is just a small ethical problem”.
The meeting abruptly ends; people rose from their places and left the 
room. The minister remained there and took some notes.
 Interpretation
First, the minister reacts and states, “It is really uncomfortable to have 
something cold on your belly”. And this actually collides with a practice 
of care that does not allow one to put somebody into an uncomfortable 
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state for the use of something or somebody else. The lady who is ill and 
sleeping cannot defend herself and therefore needs protection. The physi-
cian explicitly speaks from a medical perspective, stating that “this is 
absurd” and that this is not the right way to warm up blood bottles, 
because there are technical aids. He clarifies that this is obviously not a 
medical dilemma in which physicians do not know how to make an ade-
quate decision.
Nurse A shows empathy for the nurse who has revealed her concern. 
She identifies the role of the nurse who cared for the old lady as an “advo-
cate for the patient” who wanted to take care of her autonomy. Caring for 
her autonomy from a nursing understanding could mean that the patient 
cannot articulate herself and therefore needs protection, here given by the 
nurse. This is a mandate of nurses. It is different from the physician’s, 
who is interested in getting a warm blood bottle for a medical interven-
tion. Nursing care for patients who are sleeping implies keeping her or 
him in a state as comfortable as possible while protecting them from 
disturbing noises, interventions that can be postponed like “taking the 
blood pressure”, as well as disturbing and uncomfortable interventions 
like putting a cold blood bottle on their warm belly. Although, in the 
patient’s current state of not being able to verbally interact, the nurse sees 
that her autonomy still belongs to her and cannot be taken away, she uses 
the principle of autonomy to justify her nursing care, namely, her respon-
sibility to take care of the patient’s sleep.
When the physician defines the situation as “a mini ethical problem” 
without giving any reason, no questions or controversial points are raised. 
Why this is only a small ethical problem is left open. The physician does 
not feel a need for explanation, and nobody else asks for it. Then the 
commentaries that lack explanation move on: Physician B declares it as a 
problem that has to do with hierarchy, and Minister A remarks that the 
problem might be linked to “some communication problems on the 
ward”. Since the exclamations that follow the non-rejected definition of 
a “mini ethical problem”, one could ask whether hierarchy and commu-
nication are categories that can be put under the umbrella of small ethical 
problems or whether they are indicators for difficult situations that can-
not simply be framed as ethical. Framing them in the context of small 
ethical problems minimizes their potential for conflicts and understand-
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ing the situation in its complexity which, of course, can harm not only 
patients but also disrupt professional identities, here nursing care.
When Physician C repeats the remark of Physician A that this is a 
“petit ethical problem”, the conversation is closed down. There seems to 
be a hidden consensus about how much time should be spent on what 
kind of issues. That the discussion of the concern does not deserve much 
time could have been evoked by the minimization of the problem. The 
minister, realizing that the discussion is ending, asks the rather pragmatic 
question: “What should I tell her?” and the first answer is given by 
Physician A who started to comment on the concern. “You can tell her 
that she did not do anything wrong…”, he authorizes the minister to tell. 
Does this mean that the nurse acted correctly according to a medical 
perspective? What are the criteria to distinguish between wrong and right 
in this situation? And who has the power to define it?
Physician B adds that the nurse should be told that “the problem had 
to do with hierarchy and failed communication”. What is the message of 
this information? What can the nurse take out of this kind of analysis? 
This is difficult to tell, because there is no explanation. With regard to 
inter-relationships, especially between different professions, you can 
 narrow down and contextualize nearly everything with hierarchy and 
communication problems in a hospital. Physician C “feels instrumental-
ized” by the concern of the nurse. This is a strong reproach. “This is not 
an ethical problem at all!” is the explanation for his feeling. Does a talk of 
problems which are not defined as ethical ones, instrumentalize dispu-
tants? Again, it is not clear what counts as a “real ethical problem” in 
comparison to a “petit” ethical problem, or a different kind of a problem, 
for example, of competence and communication. Criteria are not given. 
What is the legitimization to minimize the nursing concern at all?
It is the physician who has the power to declare what counts as a “real 
ethical problem” and what counts as a petit ethical problem. Nobody in 
the group asked for an explanation why the problem is declared to be a 
petit ethical problem. Nobody talks about the physician who told the 
nurse to use the warmth of a patient’s body to warm up a blood bottle. 
What is her part in the story? What can be said about her clinical exper-
tise and responsibility? Did she behave in a correct manner? Did she pos-
sibly think that this might be a “petit ethical problem” that counts less 
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than the outcome, respectively, having a warm blood bottle for another 
patient in need?
The nurses’ professional role is to take care of the patient’s sleep. The 
nurse theorist Nancy Roper has developed a conceptual framework for 
nursing practice. One component of the model is called the “Activities of 
Daily Life” (ADL). Relaxing and being able to sleep is one element of 
these daily activities nurses have to care for. This involves having an eye 
on the duration of sleep, times of sleep, day and night rhythm, sleeping 
quality, rituals of falling asleep, habits and aids to fall asleep. Knowing the 
patient involves knowing his or her sleeping habits and knowing what 
this special patient needs to get the kind and duration of sleep that helps 
her to recover and gives comfort to her, especially when she is in pain and 
dying. The more dependent the patient is due to his situation of illness or 
disease, the more comfort the patient needs. For nurses, comfort implies a 
moral stance, clinical knowledge and the tangible, practical skills in 
which they have developed expertise.
 Conclusion
The experiences of three decades caring about care in the hospital arena 
from an ethical perspective and trying to bring in nurses’ voices into the 
discursive space of HECs point to structural shortcomings (resources), 
attention needing to be paid to power relationships and to the use of the 
ethical language being bound to a traditional institutional hierarchy in 
hospitals. Are structural shortcomings and the power-relationships 
expounded a problem in the first place? Is the language of ethics reflected 
to see whether issues of care can be described in depth? What are the 
theories and frameworks of ethics that rule the committee debates and 
how can they be broadened to capture issues of care?
Although the findings of my field study in Germany that investigated 
nurses’ participation in HECs as illustrated above cannot be generalized, 
they support the assumption that ethical conflicts of delivering caring 
practices are not listened to as such. As a result, when framing a conflict 
of care as an ethical one, it is framed as a “petit ethical problem” and its 
importance for attention and consideration is therefore minimized.
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Writing and talking about care mean that we need to take care of our 
care language and adapt it. It is difficult dealing with the limits of using 
words that do not represent patient knowledge, but only case knowledge 
that is textual and disembodied. Therefore, nurses who do bedside nurs-
ing and face-to-face body care need to be taken seriously whenever they 
articulate a concern about care.
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The patient in the bed has almost become an icon for the real patient who 
is in the computer. I’ve actually coined a term for that entity in the com-
puter. I call it the iPatient. The iPatient is getting wonderful care all across 
America. The real patient often wonders, where is everyone? When are they 
going to come by and explain things to me? Who’s in charge? Everybody 
who enters the healthcare system becomes isolated—it is built into the very 
infrastructure of the system. And, following from this, we can see that one 
of the most helpful things we can do to improve the experience of bodily 
impairment is to reduce that social isolation and vulnerability.
This apt description voiced by the medical doctor Abraham Verghese 
in a TED Talk expresses a feeling that is palpable in wider society 
(Verghese 2011). Various scholars have described the alienating effect 
provoked by being in the hospital or in other care settings. A patient’s 
sense of human belonging is likely to become vulnerable in an institu-
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tional context such as a hospital (Williams and Irurita 2004). This comes 
on top of the already disconcerting effect of the disease itself (Alzhén 
2011; Svenaeus 2011). Illness has essentially been characterized as an 
experience of not feeling at home in the world or in one’s body (Toombs 
2001a). Sveneaus describes the body as uncanny. He draws upon 
Heidegger’s description of illness as unhomelike being-in-the-world, but 
adds that the body will always remain our body. “The body is alien, yet, 
at the same time, myself. Although it involves biological processes beyond 
my control, these processes still belong to me as lived by me” (Svenaeus 
2000). In this context, some authors state that features of contemporary 
healthcare might add extra suffering and leave patients with feelings of 
discomfort and even pain (Berglund et  al. 2012; van Heijst 2011). 
Suffering can be distinguished from physical pain in that in physical pain, 
there can still be a sense of meaning and wholeness, while in suffering, 
people feel disconnected from others and the self (Cassell 2001).
Humanization refers to practices that take the perspectives and values 
of people who are part of the practice into consideration (Visse 2012). In 
this chapter I will limit myself to the notion of space and its meaning for 
the humanization of care. The influence of spatial aspects on patients’ 
well-being is described as crucial for more humanizing care (Galvin and 
Todres 2013; Norlyk et al. 2013). The notion of lived space is usually 
introduced referring to “the more” of the physical space: the felt and 
experiential space (Norlyk et al. 2013). In Europe, over the last decade, a 
lifeworld awareness has increasingly been applied to healthcare. Care 
given from a lifeworld perspective could provide important ideas and 
values that are central to the humanization of healthcare practice. This 
lifeworld perspective is grounded in phenomenological philosophy, 
which I will briefly describe in this chapter, followed by an examination 
of how lived space is understood and illustrated by examples from empir-
ical research. Second, from a care ethical perspective, I will argue for a 
broader notion of space that better reflects the practice of care. The life-
world approach remains focused on care as too narrow an interaction 
between two people, the patient and the healthcare professional. Third, I 
will explore the three-dimensional perspective of space as described by 
philosopher and sociologist Henri Lefebvre. His view allows a shift in 
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focus from the experiencing subject to social practice and changes the 
object of analysis when studying the (de)humanization of care.
 Phenomenology and Lived Space
 Lifeworld
Phenomenology refers to a philosophical attitude towards the world. 
“Phenomenology is the study of human experience and of the way things 
present themselves to us in and through such experience” (Sokolowski 
2000). In contrast to Western scientific thinking, phenomenology aims 
to bring together polarities such as mind-body, subject-object, individual- 
social and feelings-thoughts. The hyphens signify intertwining rather 
than separation (Finlay 2011). This is why Merleau-Ponty describes phe-
nomenology as a science of ambiguity. There is always ambiguity and, in 
a sense, indeterminacy, “precisely because we are not capable of disem-
bodied reflection upon our activities, but are involved in an intentional 
arc that absorbs both our body and our mind” (Merleau-Ponty 1962). 
Heidegger describes the impossibility of being disconnected from the 
world by his concept of being-in-the-world. The lifeworld—Lebenswelt—
is the central phenomenological focus and portrays this lived wholeness 
and inseparability. It denotes a meaningful whole that is both shared and 
experienced by individuals from their own unique perspective (Heidegger 
1998).
The issue of the lifeworld should be understood against the back-
ground of the advent of modern science; before then, people simply 
thought that the world we live in was the only world there was (Sokolowski 
2000). The project of phenomenology as started with Edmund Husserl 
(1859–1938) was to show that the exact, mathematical sciences are 
founded on the lifeworld and that they are transformations of the experi-
ence people directly have of things in the world. Husserl attempted to call 
to mind that
the lifeworld (…) is always already there, existing in advance for us, the 
‘ground’ of all praxis whether theoretical or extra theoretical. The world is 
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pre-given to us (…) not occasionally but always and necessarily as the uni-
versal field of all actual and possible praxis, a lifeworld. To live is always to 
live-in-certainty-of-the word. (Husserl 1970, p. 142)
The lifeworld is the beginning place-flow from which we divide up our 
experiences into more abstract categories and names (Galvin and Todres 
2013). Husserl did not question the value of modern science and his 
work suggests that there is nothing wrong with concepts and scientific 
theories as long as they refer to specific experiences and not just to each 
other. Phenomenology as a research method is directed towards exploring 
a human experience (a phenomenon) as it is lived through rather than 
how we conceptualize, theorize or reflect on it.
In recent years, interest in phenomenology has increased in the domain 
of professional practice (van Manen 2014). While in research primacy is 
increasingly given to categories, numbers and averages that might obscure 
the human dimensions (Galvin and Todres 2013), phenomenology can 
offer “a bridge across the chasm between practice and research” (Finlay 
2011). Although not everyone explicitly refers to the phenomenological 
notion of lifeworld, Dahlberg, Todres and Galvin have done so. These 
Swedish and British researchers have revisited Husserl’s notion of life-
world and describe in various papers how care led from this perspective 
could provide important ideas and values that are central to the human-
ization of healthcare practice. Humanization refers to “those things which 
make us feel more human” (Galvin and Todres 2013). They define eight 
philosophically informed dimensions for the humanization of care: insid-
erness, agency, uniqueness, togetherness, sense-making, sense of personal 
journey, sense of place and embodiment. The corresponding dimensions 
of dehumanization are described as: objectification, passivity, homogeni-
zation, isolation, loss of meaning, loss of personal journey, sense of dislo-
cation and a reductionist view of the body (Todres et  al. 2009). They 
advocate a perspective of care what they call lifeworld-led care that should 
be distinguished from patient-led or person-centred healthcare (Dahlberg 
et al. 2009). Although they appreciate these perspectives that emphasize 
the agency of patients, they question whether they encompass the kinds 
of concerns and knowledge of patients. On the one hand, they argue a 
consumerist and citizen model overly emphasizes personal or collective 
H. van der Meide
269
agency and self-authority and underemphasizes patients as “exposed” and 
“vulnerable.” In this way, they are an opposite reductionist version of a 
medical model that overemphasizes illness and underemphasizes the phe-
nomenon of human agency. They contend that when people become 
patients, they want to be seen in both their agency and vulnerability and 
feel unmet by interactions that emphasize one or the other. Because of 
the space for ambiguity, a phenomenological lifeworld perspective can 
address both dimensions of human existence.
 Lived Space as an Existential of the Lifeworld
The lifeworld is something both general and individual as we live in a 
shared world that we experience from our own unique perspective (van 
Manen 2014). To understand is both to understand something of this 
unique individual and the shared intersubjective horizons within which 
any unique experience occurs (Galvin and Todres 2013). Heidegger dif-
ferentiates between the ontological that refers to the existential precondi-
tions of being human and the ontic, in which there are many uniquely 
different individual and cultural ways of experiencing such ontological 
structures. Phenomenological research aims to give snapshots of these 
ontological structures, acknowledging that they always remain a part of 
the whole (Hansen 2015). There are at least four ontological structures 
described by various phenomenological philosophers that pervade the 
lifeworlds of all human beings, regardless of their historical, cultural or 
social situatedness. In order to not confuse these fundamental lifeworld 
themes with the more particular themes (the ontic) of certain human phe-
nomena that are studied in phenomenological research, van Manen 
describes the fundamental lifeworld themes as “existentials” (van Manen 
2014). Ashworth and Ashworth call them fragments to emphasize their 
interlinking, interpenetrating meanings (Ashworth and Ashworth 2003). 
Todres et al. use the words “constituents” and “dimensions” (Todres et al. 
2007). They all refer to a conceptual framework that can be used in 
research to describe human experiences in their holistic context. The con-
stituents of the lifeworld most commonly identified are lived time, lived 
space, lived body and lived intersubjectivity. These four existentials are 
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proven to be a helpful guide for reflection in the research process of phe-
nomenological questioning, reflecting and writing (van Manen 2014).
Lived space is thus considered an existential dimension of our life-
world. Unlike objective space, which refers to dimensions such as length, 
height and depth, lived space refers to the perceptual experience of space. 
This lived space is difficult to put into words and yet we know that the 
space in which we find ourselves affects the way we feel. The huge space 
of, for example, a train station may make us feel exposed and small, and 
a nice and cosy restaurant lets us feel at ease. The typical (sterile) air we 
smell when we enter the hospital can reassure us or instil fear. What this 
lived space as felt space entails can best be illustrated by examples from 
research practice.
Example 1: Lived Space for a Person with Alzheimer
Ashworth and Ashworth describe the lifeworld of a person suffering from 
Alzheimer’s disease in an attempt to focus in a realistic way on what peo-
ple with dementia have rather than what they lack (Ashworth and 
Ashworth 2003). In order to care well for a person with dementia, a carer 
should become an informal phenomenologist and set aside his or her 
own criteria of truth and reality and suspend the scholarly knowledge of 
what dementia typifies. Instead, the carer turns his or her attention to the 
actual activity and talk of the person in order to discover the meanings of 
that person’s lifeworld. They describe how, for a woman with dementia, 
space no longer radiates around her as the known and familiar or the 
available-to-be-known. Some spaces may be experienced as boundariless. 
There are, for example, no constraints of modesty or privacy. The woman 
in the study is no longer able to rely on space, and a gate or locked doors, 
for example, do not mean a boundary or threshold. “Naming a space may 
no longer have the power to reassure – the label may no longer indicate 
‘here’ versus ‘there.’” This boundlessness can present other difficulties. 
People with dementia often become dizzy and disoriented. This may ren-
der some comfortable places awful and some strange places attractive. For 
the person with dementia, the world is filled with objects that appear as 
recalcitrant: the sock resists conformity with the foot, and the bracelet 
stubbornly refuses to fit over her hand. There are situations in which she 
is caught up in bodily intention, usually situations that call for dexterous 
H. van der Meide
271
action. The researchers give the example of a person whose arms are held 
out for dancing and to which the person with dementia immediately 
responds.
Example 2: MS and Lived Space
The philosopher Kay Toombs (2001b), who suffers from multiple sclero-
sis (MS) herself, describes how, for her, body physical space is oriented 
space. Points in space do not represent merely objective positions, but 
rather they mark the varying range of her aims and gestures. The narrow 
passageway in which she has to move with her wheelchair represents a 
“restrictive potentiality” for her body requiring a modification of her 
actions. The dimensions of high and low also vary according to the posi-
tion of her body. From her wheelchair, the top three shelves in the gro-
cery store are too high to reach. To be a body is therefore to be tied to a 
certain world. Lived space thus concerns the encounter with an environ-
ing world: a world of places, things and situations that have meaning for 
living and consequently for health.
Linda Finlay describes the lifeworld of a woman in an attempt to elu-
cidate the existential impact of early stage MS (Finlay 2003). She shows 
how the unity between her body and self can no longer be taken for 
granted. With her arm desensitized and spatially dislocated, she has to 
learn how to carry out everyday living tasks in new and unfamiliar ways. 
She must look at her arm in order to see what “it” is doing. This provokes 
a sense of bodily alienation. Also, she tries to keep her illness hidden from 
others; this part of her identity needs to be a secret and only emerges 
within her personal space when she is alone in bed at night.
Example 3: Lived Space in the Hospital
In my PhD study, I shadowed older patients during their stay in the hos-
pital. Shadowing is an observational method in which the researcher 
observes an individual during a relatively long time. Central aspects of 
the method are the focus on meaning expressed by the whole body, and 
an extended stay of the researcher in the phenomenal event itself (van der 
Meide et al. 2013). I have described the essential structure of their experi-
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ences of hospitalization as “feeling an outsider left in uncertainty” (van 
der Meide et al. 2015). The use of the term “outsider” describes the feel-
ing of “not fitting in” and “not belonging to.” The hospital environment 
plays a constitutive role in this experience and appears as an inhospitable 
place. The opposite, a hospitable place, is a place where a person feels 
comfortable, involved in his or her own way and recognized as a person 
for whom the situation carries meaning.
Although the older patients experience the hospital as safe in certain 
respects, they do not feel at ease. The proximity of hospital staff provides 
reassurance that the physical state is being monitored and that help is at 
hand in case something goes wrong. However, the sense of safety seems 
strictly limited to their body in a physical sense. The observations show 
that hospital staff typically enter the room for a specific purpose: for 
example, to draw back the curtains in the morning, to take a blood pres-
sure measurement or to shower the patient. Most of the conversations 
between care professionals and the older patient are functionally oriented. 
I witnessed many moments of self-talk in which the older patients were 
struggling aloud with their wishes and carefully evaluating them. Having 
the impression that care professionals are busy (“they continuously walk 
back and forth”) seems to make the older patients reluctant to express 
their needs. They don’t want to be a burden for the nurse. Diffidence 
about using the hospital button is an example of this ambiguous safety. 
On the one hand, the older patients know it can be used when nobody is 
around and help is needed, and on the other hand, they are uncertain 
about what they should use the bell for. Despite being constantly sur-
rounded by many care professionals, the older patients feel alone when it 
comes to figuring out how to deal with the situation and much of their 
concerns and uncertainties remain unexpressed, although they would 
prefer it otherwise.
 Consideration
What the foregoing shows is that space is not merely experienced from 
within, but that it has a profound impact on practices in the hospital and 
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daily life by determining actions and behaviours. That is due to a number 
of features of space. Firstly, space shapes and alters identities. The meaning 
of MS is partly constituted by the space in which a person with MS 
moves. Also, space may include and exclude. Some people may feel com-
fortable and at ease in a given space, while others feel lost and alienated. 
This is eloquently described in the first example of the person with 
Alzheimer. Finally, space creates possibilities and imposes restrictions. Literal 
space configures possibilities for movement and action, as we have seen in 
the example of Toombs. If one is impaired and wheelchair bound, only 
surfaces that are accessible are conducive to this conveyance. The experi-
ences of the older patients show that lived space is also related to auton-
omy and that it has relational meanings. The hospital appears as a closed 
space for older patients, rather than an open space that invites activity 
and involvement. The patients’ worlds are thus not only objectively 
smaller as they are confined to the hospital bed or a chair but also subjec-
tively contracted.
 Space as an Active and Social Process
 Care as a Practice
Care ethics has stressed the centrality of caring for human life as a prac-
tice. Within care ethics, care is not seen as an isolated act or a set of 
actions that just occurs between the patient and the healthcare profes-
sional. Indeed, care is not given in a societal vacuum. Society as such and 
politics in particular bring intentions and expectations to the matter of 
care giving, its institutions and its funding (Vosman and Baart, 2011). 
Since caring always involves power, it is political at every level (Tronto 
2010). All kinds of other institutional incentives, such as market- 
orientation, accountability, cost-reduction and technologization, play an 
increasing role in the hospital, and consequently have implications for the 
healthcare professional-patient relationship (Vosman and Baart 2008).
As sociologist Andrew Sayer has noted, the dominant logic of systemic 
rationality changes the basis of our institutions. “Many of us are all too 
familiar with the rise of audits and the imposition of standardized proce-
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dures on activities which seem to defy standardization. Supposedly, these 
provide rational systems for organizing and assessing the performance of 
individuals and institutions” (Sayer 2011). Consequently, care can be 
understood as a practice that takes place in a complicated interplay of 
people, actions, artefacts (taken for granted) modes of knowledge and 
organizational structures (beyond the hospital as institution). A practice 
perspective implies that an issue can only be solved to some extent if one 
takes a sufficiently large perspective (a cut-out) and simultaneously 
addresses the question at different levels (Baart and Vosman 2015). The 
cultural anthropologists Gibson and Olarte Sierra show that hospital 
beds can be understood as spaces that are constituted through meaning 
and practice as political, socio-economical, cultural and social. The hos-
pital bed might appear as an administrative space, a space of discipline 
and medical surveillance, but also of self-surveillance (Gibson and Olarte 
Sierra 2006).
Empirical studies performed from a lifeworld approach are predomi-
nantly focusing on the patient perspective. They state that descriptions 
offered by a lifeworld perspective revealing the experiences of those in 
need of care can make a difference to the deepening of emphatic under-
standing in readers and practitioners (Galvin and Todres 2013). The life-
world perspective approaches care as an interaction between two people: 
the patient and the healthcare professional. The conceptualization of 
lifeworld-led healthcare includes an articulation of three dimensions: a 
philosophy of the person, a view of well-being and not just illness and a 
philosophy of care that is consistent with this. What is missing is a con-
textual and political dimension. Karin Dahlberg has emphasized that 
phenomenology is not studying the individual, but is studying how a 
particular phenomenon manifests and appears in the lifeworld, and this 
always already includes the social world (Dahlberg 2006). However, 
many phenomenological researchers tend to isolate the phenomenon 
under study from the context it is lived in by focusing too narrowly on 
individual experiences. This applies in particular to psychologically ori-
ented phenomenological research. The social and political context usually 
plays an important role at the beginning of the research, in providing a 
rationale for conducting the study, and at the end, when the results are 
reflected upon. But throughout the whole research process, such as when 
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choosing a particular method, while collecting the data and in the analy-
sis, the context often receives little attention, as the focus remains on the 
individual experience.
 Space as a Social Product
Henri Lefebvre (1901–1991) was a French philosopher and sociologist 
engaged with existential ideas (Elden 2004). In his prolific career, Lefebvre 
wrote more than 60 books and 300 articles covering a wide range of top-
ics. In his work, Lefebvre shows an interest in the dialectic and he tends 
to work with three terms rather than the dualism of the two. He con-
ceives the three as affecting each other simultaneously, without prioritiz-
ing one term over another. Instead of searching for a transcendence, a 
synthesis or a negation, he studies the continual movement between 
them. Lefebvre has written about space in The Production of Space 
(1974/1991). In this book, he argues that space is a social product, or a 
complex social construct (based on values and the social production of 
meanings), that affects spatial practices and perceptions. “(Social) space is 
a (social) product [...]; the space thus produced also serves as a tool of 
thought and of action [...] In addition to being a means of production it 
is also a means of control, and hence of domination, of power.”
Although his work is complex and not about care practices, some of 
his insights might be helpful to better understand the meaning of space 
for humanizing healthcare. Lefebvre criticizes the binary notion of objec-
tive and lived space for still starting from the subjectivity of the ego. 
Lefebvre aims to a materialist version of phenomenology in which the 
epistemological perspective shifts from the subject that thinks, acts and 
experiences to the process of social production of thought, action and 
experience. According to him, space is fundamentally bound up with 
social reality. Space does not exist “in itself ”; it is produced. Lefebvre 
proceeds from a relational concept of space and views space as a social 
product. This calls for an analysis that would include the social constella-
tions, power relations and conflicts relevant in each situation. This would 
also imply the shift of the research perspective from space to processes of 
its production; the embrace of the multiplicity of spaces that are socially 
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produced and made productive in social practices; and the focus on the 
contradictory, conflictual and, ultimately, political character of the pro-
cesses of production of space.
How is (social) space then produced? Key to Lefebvre’s theory is the 
view that the production of space can be divided into three dialectically 
interconnected dimensions: the perceived (perçu), the conceived (conçu) 
and the lived (vécu). All three concepts denote active and at once indi-
vidual and social processes.
Human beings do not stand before, or amidst, social space; they do not 
relate to the space of society as they might to a picture, a show, or a mirror. 
They know that they have a space and that they are in this space. They do 
not merely enjoy a vision, a contemplation, a spectacle – for they act and 
situate themselves in space as active participants. (Lefebvre 1991, p. 294)
The first dimension is the perceived. Evidently, perception depends 
upon the subject: a patient does not experience the hospital in the same 
way as a medical doctor. Nevertheless, Lefebvre’s attitude towards the 
phenomenological version of perception is quite sceptical. Therefore, he 
combines it with the concept of spatial practice in order to show that 
perception not only takes place in the mind, but that it is based on a 
concrete, produced materiality. The complex spatial organization of prac-
tices shapes perceived spaces in, for example, households, neighbour-
hoods and in hospitals. This is the physical dimension of space. Second, 
space cannot be perceived as such without having been conceived in 
thought previously. It refers to our knowledge of a certain space that is 
primarily produced by discourses of power and ideology constructed by 
professionals, researchers, policymakers etc. Space presumes an act of 
thought that is linked to the production of knowledge. This is the mental 
dimension of space. The dimension of lived space denotes the world as it 
is experienced by human beings in the practice of their everyday life. On 
this point, Lefebvre is unequivocal: the lived, practical experience cannot 
itself be exhausted through theoretical analysis. There always remains a 
surplus, a remainder.
Lefebvre’s theory of the production of space identifies three moments 
of production: first, material production; second, the production of 
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knowledge; and third, the production of meaning. Space is to be under-
stood in an active sense as an intricate web of relationships that is con-
tinuously produced and reproduced. When we approach space as 
something that is produced, rather than just something that is experi-
enced by individuals, the object of the analysis should consequently be 
the active process of production.
 Conclusion
What can be gained from such a three-dimensional perspective of space 
when studying the (de)humanization of hospital care? The Norwegian 
philosopher Kari Martinsen (2006) has described the hospital as a public 
house that expresses a common order. This order expresses in its turn that 
which has been valued in society. She speaks about the battle for the 
spaces and the tension between the rooms of the hospital as spaces in 
which to dwell and spaces in which to be disciplined. Dwelling refers to 
the feeling of belonging and being safe, and it concerns a shared space, 
while a disciplined space refers to a means of control and domination. In 
this context, she distinguishes two ways of seeing by the healthcare pro-
fessional, which she calls the perceiving eye and the recording eye. 
Perceiving should be seen as a participating way of looking at the other 
and allows the other, who is often not known, to emerge. Perception is a 
fundamental openness towards the other, and it is the patient who has the 
initiative to show what is of importance. In perceiving, there is a unity 
between the one who perceives and that which is perceived, and it puts 
the healthcare professional and the patient in a common world. It thus 
goes deeper than having good communication skills and requires an open 
attitude on the part of the healthcare professional. Indeed, a good health-
care professional should not only hear what is explicitly asked for but 
should be sensitive to implicit appeals (Vosman and Baart 2011).
The second way of seeing Martinsen describes is recording. While per-
ceiving occurs within a relation, recording takes place from an outside 
position. The “eye” of the healthcare professional is then busy with look-
ing for and abstracting common characteristics to organize under an 
already defined concept of classification. It abstracts from the concrete 
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context. The origin of the verb “to diagnose” refers to this analytical scru-
tiny that abstracts from all the details that might obscure a clear view (van 
Heijst 2011). Diagnosis means looking through something instead of 
looking at someone. This leads to a specific understanding of the situa-
tion. Evidently, many diagnostic tools and screening instruments have 
greatly contributed to the progress that medicine has achieved since the 
seventeenth century. However, we should not ignore some of the conse-
quences of this view, of which one is the nature of space that is produced 
by such an approach. Over-emphasis on diagnostics and guidelines guides 
the physical and the mental dimension of space in a certain direction, 
following the dominant ideology of society and politics. Also, the logic of 
the market, for example, requires that doctors do not spend any time 
with the patient that is not being paid for.
An increased interest in the dimension of space in care can be observed. 
The dominant objective of contemporary hospital architecture is to cre-
ate a “pleasant and sustaining environment.” Hospitals do everything 
possible to resemble a hospital as little as possible. One may notice this 
already when one enters the hospital. Although the hospital has always 
been a public space, this has acquired another connotation in recent 
years. The ground floor of hospitals increasingly looks like an extension 
of the city centre, with interior streets and commercial facilities, ATMs, 
bars and hairdressers. This has been called the “malling” of the hospital 
(Fiset 2006). Healing architecture draws upon research that shows that 
environmental elements such as natural light, a view of nature, less noise 
and subdued colours produce positive patient outcomes and reduce 
stress. Single-patient rooms not only create a quieter hospital stay and 
increase privacy but also reduce patient transfers and the risk of infection. 
A family zone where family members may stay overnight helps patients 
feel less alone. A quieter environment may also help staff perform their 
duties with fewer medical errors. In order to determine whether these 
developments are good examples of humanized care, a thorough analysis 
is needed. The three-dimensional perspective of space, as described in this 
paper, may provide a guide for such an analysis and can illuminate care as 
a practice that is always social and political, but at the same time lived out 
in the lifeworld. It offers a lens to look at, reflect on and enhance care 
practices. Also, studying the dynamic interplay between the dimensions 
enables a better understanding of spatial vulnerability.
H. van der Meide
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Care is an important part of daily healthcare practices and the self- 
understanding of those working in the healthcare sector. At the same 
time, the notion of care carries an extraordinary range of distinctive 
meanings, as the preceding chapters have made clear. Indeed, defini-
tions of care and its associated practices have often been so broad that 
284 
care may be found everywhere and in everything, including at times 
in the most unexpected places. Alternately, definitions have also been 
so narrow that one finds it hard to go beyond a limited set of ques-
tions, remaining instead within the confines of a single discipline. 
Although this makes it difficult to come up with a precise definition 
of care, it does not imply that it is impossible to describe care in words 
at all.
The philosophical and ethical accounts in part one of this book agree 
that the dyadic relation between a person in need and a person who pro-
vides help is one of the core elements of care. For example, in her contri-
bution, Krause demonstrates how the account of interpersonal relationality 
supplied by the philosopher and phenomenologist Emmanuel Levinas 
can be useful for discussions of care in healthcare ethics. Levinas claims 
that any encounter with another person inherently involves having to 
assume responsibilities for this other person. In the same vein, by drawing 
on the conceptual resources of phenomenology, Freter lays bare basic 
structures of the encounter of one person with another in his analysis of 
the biblical story of the Good Samaritan. The hermeneutic tradition 
often stresses that the way in which humans epistemically and physically 
relate to one another is reciprocal and invokes relational dependencies, 
with the writings of Paul Ricoeur serving as a prime example of this. In 
his analysis, Boldt describes and interprets these relational dependencies 
within Ricoeur’s concept of the self. In his chapter, Maio shows how 
Ricoeur’s approach is closely connected to the detailed understandings of 
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care that Joan Tronto develops in her political theory of care. Finally, in 
her reconstruction of historical precursors to today’s thinking in care eth-
ics, Conradi unveils the significant contributions of reflections about care 
made by Jewish women who were part of the social care and social reform 
movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. As Conradi 
argues, these often overlooked reflections are closely connected, for exam-
ple, to the theory of the I-You- relation as devised by the Jewish philoso-
pher and theologian Martin Buber.
Even if one assumes that it is possible to point to core elements of care, 
as the chapters in part one of the book attempt to do, these descriptions 
alone cannot supply simple solutions to the challenges that are rooted in 
the ambivalences and tensions of the notion of care in healthcare. 
Sociologists and anthropologists, among others, have long been inter-
ested in showing how extensive, situated, and complex care can be. The 
chapters in part two of this book address questions that arise in these 
disciplines, as well as in disciplines such as nursing sciences and law, 
including: If there is a situation in which a caregiver reacts to another 
person’s needs and provides help, can the care practices include coercion? 
And if so, when and where is this the case? Is care compatible with exclu-
sion? Can it be passive or invisible? Can it be incorporated into stan-
dardised and regulated routines? Can the care vocabulary be adapted to 
medical terminology?
Looking back at all of the chapters in this book, the following key 
ambivalences and tensions of care in healthcare emerge:
 Caring, Influencing, and Coercing
Caring for another person necessarily implies influencing the other per-
son’s abilities or their desires. For example, someone who receives help 
may be able to do what they could not do before. He or she might be in 
a better mood, experience gratitude, or feel burdened by social expecta-
tions to repay the help that was received. When the caregiver and care 
receiver discuss rehabilitative or therapeutic options, they imagine and 
perhaps adjust what they want for themselves and for one another 
accordingly.
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Sometimes the actions that a caregiver considers to be in the overall 
interest of the care receiver might not coincide with the initial will of the 
person receiving care. Nobody doubts that a nurse who supports the daily 
activities of someone who is temporarily or permanently disabled is pro-
viding care. Care is self-evident here. It is the nurse’s job. But what if the 
nurse tricks a patient who does not want to get up into getting up any-
way? Although providing care in this case may appear paternalistic, can it 
still be a response to a need? As Driessen’s chapter exemplifies, in these 
cases, caregiving may include attempts to influence a patient’s wishes, to 
encourage him or her not only to stop resisting what the caregiver per-
ceives to be good care, but to actually want it. The line that separates 
these practices from practices involving unjustified manipulation or even 
coercion is a fine one. Indeed, Driessen contends that with regard to 
dementia, good care involves attempting to avoid coercion, even if such 
attempts sometimes fail.
Writing about the psychiatric emergency ward, Opgenhaffen argues 
that is not always self-evident that coercion never can be part of good 
care. In search of an ethical foundation for handling coercion, he main-
tains that in extreme cases, coercion which aims at restoring autonomy 
might, in fact, be conducted in a caring way. Although from a care per-
spective manipulation and coercion must, prima facie, be avoided, since 
they harm another person both physically and psychologically, even these 
actions may be justifiable from the point of view of care if there is imme-
diate danger to the life and health of others or of the person concerned. 
As Opgenhaffen points out, clearly identifying and defining such circum-
stances, and maintaining a caring attitude that places the needs of the 
person in question before safety concerns, may help to minimise the 
dehumanising aspects of coercion.
Drawing the line between justifiably influencing the will of a care 
receiver in order to maintain what one regards to be the person’s overall 
well-being on the one hand, and manipulation and coercion on the other 
hand, is tantamount to making a distinction between the kinds of rela-
tionality that are constitutive of, or at least compatible with, human 
autonomy and the kinds of relationality that impede autonomy. As Boldt 
argues, autonomy is based on social conditions and comprises elements 
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of social dependencies. It is therefore a mistake to place valuing  autonomy 
in opposition to valuing care. If one is concerned about the autonomy of 
oneself and others, one ought to be concerned as well about the well-
being of oneself and others, and the care provided to oneself and others. 
Still, it is impossible to define this approach in abstract terms. Instead 
continuous everyday reflective and practical efforts are needed when pro-
viding care in healthcare settings.
 Care, Inclusion, and Exclusion
At first glance, care practices seem to be prime examples of inclusive 
activities. When caring for another person, one turns to another person, 
appreciates their needs and interests, and acts in an attempt to improve 
their situation. Such acts ideally enable care receivers to keep up their 
daily lives and thus to maintain or return to their positions as members 
of all those social groups to which they belong.
Nonetheless, care may also contribute to social exclusion. As the 
dementia village described by Haeusermann exemplifies, care receivers 
may feel happy in surroundings that in effect exclude them from their 
own neighbourhoods and social groups. Haeusermann points out that 
while the dementia village aims to give its inhabitants the impression of 
an inclusive, “normal” village life, this village is also surrounded by a 
fence.
Is it appropriate to isolate certain vulnerable groups from the major-
ity at a societal level? When approaching this question, it soon becomes 
clear that a one-dimensional conception of social exclusion does not 
lead to fruitful results. Rather, we need to consider the multiple levels 
at which exclusion and inclusion are realised simultaneously. People 
with dementia can be included by virtue of a state’s provision of afford-
able medical care. At the same time, they can be excluded from their 
local community or family through a gated institution. Meanwhile, the 
elderly can remain included in their social network by living with their 
families or within community care projects, but be denied appropriate 
medical care offered by the state. Future analyses of care and care prac-
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tices need to take a close look at exclusion that stems from caring, its 
relation to the individual will, and its effects on individual well-being 
and on societal cohesion.
 Care, Passivity, and Invisibility
Is what we call care always visible? Sometimes it is visible in what is done. 
In those cases passivity may appear to indicate a neglect of care. However, 
upon closer inspection, passivity can be a very important part of care as 
well. The most obvious example is listening to and observing what a 
patient says or expresses nonverbally. Care always involves phases of pas-
sivity in which one gets to know the other person and his or her prefer-
ences and needs. What is more, in some cases, passively being with, 
observing, and not intervening can be considered an integral part of 
actively caring, as Skeide demonstrates in her contribution on midwifes 
who accompany labouring women. Here, being with can be understood 
as a caring intervention.
In other cases, it might be helpful if care receivers are not aware of the 
caregiver’s presence. Care in these cases is supplied by making itself invis-
ible. The policy in the dementia care village described by Haeusermann 
prescribed that care workers work without uniforms. In the dementia 
village, what is allowed to be visible is the “normal”, common structure 
of typical everyday life in the German countryside (or at least the stereo-
typical, utopian conception of it). Meant to support the inhabitants’ 
well-being, this nonetheless resulted in uneasiness among some care 
workers, who felt the policy nullified their educational efforts. Moreover, 
for the residents and their family members, the absence of a clear care 
authority could lead to situations in which they do not know who to turn 
to.
In general terms, although care might at times appear to be invisible or 
passive, only the person who is seeking care can determine whether such 
invisible or passive care constitutes neglect or reassurance. The ambiva-
lence between caring actively and passively, visibly and invisibly, thus 
requires a cautious approach in any analysis of instances in which care is 
provided.
J. Boldt et al.
289
 Care, Regulation, Standardisation, 
and Fragmentation
Care in healthcare is a professional activity that takes place in a context of 
regulation and standardisation. This helps to safeguard, among other 
things, patient rights, a just distribution of care provisions, and the long- 
term economic stability of the healthcare system. Nonetheless, regulation 
can interfere with the provision of optimal care in individual cases. 
Moreover, following regulations without understanding their relation to 
the value of care can lead to attitudes and actions that neglect this value. 
As mentioned above with regard to coercion in psychiatry, Opgenhaffen 
contends that if coercion is understood as a borderline case of care in 
which one still needs to take into account the well-being of the patient, 
this can help to minimise the dehumanising aspects of coercive 
measures.
What is more, given the importance of the individual and personal 
aspects of giving and receiving care, it will always be necessary to balance 
abstract regulation on the one hand and individual context-sensitive 
decisions on the other hand. This is to say that regulating care in health-
care settings must always leave room for responsible, individual decisions 
by the caregiver.
Standardised care practices often go hand in hand with fragmented 
distributions of responsibility and authority. As Liu shows with respect to 
ambulant diabetes care, nurses are responsible for the daily care and well- 
being of their patients in many respects. At the same time, their authority 
to administer therapies is limited, and patients accordingly do not regard 
nursing staff recommendations as authoritative expert statements on par 
with the statements of physicians.
Finally, standardisation does not only have an effect on the relation of 
caregiver to care receiver. As van der Meide argues, it also concerns the 
spaces in which care is provided. Although rooms and routines in the 
hospital are needed to facilitate efficient care procedures, standardised 
spaces may also compromise the well-being and healing processes of 
patients.
 Conclusion: Asking the Right Questions 
290 
 Care, Language, and Ambiguity
Communication in healthcare is dominated by medical terminology, 
which aims to precisely define and refer to diseases, therapies, and physi-
ological facts. This terminology and its aims are an indispensable part of 
statistical surveys, economic classifications as well as efficient and error- 
free expert communication. In contrast, the language that is used to 
denote practices of care and the language that is used in providing care 
can appear to lack this kind of precision.
Since care practices are part of an institutional setting that involves 
experts, distribution of labour, and expert exchanges, some would argue 
that a lack of precision represents a disadvantage. In this context, they 
would surmise that care language needs to strive for accuracy just as medi-
cal terminology does. At the same time, however, the language of care that 
is used in care practices is necessarily close to everyday language since it has 
to do with everyday activities that are not confined to the healthcare set-
ting. Moreover, it involves the experiences and perceptions of patients as 
described in their own words. The way patients express their experiences 
can vary according to their prior life experiences, their convictions, and 
their knowledge. The vocabulary they use may be part of a larger narrative, 
rather than comprising single terms that refer to clearly delineable states of 
affairs. As the relevant discourses show, the value of narrative self-identity, 
embodied knowledge, and patient knowledge should not be neglected.
While this ultimately may be an unresolvable tension, Kohlen high-
lights the fact that in today’s healthcare settings, striving for accuracy 
prevails over the acceptance of ambiguity. Given the focus on economic 
measures, core elements of care that are subject to ambiguity are often 
regarded as irrelevant. The voices of caregivers are thus underrepresented 
in todays’ healthcare institutions, as Kohlen demonstrates in the case of 
hospital ethics committees.
 Concluding Remarks
Identifying and describing the tensions and ambivalences of care, as this 
book has done, is not tantamount to resolving these issues. Indeed, as has 
been argued, many of the tensions described may be inevitable and unre-
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solvable both in theory and in practice. Anyone working in and thinking 
about today’s healthcare settings will always be challenged in their self- 
understanding and daily practices to find ways to adequately deal with 
these tensions. However, asking the right questions may open doors to 
more attuned understandings of the complexities and challenges of care. 
To pose these questions and deal with these challenges, then, is a form of 
caring about care. This is what this book aimed to do.
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